Skadal v. Smith

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedMay 7, 2024
Docket6:24-cv-00060
StatusUnknown

This text of Skadal v. Smith (Skadal v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Skadal v. Smith, (E.D. Okla. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA AARON SKADAL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. CIV 24-060-RAW-JAR ) McINTOSH COUNTY, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff is a pro se state prisoner who is incarcerated at the McIntosh County Jail in Eufaula, Oklahoma. He filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking monetary and injunctive relief for alleged constitutional violations at his facility. (Dkt. 1). The defendants are McIntosh County; Kevin Ledbetter, McIntosh County Sheriff; Monica Smith, Jail Administrator; and Mary Martin, Assistant Jail Administrator. After review of the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff must file an amended civil rights complaint on the Court’s form, as set forth below. I. Screening/Dismissal Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The pleading standard for all civil actions was articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint also must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555-56. “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558. The Court applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that § 1915A dismissals are reviewed under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard for stating a claim for relief). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). II. Plaintiff’s Claims A. Access to the Courts Plaintiff alleges in Claim One of the complaint that from Jan 20, 2024, to February 5, 2024, Defendants Monica Smith and Mary Martin denied him law library access and access to the courts “in the form of paper documents for filing writs and appeals.” (Dkt. 1 at 5). To have standing to 2 raise a claim of denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must demonstrate actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). “To do so, he must show that any denial or delay of access to the court prejudiced him in pursuing litigation.” Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1996). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the alleged denial of access to a law library or forms caused him an actual injury. Therefore, this claim is dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff’s properly presenting the claim in an amended complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. B. Sentence Revocation In Claim Two of the complaint, Plaintiff complains that he has “suffered an unlawful revocation at the hands of McIntosh Co. Judicial System,” having been revecataed [sic] in full for a technical [violation] when the statutes clearly state 6 months is the max they can revoke for a technical [violation].” He asks that this “unlawful” revocation be overturned. (Dkt. 1 at 5-6). Plaintiff cannot receive injunctive relief for his revocation in this federal civil rights action. Instead, he can file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, after he has exhausted his state court remedies. To the extent he asks for compensatory damages for his alleged unconstitutional revocation, he first must prove his “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Gallagher v. Shelton
587 F.3d 1063 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Archuleta v. McShan
897 F.2d 495 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Bryson v. City of Edmond
905 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Gilles v. United States
906 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Miller v. Glanz
948 F.2d 1562 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Skadal v. Smith, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/skadal-v-smith-oked-2024.