Six v. Henry

796 F. Supp. 1448, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9788, 1992 WL 150772
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedJune 22, 1992
DocketCiv-91-1879-A
StatusPublished

This text of 796 F. Supp. 1448 (Six v. Henry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Six v. Henry, 796 F. Supp. 1448, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9788, 1992 WL 150772 (W.D. Okla. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER

ALLEY, District Judge.

On 29 May 1992, this Court entered an Order denying plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the Continued Deposition of Defendant and finding that defendant’s Motion to Continue Deposition was moot. This Order is intended to amplify the Court’s view on the improper conduct of Mr. Charles Watts, who represents plaintiffs, during the deposition of defendant on 11 May 1992.

The nature of this case is that plaintiffs allege an impermissible separation from public employment in the state treasurer’s office due to their politics. The portions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 that are pertinent to this Order are as follows:

(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party____ It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: ... (Hi) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The Court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c) (emphasis added).

A number of courts have interpreted the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 in a general manner and as it applies to the facts of a particular case. No general rule of thumb can be devised for what subject matter will be considered “relevant” in discovery, because the boundaries of relevance are necessarily vague. See, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D. 348, 353 (S.D.N.Y.1973); United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289, 291 (E.D.Pa.1949).

Nevertheless, the scope of discovery, including limitations on depositions and the use of protective orders, is clearly within the discretion of the trial judge. See, Chemical & Indus. Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.1962); State of Maryland v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 213, 214 (D.Md.1940). Further, if protection of a party is necessary, it can be provided more effectively by the discretionary powers of the court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) than by a constrictive concept of relevance. See, Cox v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 38 F.R.D. 396, 398 (D.S.C.1965).

Despite the relatively permissive view of relevance by the courts, it is axiomatic that discovery should not be allowed of information that has no conceivable bearing on the case. See, In re Fontaine, 402 F.Supp. 1219, 1221 (E.D.N.Y.1975); In re Surety Ass’n of Am., 388 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir.1967). See also, 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2008 at 45-51 & § 2036 at 268.

*1450 As illustrated by the discussion above, the bounds of discovery, including depositions, may extend not only to admissible evidence, but also to evidence that is potentially relevant to the issues involved in the case. No principle of relevance or potential relevance, however, can justify the probes by Mr. Watts into the defendant’s personal life. In fact, the Court finds that Mr. Watts’ questioning was appalling. Questions that the Court finds objectionable are quoted below.

“Q. Ms. Henry, as you know, I’m Charles Watts. I represent the plaintiffs in this lawsuit. My intention today is to find out some about you and your personal background, kind of who you are and what your background is. And additionally, to find out what testimony you might be able to give that would be relevant to the allegations made in this lawsuit. (Henry Dep. at 4, 1.22-25 & 5, 1.1-3)
“Q. Were you married previous to Mr. Henry?
“A. I don’t think I want to answer any questions that pertain to my personal life if it doesn’t apply to this situation.
“Q. Well, as I explained to you at the outset, part of what we intend to do today is to find out about you personally. And if you—
“A. Public information, you’re welcome to. My personal life, you’re not welcome to.
“Q. My question is: Were you married previous to Mr. Henry?
“A. I do not care to discuss anything about my personal life.
“Q. Do you refuse to answer that question?
“A. I do. Absolutely;
“Q. I’ll state on the record what I intend to do, I don’t intend to call Judge Alley after each question that you refuse to answer, but I do intend to make a record on any questions that you refuse to answer, and I do intend to bring that up to the court. And if he should direct that those questions be answered, then we intend to also seek with that the cost of presenting that to the court.
“A. Well, I will remind you one more time, my personal family life has nothing to do with this and I am not going to get into it.
“Q. What was your previous husband’s name?
“A. I am not going to answer.
“Q. You refuse to answer that question?
“A. Absolutely.
“Q. Have you previously been divorced?
“A. I am not going to answer any of this line of questioning.
“Q. Do you have children?
“A. I’m not going to answer any more questions on my personal life.
“Q. What are the names and ages of your children?
“A. I am not going to answer.
“(Id. at 8, 1.4-25 & 9, 1.1-15)
“Q. Where did you live when you went to the University of Oklahoma?
“A. In Oklahoma City.
“Q.

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Related

In Re Fontaine
402 F. Supp. 1219 (E.D. New York, 1975)
State v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc.
1 F.R.D. 213 (D. Maryland, 1940)
United States v. Kohler Co.
9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1949)
Cox v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.
38 F.R.D. 396 (D. South Carolina, 1965)
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.
58 F.R.D. 348 (S.D. New York, 1973)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
796 F. Supp. 1448, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9788, 1992 WL 150772, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/six-v-henry-okwd-1992.