SISTI v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD CORPORATION

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 26, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-03052
StatusUnknown

This text of SISTI v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD CORPORATION (SISTI v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD CORPORATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SISTI v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD CORPORATION, (E.D. Pa. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA RONALD D. SISTI and HOLLY A. SISTI, as guardians of S.J., a Minor, Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-3052 v.

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD CORPORATION, NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, and AKIM JONES- WILLIAMS, Defendants. PAPPERT, J. October 26, 2023 MEMORANDUM Ronald and Holly Sisti, as guardians of S.J., sued Norfolk Southern Railroad Corporation, its subsidiary Norfolk Southern Railway Company (collectively “Norfolk Southern”) and Akim Jones-Williams following a collision that occurred at a railroad crossing. Norfolk Southern moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for transfer to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. The Court will not dismiss the Complaint but will transfer venue to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. I In July 2014, Jones-Williams was driving in York County, Pennsylvania with S.J, a two-year old at the time, in the back seat. (Compl. ¶ 16, ECF 1–1). Jones- Williams attempted to drive across a highway-rail grade crossing when his car was struck by a train owned and operated by Norfolk Southern. (Id. at ¶¶ 8,19, 25). Norfolk Southern also owns the rail tracks and right of way over the crossing. (Id. at ¶ 20).

On behalf of S.J., the Sistis sued Norfolk Southern and Jones-Williams in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, asserting various counts of negligence. See generally (Id. at ¶¶ 46–114). The Sistis allege the crash caused S.J. to suffer serious and permanent injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 105–114). Norfolk Southern timely removed to this Court on diversity grounds (Notice of Removal, ECF 1).

II A district court “may transfer the venue of any civil action for the convenience of parties and witnesses or in the interests of justice, to any other district where it might have been brought.” Weber v. Basic Comfort Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). The purpose of § 1404(a) is “to prevent the waste ‘of time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.’” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quoting Cont’l Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960)). District courts are vested with “broad discretion” when determining whether transfer is appropriate. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995).

“In ruling on a motion to transfer, the Court should consider ‘all relevant factors to determine whether on balance the litigation would more conveniently proceed and the interests of justice be better served by transfer to a different forum.’” Weber, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (quoting Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted)). The Court must first determine “whether venue would be proper in the transferee district.” Id. If this first prong is satisfied, “the court then should determine whether a transfer would be in the interests of justice.” Id. (citing Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879). The burden of establishing that transfer is appropriate rests with the moving party. See Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970).

Although the Norfolk Southern Defendants bear that burden here, they are “not required to show ‘truly compelling circumstances for . . . change . . . [of venue, but rather that] all relevant things considered, the case would be better off transferred to another district.’” Connors v. R & S Parts & Servs., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting In re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 388 (3d Cir. 2001)) (alterations in original).

III Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), “[a] civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” The accident occurred in York County, Pennsylvania, which is in the Middle District, so venue is proper there. For that same reason, the Middle District would also have personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316–17 (3d Cir. 2007) (the accident creates “certain minimum contacts with . . . [Pennsylvania] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”).

IV The Court must next consider whether a transfer would be in the interests of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Courts have not limited their consideration to the three enumerated factors in § 1404(a) (convenience of parties, convenience of witnesses, or interests of justice), and, indeed, commentators have called on the courts to ‘consider all relevant factors.’” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (quoting 15 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3847 (4th ed. 2013)). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals considers both public and private interests when deciding

whether transfer is appropriate. Id. The private interests to assess are: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s preference; (3) where the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; (5) the convenience of the witnesses to the extent they would be unavailable in a particular forum; and (6) the location of evidence to the extent it cannot be produced in a particular forum. Id. The public interests to consider are: (1) the enforceability of the judgment; (2)

practical considerations that would make trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (3) the congestion of the court’s docket; (4) the local forum’s interest in deciding the case; and (5) the trial judge’s familiarity with any applicable state law. Id. The Court must assess all of these factors to “determine whether on balance the litigation would more conveniently proceed and the interests of justice be better served by transfer to a different forum.” Id. (citing 15 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3847).

A In considering the relevant private interests, “[the plaintiff's] choice of forum is [generally] entitled to great weight and is not to be disturbed unless the balance of convenience strongly favors the defendant[’s] forum.” Blanning v. Tisch, 378 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (citing Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970)). But “plaintiff's choice of forum merits less deference when none of the conduct complained of occurred in plaintiff’s selected forum” or “when the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not the plaintiff’s residence.” Rowles v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585
364 U.S. 19 (Supreme Court, 1960)
Van Dusen v. Barrack
376 U.S. 612 (Supreme Court, 1964)
In Re: United States of America
273 F.3d 380 (Third Circuit, 2001)
O'CONNOR v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd.
496 F.3d 312 (Third Circuit, 2007)
Rowles v. Hammermill Paper Co., Inc.
689 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1988)
Blanning v. Tisch
378 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1974)
Weber v. Basic Comfort Inc.
155 F. Supp. 2d 283 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2001)
Connors v. R & S PARTS & SERVICES, INC.
248 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2003)
Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp.
431 F.2d 22 (Third Circuit, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
SISTI v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD CORPORATION, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sisti-v-norfolk-southern-railroad-corporation-paed-2023.