Siren Realty Corp. v. Biltmore Productions Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Siren Realty Corp. v. Biltmore Productions Corp.

27 A.D.2d 519, 275 N.Y.S.2d 188, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2941

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 6, 1966

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 27 A.D.2d 519 (Siren Realty Corp. v. Biltmore Productions Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Siren Realty Corp. v. Biltmore Productions Corp., 27 A.D.2d 519, 275 N.Y.S.2d 188, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2941 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, entered September 2, 1966, denying the motion of plaintiff-appellant for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, [520]*520with $50 costs and disbursements to plaintiff-appellant, and the motion is granted. Plaintiff mortgagee brought suit to foreclose a purchase-money first mortgage upon property owned by defendant mortgagor. Mortgagor admits that it has defaulted in payments of principal, interest and real estate taxes but claims that oral agreements between the parties bar this action. Allegedly, the mortgagee agreed not to foreclose the mortgage until such time as the property was condemned if the mortgagor was financially unable to meet the payments. The purported consideration for this promise was the mortgagor’s agreement to continue to use the property for the production of motion pictures, plays, and television shows. The affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion by the president of the corporate mortgagor is eonelusory and does little more than restate its pleadings. Triable issues of fact are not established merely by repeating the allegations of the pleadings (Pribyl v. Van Loan & Co., 261 App. Div. 503, 504, affd. 287 N. Y. 749). Beyond that, it is not clear when the parties entered into the oral agreements. The answer, however, suggests that they were contemporaneous to the execution of the mortgage and, as such, may not now be raised to vary the terms of the written agreement (see Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N. Y. 377, 381-382). Appeal from order entered on September 2, 1966, denying plaintiff’s motion to modify defendant’s demand for a bill of particulars, dismissed, as academic, without costs or disbursements. No opinion. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Stevens, Steuer, Capozzoli and Witmer, JJ.

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Order, entered September 2, 1966, denying the motion of plaintiff-appellant for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, [520]*520with $50 costs and disbursements to plaintiff-appellant, and the motion is granted. Plaintiff mortgagee brought suit to foreclose a purchase-money first mortgage upon property owned by defendant mortgagor. Mortgagor admits that it has defaulted in payments of principal, interest and real estate taxes but claims that oral agreements between the parties bar this action. Allegedly, the mortgagee agreed not to foreclose the mortgage until such time as the property was condemned if the mortgagor was financially unable to meet the payments. The purported consideration for this promise was the mortgagor’s agreement to continue to use the property for the production of motion pictures, plays, and television shows. The affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion by the president of the corporate mortgagor is eonelusory and does little more than restate its pleadings. Triable issues of fact are not established merely by repeating the allegations of the pleadings (Pribyl v. Van Loan & Co., 261 App. Div. 503, 504, affd. 287 N. Y. 749). Beyond that, it is not clear when the parties entered into the oral agreements. The answer, however, suggests that they were contemporaneous to the execution of the mortgage and, as such, may not now be raised to vary the terms of the written agreement (see Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N. Y. 377, 381-382). Appeal from order entered on September 2, 1966, denying plaintiff’s motion to modify defendant’s demand for a bill of particulars, dismissed, as academic, without costs or disbursements. No opinion. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Stevens, Steuer, Capozzoli and Witmer, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

27 A.D.2d 519, 275 N.Y.S.2d 188, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2941, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/siren-realty-corp-v-biltmore-productions-corp-nyappdiv-1966.

Opinion

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