Sipe v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 28, 2022
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00586
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8

9 CARY S., Plaintiff, CASE NO. C22-0586-MAT 10 v. 11 ORDER RE: SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DISABILITY APPEAL 12 Defendant. 13

14 Plaintiff appeals a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 15 (Commissioner) denying Plaintiff’s applications for disability benefits after a hearing before an 16 administrative law judge (ALJ). Having considered the ALJ’s decision, the administrative record 17 (AR), and all memoranda of record, this matter is AFFIRMED. 18 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 19 Plaintiff was born on XXXX, 1973.1 Plaintiff has a limited education and does not have 20 any past relevant work. AR 79. Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits 21 (DIB) on and an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on June 13, 2013, alleging 22 disability beginning January 1, 2007. AR 58. The applications were denied at the initial level and 23

1 Dates of birth must be redacted to the year. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(2) and LCR 5.2(a)(1). 1 on reconsideration. On September 22, 2015, the ALJ held a hearing and took testimony from 2 Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE). AR 94–142. On December 17, 2015, the ALJ issued a 3 decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. AR 247–56. Plaintiff timely appealed. The Appeals Council

4 vacated that decision on May 8, 2017, and remanded the matter for further administrative 5 proceedings. AR 265–70. 6 Plaintiff failed to appear at a hearing before the ALJ scheduled for May 17, 2018, and, on 7 May 25, 2018, the ALJ dismissed Plaintiff’s request for a hearing. AR 274–75. Plaintiff appealed 8 the dismissal. The Appeals Council vacated the order of dismissal on April 24, 2019, and remanded 9 the case for the ALJ to offer Plaintiff the opportunity for a hearing. AR 276–79. 10 On June 23, 2021, the ALJ held a telephone hearing and took testimony from Plaintiff and 11 a VE. AR 143–74. On August 9, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. 12 58–81. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff request for review on April 1, 2022, making the 13 ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1–6. Plaintiff appeals this final decision

14 of the Commissioner to this Court. 15 JURISDICTION 16 The Court has jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 This Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the decision is in 19 accordance with the law and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 20 whole. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993). “Substantial evidence” means more 21 than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 22 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 23 (9th Cir. 1989). If there is more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 1 decision, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th 2 Cir. 2002). 3 DISCUSSION

4 The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining 5 whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2000). 6 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 7 since the alleged onset date. AR 61. 8 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: bipolar 9 disorder; schizoaffective disorder; anxiety disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); and 10 polysubstance abuse disorders. AR 61. 11 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria 12 of a listed impairment. AR 62. 13 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to

14 perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional 15 limitations: 16 She can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and exercise simple workplace judgment. She can perform work that 17 is learned by on-the-job training, which may last beyond a short demonstration up to and including one month. She can respond 18 appropriately to supervision and can have occasional interaction with coworkers but should not be required to work in close 19 coordination with coworkers or in a teamwork setting. She can deal with occasional changes in the work environment and can perform 20 work that requires no interaction with the general public to perform the work tasks. This does not preclude working in an environment 21 where the public is present.

22 AR 65. 23 At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retains the capacity to make an adjustment to work 1 that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. With the assistance of a VE, the ALJ 2 found Plaintiff capable of performing the requirements of representative occupations such as 3 industrial cleaner, hand packager, and laundry laborer. AR 80.

4 Plaintiff raises the following issue on appeal: Whether the ALJ legally erred by failing to 5 properly consider the medical opinion of Dr. John F. Robinson, Ph.D. Plaintiff requests remand 6 for further administrative proceedings. The Commissioner argues the ALJ’s decision has the 7 support of substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 8 1. Medical Opinion Evidence 9 The regulations applicable to Plaintiff’s case require the ALJ to weigh medical opinions 10 regardless of the source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Under these regulations, the ALJ 11 is required to give “controlling weight” to a treating physician’s opinion if it is “well-supported by 12 medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the 13 other substantial evidence in [claimant’s] case record.”2 Id. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).

14 More weight should be given to the opinion of a treating doctor than to a non-treating doctor, and 15 more weight should be given to the opinion of an examining doctor than to a non-examining 16 doctor. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Where not contradicted by another 17 doctor, a treating or examining doctor’s opinion may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” 18 reasons. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). Where contradicted, a treating or 19 examining doctor’s opinion may not be rejected without “‘specific and legitimate reasons’ 20 supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31 (quoting 21 22 2 In 2017, the Social Security Administration amended its regulations and removed the “controlling weight” requirement for all applications filed after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (2017). 23 Because Plaintiff’s claim was filed before March 27, 2017, the new rules are not applicable to Plaintiff’s case. 1 Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). With these regulations and considerations 2 in mind, the Court proceeds to its analysis of the medical evidence in this case. 3 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider the medical opinion of Dr. John F.

4 Robinson, Ph.D. On February 18, 2010, Dr. Robinson reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records 5 between January 2005 and September 2008. AR 1054, 1066. Dr. Robinson assessed Plaintiff with 6 marked limitation in Plaintiff ability to interact appropriately with the general public and assessed 7 moderate to no significant limitations in all other areas of mental activity. AR 1050–51. 8 Dr. Robinson opined that Plaintiff “would have difficulty working with others, and could not 9 manage direct public contact, but can muster basic polite interaction with a few familiar coworkers 10 in setting where only simple and superficial exchanges are required.” AR 1052. Dr. Robinson 11 further opined that Plaintiff “would do better in an environment with minimal change due to her 12 conditions.” AR 1052. 13 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring and failing to comment on Dr. Robinson’s

14 medical opinion. Dkt. 14, at 3. The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss 15 Dr. Robinson’s opinion but argues that this error was harmless because the doctor’s opinion was 16 consistent with the RFC and does not conflict with the jobs identified at step five. Dkt. 15, at 2. 17 An ALJ is required to “evaluate every medical opinion [they] receive.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 18 416.927(c). However, an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is “inconsequential to the 19 ultimate nondisability determination” Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 20 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 21 2010) (an ALJ does not need to provide reasons for rejecting a medical opinion that does not 22 identify any specific limitations or conflict with the RFC); Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 23 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ALJ is not required to discuss evidence that is neither 1 significant nor probative.”); Krampitz v. Saul, 853 Fed. Appx. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding 2 that the ALJ did not err by declining to discuss several medical opinions that neither identified ant 3 specific functional limitations nor conflicted with the RFC).

4 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s error was not harmless because the RFC fails to incorporate 5 Dr. Robinson’s opinion that Plaintiff can “muster basic polite interaction with a few familiar 6 coworkers in settings where only simple and superficial exchanges are required.”3 Dkt. 14 at 4–5; 7 AR 1052. Plaintiff argues that the RFC’s limitation for “occasional interaction with coworkers” is 8 inconsistent with Dr. Robinson’s opinion because the Social Security Regulations define 9 “occasional” as “occurring from very little up to one-third of the time.” Dkt. 14, at 4 (quoting 10 Social Security Rulings (SSR) 83-10, SSR 83-14, SSR 96-9p). “The ALJ is responsible for 11 translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. 12 Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). An RFC finding need not directly correspond to 13 a specific medical opinion but may incorporate the opinions by assessing RFC limitations “entirely

14 consistent” with, even if not identical to, limitations assessed by the physician. See Turner, 613 15 F.3d at 1223. Here, Dr. Robinson did not assess any specific durational limitations regarding 16 Plaintiff’s ability to interact with coworkers. The ALJ reasonably translated and incorporated the 17 doctor’s opinion in the RFC by limiting Plaintiff to only “occasional interaction” with coworkers 18 and to work that does not require close coordination with coworkers or teamwork. Because the 19 RFC is reasonably consistent with Dr. Robinson’s assessment that Plaintiff can “muster basic 20 polite interaction with a few familiar coworkers,” the ALJ’s failure to discuss the doctor’s assessed 21 limitations was harmless. 22

3 Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ’s failure to address Dr. Robinson’s assessment of moderate and marked 23 limitations in areas of mental activity is harmless because the ALJ’s RFC “roughly corresponds to the same limitations opined here by the doctor.” Dkt. 14, at 3–4. 1 Plaintiff argues in the Reply Brief that the RFC fails to accommodate Dr. Robinson’s 2 assessment that Plaintiff could only interact with “a few familiar coworkers in settings where only 3 simple and superficial exchanges are required.”4 Dkt. 20, at 4; AR 1052. In addition to limiting

4 Plaintiff to only “occasional interaction with coworkers,” the RFC provides that Plaintiff “should 5 not be required to work in close coordination with coworkers or in a teamwork setting.” AR 65. 6 These limitations are entirely consistent with Dr. Robinson’s limitations and adequately 7 incorporate the doctor’s observation that Plaintiff “would have difficulty working with others.” 8 See AR 1052; see also Turner, 613 F.3d at 1223. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that the RFC 9 is inconsistent with Dr. Robinson’s assessment. 10 Plaintiff next argues that the RFC fails to incorporate Dr. Robinson’s opinion that Plaintiff 11 “would do better in an environment with minimal change due to her conditions.” Dkt. 14, at 5; AR 12 1052. Plaintiff argues that the RFC’s limitation that Plaintiff “can deal with occasional changes in 13 the work environment” is inconsistent with Dr. Robinson’s opinion because “minimal” is defined

14 as “the least possible.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Minimal, Meriam-Webster.com Dictionary, 15 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minimal). Here, like above, Dr. Robinson did not 16 assess any specific limitations regarding the amount of workplace changes that Plaintiff can 17 handle. Although Dr. Robinson opined that Plaintiff “would do better in an environment with 18 minimal change,” the doctor did not assess that Plaintiff would be unable to work in an 19 environmental with more than minimal change. Similarly, Dr. Robinson’s notation that Plaintiff 20 “does not do well with change or stress and would require clear, orderly, predictable work setting” 21 4 Plaintiff further argues in the Reply Brief that the RFC fails to consider Dr. Robinson’s opinion that 22 Plaintiff’s ability to interact with coworkers would be “preluded by an exacerbation of her ‘underlying [psychological disorder] with [drug addiction and alcohol].’” Dkt. 20, at 4 (quoting AR 1052). However, a claimant is not entitled to disability benefits “if alcoholism or drug addiction would . . . be a contributing 23 factor material to the Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). 1 does not suggest any greater limitation than already provided in the RFC. See Carmickle v. Comm’r 2 of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (an ALJ may decline to adopt the opinion 3 of a physician “offered as a recommendation, not an imperative”) (emphasis in original)).

4 Therefore, the ALJ reasonably translated and incorporated the doctor’s limitations in the RFC by 5 limiting Plaintiff to only “occasional changes in the work environment.” See Turner, 613 F.3d at 6 1223. Because the RFC is reasonably consistent with Dr. Robinson’s opinion that Plaintiff “would 7 do better in an environment with minimal change,” the ALJ’s failure to discuss the doctor’s 8 assessed limitations was harmless. 9 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s error was further harmless because Dr. 10 Robinson’s opinion does not conflict with the jobs identified at step five. Dkt. 15, at 5–6. The ALJ 11 found at step five that Plaintiff would be capable of performing the requirements of industrial 12 cleaner, hand packager, and laundry laborer. AR 80. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) 13 describes all three jobs as “not significant” in dealing with people. See DOT 361.687-018 (laundry

14 laborer); DOT 381.687-018 (cleaner, industrial); DOT 920.587-018 (packager, hand). Indeed, 15 according to the DOT, none of the three jobs identified at step five require talking. Therefore, the 16 ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Robinson’s opinion was harmless for the additional reason that the 17 doctor’s opinion does not conflict with the jobs identified at step five. 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons set forth above, this matter is AFFIRMED. 20 DATED this 28th day of December, 2022.

21 A 22 MARY ALICE THEILER 23 United States Magistrate Judge