Siomkin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp.

174 F.2d 289, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 3455
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedApril 19, 1949
DocketNo. 194, Docket 21250
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 174 F.2d 289 (Siomkin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Siomkin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 174 F.2d 289, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 3455 (2d Cir. 1949).

Opinions

L. HAND, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, who represents employees of the defendant, appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in an action to recover damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. The only question is whether the employees were entitled to added overtime upon payments made to them during the years 1940-45, both inclusive, under an “Employee Participa[290]*290tion Plan,” which went into effect on January first, 1940, and a copy of which we annex in the margin.1 The plaintiff asserts that this bonus should be treated as an addition only to the regular “rate”, and that the employees were therefore entitled to an added fifty percent of that proportion of it which overtime bore to straight time and overtime combined. The defendant asserts that the bonus should be allocated propor[291]*291tionately to all the pay received — straight time and overtime — with the result that no added overtime is due.

On February 5, 1945, the Wages and Hoars Administrator issued an “Interpretative Bulletin,” of whose relevant part — “Category B” — we annex a copy.2 Its meaning is not altogether clear, and it is in any event— as it itself declares — only a declaration of the Administrator’s “en[292]*292forcement policy,” which '“does not and cannot affect the independent right of employees * , * * to ' recover wages that are due 'them.” As we bead it, it means that unless a bonus is paid at intervals of three months or less, the Administrator will not add any overtime at all, and that even when it is-paid at such intervals no overtime will be added, if the bonus is “based upon a percentage of his”- — the employee’s —“total earnings,” because in such cases it includes the payment of both straight time and overtime. The Administrator has not the power to issue regulations in the ordinary sense, and his “Bulletins” have not the force of law, though they- should be deemed to have the authority of. an administrative ■ interpretation.3 As res nova, we do not agree that no overtime should be added to a regularly paid bonus which is paid at longer intervals than three months. That may be a desirable limit for the.- Administrator to impose upon himself in enforcement cases because of the accounting ing difficulties.it avoids, but it is not a val-lid defence in actions by employees. On the other hand, we -accept the Bulletin as an administrative interpretation — -applying as well to bonuses payable at longer interyals than three months, as to those paid at other intervals — in so far as it declares that to a bonus “computed” ■ or “based” upon a “percentage” of “total earnings” overtime need not be added. This we do because, quite aside from any interpretative authority of the “Bulletin,” we should- independently so interpret § 7(a) of the Act. A bonus which varies in' proportion to “total earnings,” varies in proportion to the sum of the straight time payments and the overtime payments, and a percentage of an aggregate is ordinarily eom'püted upon every unit’ of the aggregate, unless some other purpose appears. It would be purely gratuitous to apply the percentage to “total earnings” over a period upon each dollar of straight time, but upon only sixty-seven cents of each dollar of overtime. Indeed, the plaintiff makes no such argument; -his position is that the percentage must be applied to “total earnings” made in the year in which the bonus is computed and paid. In this we .think that, he is in part right and in part wrong; but before -giving our reasons for this we must analyze in some detail how the “Plan” operates.

The bonus received in any year was made up as follows: The -company'subtracted from its earning's six percent of an amount which it estimated to be the capital contribution of its, shareholders; and then found the percentage which the remainder of its earnings bore to the capital so estimated. This percentage was used as the multiplier of a multiplicand, made up of one-half the sum of the employee’s total earnings over the last five years, including the year in question; and the product Was the bonus. Obviously it was made" up of five components, each computed by using the same multiplier upon one-half the employee’s earnings in each of the past four years and in the current year. (For simplicity we disregard those cases in which an employee had served less than five years; and we assume that the “Plan” dates from its “effective” date, January 1, 1940,-although it was only “announced” on April 10, 1940.) For reasons which will appear, it is somewhat easier to- begin with the year, 1944. The “Plan” had been in existence five years on December 31st of that year, so that each of the five multiplicands used in computing the bonus for that year was one-half the “total earnings” of a year during which the “Plan” had been in effect. It is hardly necessary to say that, if , to each of the five components of the bonus, computed on those multiplicands, no overtime should be added, none should be added to the whole bonus [293]*293paid in that year. However, during each of the years 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943 each employee knew that to his “total earnings” for that year would be added a bonus which he would receive in five installments — if he remained in service so long — one component paid in the year in which the earnings were made, and one paid in each of the succeeding four years. Had the five components been computed upon half the “total earnings” for 1940, and been paid in that year, the result would have been the product of a multiplicand of two and one-half times the “total earnings” for that year multiplied by the percentage fixed for that year. It is plain that at least to the first component — that paid in 1940 — no overtime should he added. Had the payment of the other four 'components been merely, deferred to four successive years — the percentage remaining the same — to each of them also no overtime would be added,, for overtime 'does not depend upon the date at which a bonus 'is paid. Thus, the only question is whether there is a valid distinction between the component paid in 1940 and the four components paid in future years because the multipliers' — -“percentages”—used varied in .every year. We think not. Whatever percentage was used to compute .a component of a bonus based upon the '“total earnings” of 1940, the product had ■for :its •multiplicand the same ,sum — one-'half ¡the amount of those earnings. There was mo ¡more reason to assume, when the component for 1940 of the bonus paid in 1944, for example, was computed by the use of The percentage fixed in 1944, that that percentage was not applied upon every dollar.of .the “total earnings” of 1940 — straight time ¡and overtime — than to assume that the percentage fixed in 1940 was not applied to every .dollar of the same earnings to determine the component for 1940 of the bonus paid in 1940. In each case, unless some reason existed .to the contrary, the percentage -should be .assumed to be applied ratably upon .every .dollar of the multiplicand. There was no reason to the contrary, and we hold that no overtime was payable upon the bonuses paid in 1944 and 1945, both of -which -.were .entirely made up of deferred payments ox .components computed upon '“total -earnings” made during years while the “Plan” was in operation.

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Bluebook (online)
174 F.2d 289, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 3455, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/siomkin-v-fairchild-camera-instrument-corp-ca2-1949.