24CA0861 Singh v ICAO 12-19-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0861 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado WC No. 5-101-459-010
Amritpal Singh,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado; MKBS, LLC, d/b/a/ Metro Taxi; and Pinnacol Assurance,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Tow and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 19, 2024
Amritpal Singh, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Harvey D. Flewelling, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents MKBS, LLC d/b/a/ Metro Taxi and Pinnacol Assurance ¶1 In this workers’ compensation action, claimant, Amritpal
Singh, seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals
Office (Panel) affirming the decision of an administrative law judge
(ALJ) denying his request to reopen his claim. We affirm the Panel’s
order.
I. Background
¶2 Because a division of this court already thoroughly reviewed
and set forth the history of this case in a prior opinion, Singh v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., slip op. at 1-14 (Colo. App. No.
21CA0933, June 30, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.
35(e)), we repeat only the facts and procedural history relevant to
Singh’s current appeal.
¶3 In March 2019, Singh was working as a taxi driver for MKBS
LLC, doing business as Metro Taxi (we refer to Metro Taxi and its
insurer, Pinnacol Assurance, together as “employer”), when he
suffered an admitted work injury in a car accident. After the
accident, an emergency room physician diagnosed him with neck
muscle strain but observed no other signs of serious injury. Singh
received treatment for his injury and temporary total disability
(TTD) benefits until June 25, 2019, when his authorized treating
1 physician (ATP) released him to return to work with no restrictions.
In October 2019, his ATP concluded that he had reached maximum
medical improvement (MMI).
¶4 Singh filed an application for hearing (AFH) on the issue of
continued TTD benefits. In November 2019, an ALJ entered an
order finding that once the ATP released Singh to full work duty, his
TTD benefits ceased under section 8-42-105(3)(c), C.R.S. 2024
(providing that TTD benefits continue until an ATP releases an
employee to return to regular employment). The ALJ therefore
denied and dismissed all TTD benefits after June 25, 2019. Singh
continued to receive both medical and psychiatric treatment for
several months, with his ATP reporting that Singh had “subjective
complaints that outweighed the objective findings.”
¶5 In March 2020, Singh underwent a division-sponsored
independent medical exam (DIME). Reviewing Singh’s medical
history, the DIME physician learned that Singh also had at least
four other car accidents reported in his medical records, including a
high-speed, head-on collision in 2007 for which Singh received
extensive treatment. The DIME physician observed that many of
the physical conditions Singh described after the 2019 injury were
2 pre-existing. But she concluded that his condition from the prior
accidents had resolved before the 2019 accident. Although the
DIME physician determined that Singh only suffered a neck strain
in the latest accident, she assigned him a 12% permanent physical
impairment rating in addition to a 5% mental impairment rating.
The employer applied for a hearing to challenge the DIME’s
impairment findings.
¶6 On December 8, 2020, an ALJ concluded that the employer
overcame the DIME opinion and that Singh sustained no physical
or medical permanent impairment from the 2019 accident. In June
2021, the Panel affirmed that order, and Singh appealed to this
court. A division of this court affirmed the Panel’s order in an
unpublished opinion on June 30, 2022. Singh then filed a petition
for writ of certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court, which was
denied.
¶7 On March 15, 2023, Singh filed an AFH to address multiple
issues including medical and TTD benefits, as well as impairment
and permanent disability. The employer moved to strike the
hearing because the issues were closed as a matter of law. On April
3 11, an ALJ issued an order eliminating all issues except
disfigurement and penalties.
¶8 A hearing was held on July 18, 2023. The ALJ determined
that Singh failed to identify any penalty or disfigurement. Singh did
not appeal that order, but filed another AFH reasserting the
previous issues and adding “petition to reopen” as an issue for
hearing. After a November 2023 hearing on the issue of reopening,
at which Singh testified, an ALJ determined that Singh failed to
prove an error, mistake, or change of condition that would warrant
reopening his claim. Therefore, the ALJ denied and dismissed
Singh’s petition to reopen. Singh appealed the order to the Panel,
which affirmed. Singh now appeals the Panel’s order.
II. Discussion
A. Issues on Appeal
¶9 In Singh’s opening brief, he expresses dissatisfaction with the
overall conclusion that he is not permanently disabled. He asserts
he is badly injured, both mentally and physically, and should
receive benefits for life. In its answer brief, employer describes the
sole issue on appeal as “whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s findings that Singh is not entitled to reopen his claim.” In
4 Singh’s lengthy reply brief, he attempts to explain his medical
history and disagreements with prior administrative and judicial
decisions addressing his various claims.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 10 As relevant here, we may only set aside the Panel’s order if
“the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence” or the
“denial of benefits is not supported by applicable law.” § 8-43-308,
C.R.S. 2024.
III. Analysis
¶ 11 At the outset, we note that many of the issues Singh asserts in
this appeal are duplicative of ones he made to the prior division that
entered the 2022 opinion. To the extent that division has already
rejected those arguments, we consider those issues to be the law of
the case. See Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 85M,
¶ 49 (“Once an issue has been raised and decided, it becomes the
law of the case.”).
¶ 12 For example, the prior division already concluded that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that the
DIME’s permanent impairment finding was overcome and that
Singh was not permanently disabled. The division also addressed
5 Singh’s contentions that he could not work, and held that his
allegations lacked record support and were belied by his medical
records. The division considered Singh’s argument that he was not
at MMI, determining that substantial record evidence established
that he reached MMI by October 2019. Because he was returned to
full work duty in June 2019, his TTD benefits ceased as of that date
by operation of statute. Finally, the division held that Singh was
not entitled to maintenance medical benefits because he had not
shown that any post-MMI treatment was reasonably necessary to
relieve him from the effects of the 2019 accident. We perceive no
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24CA0861 Singh v ICAO 12-19-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0861 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado WC No. 5-101-459-010
Amritpal Singh,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado; MKBS, LLC, d/b/a/ Metro Taxi; and Pinnacol Assurance,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Tow and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 19, 2024
Amritpal Singh, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Harvey D. Flewelling, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents MKBS, LLC d/b/a/ Metro Taxi and Pinnacol Assurance ¶1 In this workers’ compensation action, claimant, Amritpal
Singh, seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals
Office (Panel) affirming the decision of an administrative law judge
(ALJ) denying his request to reopen his claim. We affirm the Panel’s
order.
I. Background
¶2 Because a division of this court already thoroughly reviewed
and set forth the history of this case in a prior opinion, Singh v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., slip op. at 1-14 (Colo. App. No.
21CA0933, June 30, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.
35(e)), we repeat only the facts and procedural history relevant to
Singh’s current appeal.
¶3 In March 2019, Singh was working as a taxi driver for MKBS
LLC, doing business as Metro Taxi (we refer to Metro Taxi and its
insurer, Pinnacol Assurance, together as “employer”), when he
suffered an admitted work injury in a car accident. After the
accident, an emergency room physician diagnosed him with neck
muscle strain but observed no other signs of serious injury. Singh
received treatment for his injury and temporary total disability
(TTD) benefits until June 25, 2019, when his authorized treating
1 physician (ATP) released him to return to work with no restrictions.
In October 2019, his ATP concluded that he had reached maximum
medical improvement (MMI).
¶4 Singh filed an application for hearing (AFH) on the issue of
continued TTD benefits. In November 2019, an ALJ entered an
order finding that once the ATP released Singh to full work duty, his
TTD benefits ceased under section 8-42-105(3)(c), C.R.S. 2024
(providing that TTD benefits continue until an ATP releases an
employee to return to regular employment). The ALJ therefore
denied and dismissed all TTD benefits after June 25, 2019. Singh
continued to receive both medical and psychiatric treatment for
several months, with his ATP reporting that Singh had “subjective
complaints that outweighed the objective findings.”
¶5 In March 2020, Singh underwent a division-sponsored
independent medical exam (DIME). Reviewing Singh’s medical
history, the DIME physician learned that Singh also had at least
four other car accidents reported in his medical records, including a
high-speed, head-on collision in 2007 for which Singh received
extensive treatment. The DIME physician observed that many of
the physical conditions Singh described after the 2019 injury were
2 pre-existing. But she concluded that his condition from the prior
accidents had resolved before the 2019 accident. Although the
DIME physician determined that Singh only suffered a neck strain
in the latest accident, she assigned him a 12% permanent physical
impairment rating in addition to a 5% mental impairment rating.
The employer applied for a hearing to challenge the DIME’s
impairment findings.
¶6 On December 8, 2020, an ALJ concluded that the employer
overcame the DIME opinion and that Singh sustained no physical
or medical permanent impairment from the 2019 accident. In June
2021, the Panel affirmed that order, and Singh appealed to this
court. A division of this court affirmed the Panel’s order in an
unpublished opinion on June 30, 2022. Singh then filed a petition
for writ of certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court, which was
denied.
¶7 On March 15, 2023, Singh filed an AFH to address multiple
issues including medical and TTD benefits, as well as impairment
and permanent disability. The employer moved to strike the
hearing because the issues were closed as a matter of law. On April
3 11, an ALJ issued an order eliminating all issues except
disfigurement and penalties.
¶8 A hearing was held on July 18, 2023. The ALJ determined
that Singh failed to identify any penalty or disfigurement. Singh did
not appeal that order, but filed another AFH reasserting the
previous issues and adding “petition to reopen” as an issue for
hearing. After a November 2023 hearing on the issue of reopening,
at which Singh testified, an ALJ determined that Singh failed to
prove an error, mistake, or change of condition that would warrant
reopening his claim. Therefore, the ALJ denied and dismissed
Singh’s petition to reopen. Singh appealed the order to the Panel,
which affirmed. Singh now appeals the Panel’s order.
II. Discussion
A. Issues on Appeal
¶9 In Singh’s opening brief, he expresses dissatisfaction with the
overall conclusion that he is not permanently disabled. He asserts
he is badly injured, both mentally and physically, and should
receive benefits for life. In its answer brief, employer describes the
sole issue on appeal as “whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s findings that Singh is not entitled to reopen his claim.” In
4 Singh’s lengthy reply brief, he attempts to explain his medical
history and disagreements with prior administrative and judicial
decisions addressing his various claims.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 10 As relevant here, we may only set aside the Panel’s order if
“the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence” or the
“denial of benefits is not supported by applicable law.” § 8-43-308,
C.R.S. 2024.
III. Analysis
¶ 11 At the outset, we note that many of the issues Singh asserts in
this appeal are duplicative of ones he made to the prior division that
entered the 2022 opinion. To the extent that division has already
rejected those arguments, we consider those issues to be the law of
the case. See Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 85M,
¶ 49 (“Once an issue has been raised and decided, it becomes the
law of the case.”).
¶ 12 For example, the prior division already concluded that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that the
DIME’s permanent impairment finding was overcome and that
Singh was not permanently disabled. The division also addressed
5 Singh’s contentions that he could not work, and held that his
allegations lacked record support and were belied by his medical
records. The division considered Singh’s argument that he was not
at MMI, determining that substantial record evidence established
that he reached MMI by October 2019. Because he was returned to
full work duty in June 2019, his TTD benefits ceased as of that date
by operation of statute. Finally, the division held that Singh was
not entitled to maintenance medical benefits because he had not
shown that any post-MMI treatment was reasonably necessary to
relieve him from the effects of the 2019 accident. We perceive no
reason to revisit those issues. Young, ¶ 49.
¶ 13 The only new issue presented in this appeal is whether the
ALJ or Panel erred by denying and dismissing Singh’s petition to
reopen his worker’s compensation claim.
¶ 14 At any time within six years of the date of injury, an ALJ may
reopen an award on the grounds of fraud, overpayment, error,
mistake, or change in condition. § 8-43-303(1) C.R.S. 2024.
Reopening is appropriate if the claimant proves that additional
medical treatment or disability benefits are warranted. Richards v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 996 P.2d 756, 758 (Colo. App. 2000).
6 The determination of whether a claimant has sustained his burden
of proof to reopen a claim is left to the sound discretion of the ALJ.
Berg v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 128 P.3d 270, 272 (Colo. App.
2005). An ALJ’s decision to grant or deny a petition to reopen may
therefore “be reversed only for fraud or clear abuse of discretion.”
Wilson v. Jim Snyder Drilling, 747 P.2d 647, 651 (Colo. 1987).
¶ 15 Singh did not provide a transcript of the November 2023
hearing. Accordingly, we must assume that the ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.1 Nova
v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 754 P2d 800, 801 (Colo. App. 1988).
¶ 16 The reopening authority granted ALJs by section 8-43-303 “is
permissive, and whether to reopen a prior award when the statutory
criteria have been met is left to the sound discretion of the
ALJ.” Cordova v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 55 P.3d 186, 189 (Colo.
App. 2002). The party seeking reopening bears “the burden of proof
as to any issues sought to be reopened.” § 8-43-303(4). In the
1 We also note that the ALJ’s lengthy and detailed order points to
several comprehensive reports that he credited, which illustrate there is evidence in the record to support his findings. § 8-43-308, C.R.S. 2024; Paint Connection Plus v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 240 P.3d 429, 431 (Colo. App. 2010) (“When an ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by them.”).
7 absence of fraud or clear abuse of discretion, the ALJ’s decision
concerning reopening is binding on appeal. Jarosinski v. Indus.
Claim Appeals Off., 62 P.3d 1082, 1084 (Colo. App. 2002). An
abuse of discretion occurs when the ALJ’s order is beyond the
bounds of reason, as where it is unsupported by the evidence or
contrary to law. Id.
¶ 17 In Singh’s appeal to this court, he makes numerous
arguments that were previously made and rejected, including that
he is permanently disabled and cannot work. For instance, he
asserts he has a “very strong claim” that the ALJ ignored evidence
that he had a brain injury. He takes issue with the ALJ’s
determination that the 2019 accident was a “low speed collision”
and that his injuries have resolved. None of these arguments
explain why his case should be reopened based on the limited
statutory grounds available for reopening a case. Rather, Singh is
merely attempting to relitigate issues that have already been fully
and finally resolved.
¶ 18 Singh’s remaining arguments in this appeal, (for instance, that
he should be awarded benefits for life or that prior decisions were
tainted by fraud) are conclusory, and we decline to address them.
8 See Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA 71, ¶ 62
(declining to address the claimant’s argument because he offered
nothing more than one or two conclusory sentences, with no
citations to legal authority in support of the argument); Castillo v.
Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006) (a party who
does not refer to evidence or authority in support of an argument
does not present a cogent argument for review).
IV. Disposition
¶ 19 The Panel’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE PAWAR concur.