Sineni v. Burnham

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-16-163

REC'D GUMB CLERKS OF ANTHONY SINENI, III, ) MAY 12 '17 AM9:36 ) Plaintiff, ) V. ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S ) MOTION FOR JONATHAN BURNHAM and ) RECONSIDERATION JONATHAN BURNHAM d/b / a ) MAINE PAWN & JEWELRY ) ) Defendants. )

Before the Court is Plaintiff Anthony Sineni's Motion to Reconsider. Plaintiff

seeks reconsideration of the Court's April 7, 2017 Order granting summary

judgment in favor of Defendants pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(c) and denying

Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendants' counterclaims. After review of Plaintiffs

motion, the Court affirms its April 7, 2017 Order.

I. Legislative History

Plaintiff asks the Court to review legislative history of 30-A M.R.S. § 3972. In

interpreting a statute, the Court seeks to discern the legislature's intent, an

exercise most equitably carried out by looking to the language of the statute. "To

give effect to the Legislature's intent, we look first to the statute's plain meaning

and, if there is ambiguity, we look beyond that language to the legislative history

to determine the intent of the Legislature. Great Northern Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot

Nation, 2001 ME 68, <_[ 15, 770 A.2d 574.

Plaintiff-Anthony Sineni, Esq. Defendant-Dawn Dyer, Esq.

1 In this case, there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute. Therefore,

the Court does not look to the legislative history, but instead interprets the plain

language before it as may be found in the Court's April 7, 2016 Order.

II. Restitution

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to restitution for the loss of his family's silver

pursuant to his claim for violation of 30-A M.R.S. § 3972. Plaintiff argues that the

court should equate the term "restitution" in the statute with general economic

damages. Plaintiff argues that because Section 3972 does not appear in the criminal

statutes, and because there is no civil definition of restitution, the court should

interpret it according to the plain meaning of the word.

The Court reaffirms its determination that there is no private right of action for

recovery of damages for violation of the statutory record requirements of dealers in

secondhand precious metals. Although Section 3972 may not be found in the

criminal statute, the statute does refer to the criminal code and establish that

violation of Section 3972 is a criminal offense. The plain language of the statute

states: "A dealer who violates any of the requirements of this section is guilty of a

Class E crime except as specified in subsection 2, paragraph E. A court may award

restitution pursuant to Title 17-A, section 1325 to any victim, including a dealer,

who suffers economic loss as the result of a violation of this section." 3 0-A M.R.S. §

3972(8). If the Legislature had intended to confer a private cause of action or civil

penalty, it could have done so, just as it has in any number of statutes not found

within the criminal code. Making this conclusion even clearer is the prefatory

sentence of subsection 8 (that violation of the statute is a class E. crime), which

2 cannot be disassociated from the following sentence that expressly provides for

restitution. This would be an odd way indeed for the Legislature to confer a private

cause of action; to wit, by calling it restitution on the heels of an admonition that

violation of the statute is a crime.

III. Abuse of Process

Plaintiff moves the Court to reconsider Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendants'

counterclaim for abuse of process. Because Defendant has pied sufficient facts to

make out a prima facie case for abuse of process, as is set out in the Court's April 7,

2017 Order, the Court affirms its denial of Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss.

IV. Conclusion

The Court considers Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and affirms the Court's

order of April 7, 2017.

Dated: May 12, 2017