Sims v. Tyler

281 S.E.2d 229, 276 S.C. 640, 1981 S.C. LEXIS 459
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedAugust 13, 1981
Docket21548
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 281 S.E.2d 229 (Sims v. Tyler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sims v. Tyler, 281 S.E.2d 229, 276 S.C. 640, 1981 S.C. LEXIS 459 (S.C. 1981).

Opinion

Gregory, Justice:

The appellants H-enry M. Sims and Ester B. Sims appeal from a decree reforming a deed and granting title to lot 47-A in the Highland Park Subdivision to the respondents Wilson Tyler, Jr. and Mary Tyler. We reverse.

On April 2, 1969, James B. Perry, the developer of the subdivision and one of the respondents, deeded lots 46-A and 47-A to the appellants. The deed refers to a plat recorded in Plat Book X at pages 674 and 674-A at the Rich-land County Courthouse. Although this plat has been revised on several occasions, it plainly shows lots 46-A and 47-A.

The Sims built a house on lot 46-A. They planted a garden and built a doghouse on 47-A. They paid taxes on both lots 46-A and 47-A for several years. On April 9, 1974, P-erry conveyed to Wilson Tyler, Jr. and Mary Tyler, two *642 of the respondents, a lot described as A on an unrecorded plat dated March 5, 1974. This lot was 47-A conveyed earlier to the Sims. The Tylers did not hire an attorney for this transaction nor did they seek a title examination which would have revealed the Sims’ ownership of lot 47-A.

The Tylers requested the Sims to remove the doghouse so they could construct a fence. After the doghouse was removed the fence was built. The Sims then instituted this action for unlawful taking of property and trespass and the Tylers subsequently impleaded Perry.

The trial judge ordered title to lot 47-A transferred to the Tylers, reforming the deed on the basis of mutual mistake.

Before equity will reform an instrument, it must be shown by evidence which is most clear and convincing not simply that it was a mistake on the part of one of the parties but that it was a mutual mistake. Belin v. Stikeleather, 232 S. C. 116, 101 S. E. (2d) 185 (1957). A mutual mistake is one where both parties intended a certain tiling and by mistake in the drafting did not get what both parties intended. Id.

There is no evidence to support respondents’ contention that the Sims did not intend to purchase this lot. The purchase price, the payment of taxes since its purchase, the construction of the doghouse and the planting of the garden are clear and convincing evidence the Sims intended to purchase lot 47-A.

Perry described lot 47-A as a “dog lot” unsuitable for building a house. Therefore, the nine thousand five hundred dollars ($9,500.00) paid to him by the Sims was adequate consideration for both lots. The Sims testified they purchased both lots because they intended to construct a large house on 46-A, thus creating the need for extra yard space. They built a house for thirty-five thousand dollars *643 ($35,000.00), which they estimate is valued now at seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00).

Perry asserts he did not intend to convey lot 47-A to the Sims, claiming he failed to read the deed. One who is capable of reading and understanding but fails to read a contract before signing is bound by the terms thereof. Evans v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 269 S. C. 584, 587, 239 S. E. (2d) 76 (1977). We perceive no mistake on the Sims’ part and if there was a mistake it was unilateral, not mutual. L-J, Inc. v. S. C. Highway Dept., 270 S. C. 413, 242 S. E. (2d) 656 (1978).

Where the mistake is unilateral, equity will refuse to grant reformation except under strong and extraordinary circumstances showing imbecility or something which would make it a great wrong to enforce the agreement. These circumstances must be shown by competent testimony of the clearest kind. Belin v. Stikeleather, supra. There is no evidence of extraordinary circumstances in this case.

We hold the trial court erred in reforming the deed. It is not necessary to address appellant’s remaining exceptions as we reverse the order of the trial judge and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Lewis, C. J., and Littlejohn, Ness and Harwell, JJ-, concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ditech Holding Corporation
S.D. New York, 2023
Wells Fargo Bank v. Fallon Properties SC
Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2019
Kiawah Resort Associates, L.P. v. Kiawah Island Community Ass'n
808 S.E.2d 521 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2017)
Wachovia Bank, National Ass'n v. Blackburn
755 S.E.2d 437 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 2014)
Bahringer v. ADT Security Services, Inc.
942 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D. South Carolina, 2013)
Herron v. CENTURY BMW
693 S.E.2d 394 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 2010)
Rabon v. SCDHPT
Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2006
Regions Bank v. Schmauch
582 S.E.2d 432 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2003)
George v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance
545 S.E.2d 500 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 2001)
Mueller v. Generali-US Branch
4 F. App'x 187 (Fourth Circuit, 2001)
Tolley v. Health Care & Retir
Fourth Circuit, 1998
Crosby v. Protective Life Insurance
359 S.E.2d 298 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1987)
Bellamy v. Bellamy
355 S.E.2d 1 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1987)
Timms v. Timms
348 S.E.2d 386 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1986)
Amick v. Hagler
334 S.E.2d 525 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1985)
Hellams v. Harnist
325 S.E.2d 569 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1985)
Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Castile
320 S.E.2d 488 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1984)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
281 S.E.2d 229, 276 S.C. 640, 1981 S.C. LEXIS 459, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sims-v-tyler-sc-1981.