2022 IL App (1st) 210890-U
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
SECOND DIVISION August 9, 2022 No. 1-21-0890 ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
MICHAEL SIMS and JOHN GARCIA, on behalf of ) themselves and all others similarly situated, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 20 CH 6309 ) THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and ) The Honorable the COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS, as indemnitor, ) Eve M. Reilly, ) Judge Presiding. Defendants-Appellees. )
PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Trial court’s dismissal of complaint by public employees covered by collective bargaining agreement alleging underpayment of wages by public employer, on grounds that claims were preempted by Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2020)) and that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, is affirmed.
¶2 Plaintiffs Michael Sims and John Garcia appeal the dismissal of their complaint purporting
to assert a class action for underpayment of wages in violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2020)) by defendants Thomas J. Dart,
in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County (Sheriff), and the County of Cook, as indemnitor. No. 1-21-0890
The trial court’s bases for dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint were that the claims asserted were
preempted by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2020)) and that
the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. For the following reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The plaintiffs are employed by the defendants as deputy sheriffs in the Cook County Sheriff’s
Office (Sheriff’s Office). As such, they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
between the defendants and the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (FOP Labor
Council). Several provisions of that CBA are pertinent to this appeal. One such provision is section
2.1(G), which gives the defendants “the rights take any and all actions as may be necessary to carry
out the duties and responsibilities of the employer in situations of civil emergency as may be
declared by the employer. It is the sole discretion of the employer to determine that civil emergency
conditions exist *** which call for immediate action whereas it may be required to assign
employees as the Employer deems necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities.”
¶5 A second pertinent provision is section 5.1, which provides in pertinent part that “Deputy
Sheriffs who are assigned as Civil Process Servers, and those in Child Support Warrants, Child
Support Civil Process, Warrants, Levies, Evictions, S.W.A.P. Units and Canine Unit, will receive
salaries in accordance with Payroll Grade D2B.” An appendix to the CBA specifies the hourly, bi-
weekly, and annual rates of pay for payroll grades D2 and D2B. In general, the pay rates for payroll
grade D2B are higher than the rates for payroll grade D2 by about $2.00 per hour.
¶6 Finally, article XI of the CBA sets forth a four-step grievance process to “specify the method
by which employees may present grievances and seek redress.” The grievance policy “shall apply
to all bargaining unit employees under the jurisdiction” of the defendants. A grievance is defined
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as “a difference between an employee or the union and the employer with respect to the
interpretation or application of, or compliance with the terms of this Agreement between the
Employer and the Union.” A grievance may be presented by either the aggrieved employee or by
a union representative. The four-step process culminates in a hearing before an impartial arbitrator,
and “the decision of the Arbitrator shall be binding.”
¶7 The instant dispute concerning wages arises out of a staffing shortage among correctional
officers that occurred within the Sheriff’s Office in 2020, due to the spread of COVID-19 within
the Cook County Jail and the efforts undertaken by the Sheriff’s Office to mitigate it. To address
these staffing shortages, the Sheriff temporarily reassigned certain deputy sheriffs to work in the
jail despite the fact that they did not hold assignments to work there. The parties agree that the
Sheriff did this pursuant to its emergency authority under section 2.1(G) of the CBA, and there is
no dispute that a civil emergency did exist under that section.
¶8 On October 15, 2020, the plaintiffs filed the instant complaint, seeking to assert a class action
on behalf of themselves and other similarly-situated deputy sheriffs who had been reassigned to
duties within the Cook County Department of Corrections (Department of Corrections). The
complaint alleged that, prior to approximately March 2020, the plaintiffs’ assignment had been to
work “street units” performing duties such as service of civil process and warrant execution. In
working such positions, they received wages and salaries in accordance with payroll grade D2B
and “had been earning such pay for multiple pay periods” as of that time. The complaint went on
to allege that, in or about March 2020, the Sheriff “unilaterally suspended” the CBA applicable to
deputy sheriffs such as the plaintiffs “under an emergency clause provision therein.” The Sheriff
then temporarily reassigned the plaintiffs to work within the Department of Corrections and began
paying them at the lower rate of pay earned by correctional officers instead of paying them
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according to the D2B payroll grade scale.
¶9 The complaint alleged that, despite the suspension of the CBA, each plaintiff had an implicit
employment agreement with the defendants that they would continue to be paid according to the
D2B payroll grade scale, at which each of them had been paid for multiple pay periods. It alleged
that, prior to their temporary reassignment, the plaintiffs had been paid “according to a
demonstrable formula” (i.e., the D2B payroll grade scale), and the plaintiffs and defendants had
“mutually assented” to the plaintiffs’ receipt of such rate of pay “by virtue of the fact that each
was so paid for multiple pay periods” preceding their temporary reassignment. Finally, it alleged
that the defendants’ payment of the plaintiffs at the correctional officers’ pay rate instead of the
D2B rate established in their implicit employment agreement violated the Wage Act (820 ILCS
115/1 et seq. (West 2020)). It sought class certification, damages in the amount that each plaintiff
was owed at the D2B rate for each hour of underpaid work since the reassignment, 2% of the
amount of such underpayment for each month it occurred, and reasonable attorney fees.
¶ 10 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on multiple grounds.
Pertinent to this appeal, they first argued that the plaintiffs’ claims involved matters of collective
bargaining and thus were preempted by the Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West
2020)), under which the proper venue for adjudication was the Illinois Labor Relations Board
(ILRB). They asserted that preemption occurs whenever a trial court is required to interpret a CBA
in order to resolve a claim, and the trial court would be required to do so here in order to resolve
the plaintiffs’ claims. The defendants further contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their administrative remedies
through the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA.
¶ 11 The plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss. Generally speaking, they argued that
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their claims were not preempted because they did not arise from the provisions of the CBA and
therefore the trial court would not be required to interpret the CBA to resolve them. They pointed
out that their complaint pled that the CBA had been suspended during the time of their
reassignment and that the CBA was referenced only to the extent that it provided a formula for
calculating damages under the D2B payroll grade scale. They also argued that they were not
required to exhaust administrative remedies because the suspension of the CBA meant that “there
were no administrative remedies to abide by pursuant to the CBA” and that the claims arose
pursuant to statute and not under the CBA itself.
¶ 12 The trial court conducted oral argument on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, at which time
it questioned the plaintiffs’ counsel about the plaintiffs’ basis for asserting that the CBA had been
suspended in its entirety. The exchange occurred as follows:
“THE COURT: Why are you saying that the CBA is suspended though? Where are
you getting that from?
MR. WILKERSON [(Plaintiffs’ Attorney)]: Under the emergency provision, that
they are allowed to quote, unquote, relax standards. However, that would never happen if
the CBA was still being held —
THE COURT: But your interpretation of relaxed standards is that the CBA was
suspended.
MR. WILKERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WILKERSON: And it can also be —
THE COURT: And it could also be that it took the case law provision of the CBA to
get there.
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MR. WILKERSON: Well, *** once they enacted that provision, albeit temporary,
*** it was suspended during those circumstances.
***
THE COURT: *** [T]he fact that they are relaxing *** the CBA under *** that
emergency provision, how does that get you to the point where the entire CBA is
suspended? I guess —
MR. WILKERSON: Your Honor, they wouldn’t have even been able *** to transfer
sheriff deputies, who have no training as correctional officers, and then get them to work
for a lower wage and work as a correctional officer without various steps in the CBA. So
they automatically skipped procedures just to do that. That is just one example of
essentially using the emergency standards to essentially handle Covid as best anyone could,
*** but that’s never been done before here, your Honor.
And just by *** their actions *** of moving officers with zero training in a
correctional facility due to an emergency and skipping their own procedures speaks to that.
THE COURT: Okay.”
¶ 13 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The court reasoned that it would be required to interpret the emergency provision of the CBA to
make any determination about whether its language meant that the CBA had in fact been suspended
in its entirety. Because it would need to analyze the CBA, the trial court concluded that the claim
was preempted and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. It further stated that it agreed with the
defendants that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies under the CBA and
had failed to do so. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 15 This appeal involves the dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020). Dismissal is proper under that section where the trial
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action (id. § 2-619(a)(1)) or where the claim
asserted is barred by other affirmative matter that defeats the claim (id. § 2-619(a)(9)). In
reviewing a dismissal under section 2-619, this court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint and the reasonable inferences that arise therefrom. McHenry Township v. County of
McHenry, 2022 IL 127258, ¶ 57. However, we disregard any legal and factual conclusions in the
complaint that are not supported by specific allegations. Id. We undertake de novo review of the
trial court’s judgment and evaluate whether dismissal was proper as a matter of law. Id.
¶ 16 A. Preemption of claim by Public Labor Relations Act
¶ 17 The plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the Public Labor
Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2020)) preempted their claim by vesting jurisdiction
with the ILRB instead of the circuit court. Their contention is that the trial court incorrectly viewed
their claim as arising solely under the CBA. In actuality, they argue, their right to payment on the
D2B scale “arose from an independent agreement” that can be enforced under the Wage Act
without requiring any interpretation of the CBA. In other words, their claim is simply “that there
was an agreed upon rate of pay and that the Sheriff failed to pay it.” They assert that, to the extent
their claim requires any reference to the CBA, it would only involve looking at the D2B payroll
grade scale in order to calculate damages, and such tangential reference to a CBA does not trigger
preemption. At most, it involves a “minimal level” of interpretation of the CBA, and this “does
not automatically trigger preemption.” Finally, they argue that the court must accept as true their
allegation that the CBA was suspended, and from this premise they assert that “interpretation of
the CBA is not required to evaluate the merits of the Plaintiffs’ allegations since they do not arise
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from the CBA’s provisions.”
¶ 18 The general rule is that circuit courts are vested by the Illinois Constitution with original
jurisdiction over all justiciable matters, except in circumstances (not present in this case) where
the supreme court has exclusive and original jurisdiction. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. However,
where the legislature enacts a comprehensive statutory scheme creating rights and duties that have
no counterpart in common law or equity, the legislature may vest original jurisdiction in an
administrative agency (J & J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc., 2016 IL 119870, ¶ 23) and
thereby limit or preclude the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Board of Education of Warren
Township High School District 121 v. Warren Township High School Federation of Teachers,
Local 504, IFT/AFL-CIO, 128 Ill. 2d 155, 165 (1989).
¶ 19 The Public Labor Relations Act is part of a “ ‘comprehensive regulatory scheme for public
sector bargaining in Illinois.’ ” See Board of Education of Community School District No. 1, Coles
County v. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d 216, 221 (1988) (quoting Chicago Board of Education v. Chicago
Teachers Union, 142 Ill. App. 3d 527, 530 (1986)). Section 2 of the Public Labor Relations Act
provides in part, “It is the purpose of this Act to regulate labor relations between public employers
and employees, including the designation of employee representatives, negotiation of wages, hours
and other conditions of employment, and resolution of disputes arising under collective bargaining
agreements.” 5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2020). Section 5(a) creates the Illinois Labor Relations Board
and provides that it is comprised of two panels, the State Panel and the Local Panel. Id. § 5(a).
Relevant here, section 5(b) provides that “[t]he Local Panel shall have jurisdiction over collective
bargaining agreement matters between employee organizations and units of local government with
a population in excess of 2 million persons, but excluding the Regional Transportation Authority.”
Id. § 5(b). Section 15(a) provides that the provisions of the Public Labor Relations Act or any
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collective bargaining agreement negotiated under it shall prevail and control in the case of any
conflict between the provisions of the statute and any other law, executive order or administrative
regulation “relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and employment relations. Id.
§ 15(a). Section 15(b) likewise provides that any collective bargaining agreement executed
pursuant to the Public Labor Relations Act shall supersede any contrary statutes, charters,
ordinances, rules or regulations “relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and
employment relations adopted by the public employer or its agents.” Id. § 15(b). The ILRB has
jurisdiction to resolve unfair labor practice complaints against public employers and labor
organizations. Id. §§ 10, 11.
¶ 20 The appellate court has held that the Public Labor Relations Act vests the ILRB with
jurisdiction over claims by public employees against public employers involving “disputes arising
from CBAs.” Gantz v. McHenry County Sheriff’s Department Merit Comm’n, 296 Ill. App. 3d
335, 340 (1998); accord McGreal v. Village of Orland Park, No. 12 C 5135, 2013 WL 3984477,
*11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2013) (Public Labor Relations Act “has been interpreted to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on the [ILRB] over matters involving collective bargaining agreements between public
employers and employees, including breach of contract claims”). Similarly, claims by public
employees against their public employers that necessitate the “interpretation” of the terms of a
CBA have been held to come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ILRB. Cessna v. City of
Danville, 296 Ill. App. 3d 156, 166 (1998). Among the reasons for this is that allowing an employee
to pursue a breach of contract claim against a public employer in circuit court would undermine
the legislative intent of the Public Labor Relations Act “to provide a uniform body of law in the
field of labor-management relations to be administered by those who have the required expertise
in this area.” Id. at 168. Also, allowing concurrent jurisdiction between the ILRB and the circuit
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court “may lead to forum shopping and inconsistent judgments in similar factual settings.” Id.
Finally, because circuit courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims against labor unions for breach of
the duty of fair representation, the proving of which is a prerequisite to maintaining an action
against a public employer for breach of a CBA, circuit courts would be faced with undue delay in
waiting for decisions by the ILRB on claims for breach of the duty of fair representation before
claims against employers could be resolved. Id.
¶ 21 In this case, the plaintiffs’ argument does not take issue with the principles set forth above.
Rather, as stated previously, the plaintiffs’ argument is that their claim involves an implicit
agreement that exists independently of the CBA. Because of this, they argue, their claim neither
arises out of the CBA nor requires any interpretation of its terms. According to the plaintiffs,
reference to the CBA is only necessary to ascertain their damages because that is the document
that sets forth the D2B payroll grade scale, and such tangential reference to the CBA does not
require preemption. Thus, they argue, their claim for underpayment of wages pursuant to this
implicit, independent agreement can be enforced through the Wage Act.
¶ 22 We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that their claim neither arises out of the CBA nor requires
interpretation of it and that therefore it is not preempted. First, if the CBA remained in effect and
was not suspended in its entirety when the Sheriff invoked section 2.1(G) and reassigned the
plaintiffs from working street units to duties within the Department of Corrections, then whatever
right that the plaintiffs had to receive wages or salaries under the D2B payroll grade scale arose
out of the CBA. In that circumstance, any claim by the plaintiffs that they are entitled to be paid
on the D2B payroll scale notwithstanding their reassignment would present a dispute arising out
of the terms of CBA, resulting in preemption. See Gantz, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 340. Alternatively, if
we credit the plaintiffs’ allegation that the CBA was in fact suspended or otherwise lost its legal
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effect when the Sheriff invoked section 2.1(G) and reassigned the plaintiffs, ultimately no legal
determination could be made on this point without the court interpreting the applicable provisions
of the CBA. The trial court recognized in its ruling that this would be the case, and we agree with
the trial court on this matter. One way or another, the claim raised by the plaintiffs cannot be
resolved without undertaking some substantive interpretation of the terms of the applicable CBA,
and for this reason the plaintiffs’ claim is preempted. See Cessna, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 166.
Jurisdiction over this kind of claim is vested in the ILRB, not in the circuit court. Id.
¶ 23 We reject the plaintiffs’ attempts to overcome preemption by alleging that an “implied”
agreement existed based on past payment of D2B wages that is entirely “independent” of the CBA.
It would thwart the policies of the Public Labor Relations Act to allow preemption to be overcome
through this kind of allegation. This court has previously rejected this kind of argument in a case
involving preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) (29
U.S.C. § 185 (2018)), which applies outside the context of state public employment and similarly
preempts state-law claims that require the interpretation of a CBA. Glasper v. Scrub, Inc., 2021 IL
App (1st) 200764, ¶ 39. In Glasper, the court recognized that an implied contract can exist “in the
absence of an express agreement.” Id. However, it reasoned that where the plaintiff has the benefit
of an express agreement in the form of a CBA that had been negotiated on her behalf, no implied
agreement could exist between the plaintiff and her employer. Id. The same result is warranted
here. It is a general principle of contract law that an implied contract cannot coexist with an express
contract on the same subject. Maness v. Santa Fe Park Enterprises, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d 1014,
1022 (1998). Again, for a court even to resolve the issue of whether an implied agreement existed
that was independent of the CBA and controlled over the express terms of the CBA addressing the
same subject matter, the court would have to interpret the terms of the CBA.
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¶ 24 We have reviewed the various cases cited by the plaintiffs, and we find that none of them aid
the plaintiffs’ argument. Significantly, none of the cases cited by the plaintiffs involves preemption
of circuit court jurisdiction in favor of the ILRB under the Public Labor Relations Act. 1 Instead,
most of the cases cited by the plaintiffs involve federal preemption of state law under section 301
of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. § 185 (2018)), 2 with a few involving the grievance requirements of
CBAs.
¶ 25 In one such case, Dollear v. G.F. Connelly Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d
937, 939 (N.D. Ill. 2005), a plaintiff’s state law claims were not preempted where they were
predicated on an express written contract that the plaintiff had with his former employer to receive
incentive bonuses. The court found that this was independent of the CBA and “does not depend
on the CBA in any respect.” Id. Here, the plaintiffs have no express written contract that is clearly
separate from their CBA. Rather, as stated, their claim either arises out of the CBA or requires
substantive interpretation of its provisions to resolve their arguments that it does not apply.
1 In Barlett v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 7225, 2015 WL 135286, *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2015), the district court noted that the defendant had made this argument, but it was not addressed by the district court.
2 The analysis of whether a state law claim is preempted by federal labor law under section 301 of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. § 185 (2018)) is similar to the issue in this case, in that it turns on whether a CBA must be interpreted to resolve the claim. Barlett explains that section 301 requires employees to exhaust the grievances and arbitration remedies provided for in a CBA prior to filing suit. Barlett, 2015 WL 135286, *3. Suits for violation of CBAs may then be pursued in the appropriate federal district court. Id. In any case where “ ‘the resolution of a state law claim depends on the meaning of, or requires the interpretation of, a collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law is preempted and federal labor law principles must be employed to resolve the dispute.’ ” Id. at *4 (quoting Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates, 101 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1996), citing Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405- 06 (1988)). “ ‘To determine whether a state-law claim is pre-empted, we must look at the legal character of the claim: a question of state law, entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective bargaining agreement, may go forward as a state-law claim, whereas a claim, the resolution of which is sufficiently dependent on an interpretation of the [collective bargaining agreement], will be preempted.’ ” Id. (quoting Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2004)). However, “preemption will not occur if a dispute merely references or requires consultation of a collective bargaining agreement.” Id. (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994)).
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¶ 26 In two other cases cited by the plaintiffs, Byrne v. Hayes Beer Distributing Co., 2018 IL App
(1st) 172612, and Daniels v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 277 Ill. App. 3d 968
(1996), the plaintiffs were allowed to pursue claims in circuit court to assert substantive statutory
rights granted under the Wage Act. In Byrne, the claim was that an employer’s practice of
deducting delivery drivers’ commissions for products that lingered too long on store shelves
violated the requirement of section 9 of the Wage Act (820 ILCS 115/9 (West 2016)) that an
employee must expressly agree in writing to wage deductions at the time the deductions are made.
Byrne, 2018 IL App (1st) 172612, ¶ 1. The court held that this was a right conferred by statute; it
was not one dependent on or requiring interpretation of the parties’ CBA, which was silent on the
issue. Id. ¶ 32. Similarly, in Daniels, the claim was that the refusal to pay terminated employees
for accrued but unused vacation days violated section 5 of the Wage Act (820 ILCS 115/5 (West
1996)), which requires an employer to pay the monetary equivalent of all earned vacation time as
final compensation if an employment contract provides for paid vacation and the employee is
termination without having taken all of it. Daniels, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 969. The court held that this
right to be paid for unused vacation days arose under the statute, that it was not addressed in the
CBA, and that no interpretation of the CBA was required to resolve the claim. Id. at 973.
¶ 27 Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs are not seeking to enforce one of the substantive statutory
rights granted by the Wage Act, such as the right in section 5 to receive pay for unused vacation
days or the right in section 9 to avoid having wages deducted without giving express written
consent at the time of deduction. See 820 ILCS 115/5, 9 (West 2020). Instead, the right that the
plaintiffs are seeking to enforce here is to be paid according to the D2B payroll grade scale
notwithstanding their reassignment. Their alleged right to receive this particular amount of wages
is not statutory but is a matter of contract or agreement, whether that is the CBA or an implicit
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agreement based on past practice. The Wage Act does not provide employees with the substantive
right to a particular amount of wages. Smith v. C.H. James Restaurant Holdings, No. 11 C 5545,
2012 WL 255806, *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2012) (collecting cases). Instead, it provides employees
with a cause of action against their employers for timely and complete payment of wages.
O’Malley v. Udo, 2022 IL App (1st) 200007, ¶ 46; 820 ILCS 115/14(a) (West 2020). It defines
“wages” in pertinent part as “any compensation owed an employee by an employer pursuant to an
employment contract or agreement between the 2 parties.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 115/2
(West 2020). Accordingly, in a case such as this, the Wage Act provides a means to enforce the
terms of an existing contract or agreement, but it provides no substantive right to payment beyond
what that contract or agreement requires. Chagoya v. City of Chicago, 992 F.3d 607, 624 (7th Cir.
2021). For this reason, the plaintiffs’ claim here is one that involves interpretation of the relevant
CBA in a way that was not necessary for the claims at issue in Byrne and Daniels.
¶ 28 Finally, we simply find that the plaintiffs’ claim in this case requires a level of interpretation
of the CBA that the district court found not to be necessary in Barlett v. City of Chicago, No. 14
C 7225, 2015 WL 135286 (N.D. Ill. Jan 9, 2015), the last case relied upon by the plaintiffs. There,
the plaintiff was a SWAT team member of the Chicago Police Department who brought a claim
alleging that the defendant had violated the Wage Act by failing to compensate him for the time
he spent loading and unloading SWAT gear and weapons into and out of his personal vehicle and
for using his personal vehicle to respond to assignments, notwithstanding its imposition of
procedures requiring him to do these things. Id. at *1. The district court rejected the defendant’s
argument in its motion to dismiss that the claim was preempted under section 301 of the LMRA
because interpretation of the CBA was required to resolve these claims. Id. at *4-5. It found that
the plaintiff was not asking the court to “make a determination as to the wages owed to him under
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the CBA,” nor was the plaintiff alleging the defendant “violated the CBA.” Id. at *5. The district
court reiterated multiple times in its decision that, as presented, the plaintiff’s Wage Act claim did
not require interpretation of the terms of the CBA, and it stated that preemption may be warranted
if the claim later turned out to require interpretation of the CBA. Id.
¶ 29 As a federal district court decision, Barlett is not binding on this court. State ex rel. Leibowitz
v. Family Vision Care, LLC, 2020 IL 124754, ¶ 74. Regardless of that, however, we find that the
claim presented by the plaintiffs in this case requires significant interpretation of the CBA in a way
that was apparently not the case in Barlett. As we discussed above, for a court to even reach the
plaintiffs’ assertion that their right to wages on the D2B scale despite reassignment is not owed
“under the CBA” but rather is owed according to an “implicit” and “separately agreed upon wage
rate,” a court must undertake a substantive interpretation of the provisions of the CBA. No
contention similar to this was raised in Barlett, and the district court made clear that preemption
might be necessary in that case if the plaintiff later took a position that required interpretation of
the CBA. The plaintiffs have taken such a position in this case.
¶ 30 B. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
¶ 31 As an additional basis for dismissal of the plaintiffs’ cause of action, the trial court found that
it lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
under the grievance provisions of the CBA. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that this finding by the
trial court was erroneous. They argue that the grievance requirements of the CBA do not apply to
their claim because the Sheriff suspended the CBA prior to the time their claim arose. Thus, they
argue that their claim arises under the Wage Act and not under the CBA. The plaintiffs
acknowledge that this issue of exhaustion of remedies is “directly tied” to the issue of preemption.
¶ 32 Article XI of the applicable CBA sets forth a four-step grievance process, which “shall apply
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to all bargaining unit employees under the jurisdiction” of the defendants. This includes the
plaintiffs. It defines a grievance as “a difference between an employee or the union and the
employer with respect to the interpretation or application of, or compliance with the terms of this
Agreement between the Employer and the Union.” (Emphases added.) It allows a grievance to be
presented by either the aggrieved employee or by a union representative. It provides that the four-
step process culminates in a hearing before an impartial arbitrator and that “the decision of the
Arbitrator shall be binding.”
¶ 33 It is required by section 8 of the Public Labor Relations Act that CBAs “shall contain a
grievance resolution procedure which shall apply to all employees in the bargaining unit and shall
provide for final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning the administration or
interpretation of the agreement unless mutually agreed otherwise.” (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS
315/8 (West 2020). “When a CBA provides for a grievance procedure and arbitration as a means
for settling disputes, those procedures are the exclusive method to redress violations of that
agreement.” Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 308 v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2012 IL App
(1st) 112517, ¶ 17. If contractual remedies under the CBA are not exhausted prior to bringing a
claim in state circuit court, the circuit court must dismiss the claim. Id. However, not all disputes
between an employee and an employer are subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures of
a CBA. Daniels, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 972. To determine whether an employee’s exclusive remedy
is to follow the grievance and arbitration procedure outlined in a CBA, a court considers whether
the claim is one which on its face is governed by the contract. Id.
¶ 34 For largely the same reasons discussed above, we find that the claim presented by the
plaintiffs here is subject to the grievance and arbitration requirements of the CBA. On its face, the
plaintiffs’ claim that they are entitled to be paid according to the D2B payroll grade scale presents
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a matter governed by the parties’ CBA. Any dispute about whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
continue to receive pay on the D2B scale notwithstanding their reassignment from street units to
duties within the Department of Corrections presents a question requiring interpretation of the
CBA. Further, we find that the plaintiffs’ argument that the CBA does not apply because it had
been “suspended” by the Sheriff necessarily presents an issue pertaining to “the interpretation or
application of” the terms of the CBA. These are questions clearly vested by the CBA and the statute
in the grievance and arbitration process. As there is no dispute that the plaintiffs did not exhaust
their administrative remedies prior to filing an action in circuit court, the trial court’s dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ cause of action for this reason was proper.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
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