1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 SIMRANJOT SINGH (A-245-702-344), Case No. 1:26-cv-00325-DC-CSK 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, Warden of the California City Detention Facility, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Simranjot Singh (A-245-702-344), a noncitizen, filed a petition for a writ of 19 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his re-detention by U.S. Immigration and 20 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner argues that his re-detention without a 21 hearing and his continued detention violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment 22 and exceeds statutory authority. (Id. (claims one through three).) For the following reasons, this 23 Court recommends that the petition be granted. 25 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 26 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 27 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 28 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 1 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 2 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 3 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 4 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 5 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 6 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 7 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 9 On January 15, 2026, petitioner filed his habeas petition and a motion for a temporary 10 restraining order. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On January 16, 2026, the district court ordered respondents to 11 file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion for a temporary restraining order 12 and to substantively address whether any provision of law or fact in this case would distinguish it 13 from the district court’s decisions in Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3458802 (E.D. 14 Cal. Dec. 2, 2025), Selis Tinoco v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3567862 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2025), 15 and other similar cases previously decided by the district court, or indicate that the matter is not 16 substantively distinguishable. (ECF No. 4.) On January 20, 2026, respondents filed an 17 opposition to the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 18 7.) In the opposition, respondents argued that “the detention authority in this case is lawful under 19 the Constitution and applicable provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (“INA”). (Id. 20 at 1.) Respondents also conceded they did not have legal arguments to distinguish this case from 21 previous orders issued by the district court, nor did they identify material factual differences 22 between this case and Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3458802 or Selis Tinoco v. 23 Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3567862. (See id.) Respondents do not oppose converting the motion for 24 a temporary restraining order to a motion for a preliminary injunction, and waived oral argument. 25 (Id. at 1-2.) 26 On January 21, 2026, the district court granted petitioner’s motion for a temporary 27 restraining order and issued a preliminary injunction on the same terms given that the standard for 28 issuing a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a 1 preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 8 (citing Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 2 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).) The district court noted that while respondents contended that 3 petitioner’s detention is lawful under the Constitution and applicable provisions of the INA, they 4 acknowledged that the district court’s decisions in Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 5 3458802 and Selis Tinoco v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3567862 are not distinguishable from this 6 case. (ECF No. 8.) In addition to granting petitioner’s immediate release, the district court 7 ordered respondents not to impose any additional restriction on petitioner, such as electronic 8 monitoring, unless determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. (Id.) 9 If the Government seeks to re-detain petitioner, it must provide no less than 7 days’ notice and 10 hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its 11 implementing regulations, at which hearing petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered. 12 (Id.) The district court referred this action to the assigned Magistrate Judge for further 13 proceedings. (Id.) 14 On February 13, 2026, in response to this Court’s order requiring respondents to file a 15 status report, respondents stated they opposed the underlying petition for the reasons discussed in 16 their opposition to the temporary restraining order and prior cases named by the district court, but 17 that they did not have additional briefing to provide to the Court. (ECF No. 10.) Briefing is 18 closed. (See Docket.) 19 Where the record before the district court has not changed since the district court’s ruling 20 on the motion for a temporary injunction and issuance of a preliminary injunction, this Court 21 recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted based on separate findings that 22 petitioner is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (claim three) and that respondents violated petitioner’s 23 Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights by re-detaining him and continuing to detain him 24 without a hearing (claim two). See Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3458802; Selis 25 Tinoco v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3567862. Because the resolution of the statutory claim (claim 26 three) and the procedural due process claim (claim two) provide the relief requested, the Court 27 need not reach the first claim. This Court further recommends that a permanent injunction be 28 issued enjoining and restraining respondents from re-detaining petitioner unless the government 1 | demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral 2 || decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical 3 || custody is legally justified. Petitioner shall be allowed to have his counsel present at any such 4 | hearing. 5 | IN. CONCLUSION 6 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 7 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 8 2. A permanent injunction be issued enjoining and restraining respondents from re- 9 || detaining petitioner Simranjot Singh (A-245-702-344) unless the government demonstrates, by 10 || clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, 11 | that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally 12 | justified. Petitioner shall be allowed to have his counsel present at any such hearing.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 SIMRANJOT SINGH (A-245-702-344), Case No. 1:26-cv-00325-DC-CSK 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, Warden of the California City Detention Facility, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Simranjot Singh (A-245-702-344), a noncitizen, filed a petition for a writ of 19 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his re-detention by U.S. Immigration and 20 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner argues that his re-detention without a 21 hearing and his continued detention violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment 22 and exceeds statutory authority. (Id. (claims one through three).) For the following reasons, this 23 Court recommends that the petition be granted. 25 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 26 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 27 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 28 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 1 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 2 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 3 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 4 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 5 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 6 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 7 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 9 On January 15, 2026, petitioner filed his habeas petition and a motion for a temporary 10 restraining order. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On January 16, 2026, the district court ordered respondents to 11 file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion for a temporary restraining order 12 and to substantively address whether any provision of law or fact in this case would distinguish it 13 from the district court’s decisions in Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3458802 (E.D. 14 Cal. Dec. 2, 2025), Selis Tinoco v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3567862 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2025), 15 and other similar cases previously decided by the district court, or indicate that the matter is not 16 substantively distinguishable. (ECF No. 4.) On January 20, 2026, respondents filed an 17 opposition to the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 18 7.) In the opposition, respondents argued that “the detention authority in this case is lawful under 19 the Constitution and applicable provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (“INA”). (Id. 20 at 1.) Respondents also conceded they did not have legal arguments to distinguish this case from 21 previous orders issued by the district court, nor did they identify material factual differences 22 between this case and Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3458802 or Selis Tinoco v. 23 Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3567862. (See id.) Respondents do not oppose converting the motion for 24 a temporary restraining order to a motion for a preliminary injunction, and waived oral argument. 25 (Id. at 1-2.) 26 On January 21, 2026, the district court granted petitioner’s motion for a temporary 27 restraining order and issued a preliminary injunction on the same terms given that the standard for 28 issuing a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a 1 preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 8 (citing Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 2 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).) The district court noted that while respondents contended that 3 petitioner’s detention is lawful under the Constitution and applicable provisions of the INA, they 4 acknowledged that the district court’s decisions in Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 5 3458802 and Selis Tinoco v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3567862 are not distinguishable from this 6 case. (ECF No. 8.) In addition to granting petitioner’s immediate release, the district court 7 ordered respondents not to impose any additional restriction on petitioner, such as electronic 8 monitoring, unless determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. (Id.) 9 If the Government seeks to re-detain petitioner, it must provide no less than 7 days’ notice and 10 hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its 11 implementing regulations, at which hearing petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered. 12 (Id.) The district court referred this action to the assigned Magistrate Judge for further 13 proceedings. (Id.) 14 On February 13, 2026, in response to this Court’s order requiring respondents to file a 15 status report, respondents stated they opposed the underlying petition for the reasons discussed in 16 their opposition to the temporary restraining order and prior cases named by the district court, but 17 that they did not have additional briefing to provide to the Court. (ECF No. 10.) Briefing is 18 closed. (See Docket.) 19 Where the record before the district court has not changed since the district court’s ruling 20 on the motion for a temporary injunction and issuance of a preliminary injunction, this Court 21 recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted based on separate findings that 22 petitioner is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (claim three) and that respondents violated petitioner’s 23 Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights by re-detaining him and continuing to detain him 24 without a hearing (claim two). See Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3458802; Selis 25 Tinoco v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3567862. Because the resolution of the statutory claim (claim 26 three) and the procedural due process claim (claim two) provide the relief requested, the Court 27 need not reach the first claim. This Court further recommends that a permanent injunction be 28 issued enjoining and restraining respondents from re-detaining petitioner unless the government 1 | demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral 2 || decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical 3 || custody is legally justified. Petitioner shall be allowed to have his counsel present at any such 4 | hearing. 5 | IN. CONCLUSION 6 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 7 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 8 2. A permanent injunction be issued enjoining and restraining respondents from re- 9 || detaining petitioner Simranjot Singh (A-245-702-344) unless the government demonstrates, by 10 || clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, 11 | that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally 12 | justified. Petitioner shall be allowed to have his counsel present at any such hearing. This 13 || injunction does not address other circumstances where detention authority is established under 14 || different authority than what is presented in this case (e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. 1S § 1231). 16 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment for petitioner and close this case. 17 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 18 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days after 19 || being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 20 | the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 21 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 22 || filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 23 || failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 24 || Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (th Cir. 1991). 25 26 || Dated: March 18, 2026 A aA Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM 28 | 4, sing0325.26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE