Simpson v. Simpson

141 So. 50, 174 La. 530, 1932 La. LEXIS 1695
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMarch 30, 1932
DocketNo. 31068.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 141 So. 50 (Simpson v. Simpson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simpson v. Simpson, 141 So. 50, 174 La. 530, 1932 La. LEXIS 1695 (La. 1932).

Opinion

ODOM, J.

Prior to 1921, this plaintiff and defendant became involved in litigation, the exact nature of which is not disclosed, and in April, 1920, they agreed to “compromise and dismiss and settle said suit.” By notarial act, in which it was declared that, “In consideration of the premises and the settlement and dismissal of said suit,” this plaintiff, Mrs. Simpson, sold to the defendant, under full warranty of title, a certain lot and the residence thereon on Highland avenue in the city of Shreveport, with the following reservation:

“The said Mrs. Ada Hicks Simpson, reserving however, the usufruct and usé of said property during her natural life with all rights and claims appertaining thereto.”

The act further provides that, “in consideration of the premises,” the said Tom B. Simpson paid to Mrs. Simpson $260 in cash, and “as a further consideration binds and obligates himself to repair and paint said building located upon the above mentioned property and binds and obligates himself to keep said property in good repair, paying all taxes and assessments against the same and keeping the same insured * * * for an amount approximating the value of the'said building, loss if any, to be used in reconstructing another building on said premises to be likewise-subject to the'life usufruct of the said Mrs. Simpson.”

As a further consideration of the transfer of this lot and house to said Tom B. Simpson. *51 this defendant, he granted unto her “the usu-fruct” of a residence owned by him situated in said city on Vine street, “with full and complete authority to collect all rents therefrom for her own use and benefit so long as she lives, binding and obligating himself to keep said property in repair and to pay all taxes and insurance thereon at his own cost and expense.”

The said notarial act of compromise and settlement of said suit provides that, in case Tom B. Simpson, defendant here, should fail to carry out the terms and conditions of the transfer of the naked ownership of the property by Mrs. Simpson to him, said property “herein conveyed to him shall revert to the said Mrs. Ada Hicks Simpson and this transfer of said property shall thereupon become null and void without she being required to refund any amount already received at the time of said reverting, and her usufruct to the house at 44S Vine Street shall cease.”

Then follows the following pertinent paragraph:'

“But before said forfeiture shall be declared, the said Tom B. Simpson shall have thirty days’ written notice of the exact matters in which he has failed to comply with the terms and conditions herein and only on his failure to so comply after such written notice can such forfeiture be declared.”

In accordance with this act of compromise and settlement the old lawsuit was dismissed.

The present suit was filed on February 7, 1930, alleging that, defendant, Tom B. Simpson, had failed to comply witíi his obligation to keep the two residences in good repair, and for that reason it had been necessary for her to spend $521.81 for repairs thereon; she prayed for judgment against him for that sum, and adjudging “the reversion to her” of the property which she had transferred to him and adjudging her to be the owner thereof and revoking and rescinding the compromise and agreement and “reinstating the said suit (meaning the old lawsuit which had been dismissed) on the docket of your honorable court to be further proceeded with in due course according to law.”

The defendant resisted these demands on the ground that he had fully complied with all the obligations imposed upon him by the act of compromise and settlement.

The lower court rejected plaintiffs’ demands, but found that defendant should make certain repairs to the house on Highland avenue, and gave him ninety days in Which to make them. Plaintiff appealed.

(1)Plaintiff has brought up a record of more than 250 pages; 200 pages of which being testimony touching the question whether defendant complied with the obligation which he assumed to keep the two residences in good repair. After reading it and the briefs filed, and after a careful consideration of all the testimony and all points raised, our opinion is that the lower court made no error in his ruling.

At the time this compromise and settlement of the old suit were made and this agreement entered into, Mrs. Simpson, who is the stepmother of defendant, was living in the residence which she transferred to defendant with reservation of the usufruct. The other house, the one on Vine street, was then leased. Shortly after the agreement was entered into, the exact date not being shown, but evidently in the year 1920, Mrs. Simpson made written demand upon defendant to “arrange the porches as they were before, so that they can be used for the purpose that galleries are intended to be, within thirty days from the date hereof, or I shall declare the contract null and void.” This had reference to the house on Vine street.

Immediately following receipt of this notice, defendant employed a contractor to “arrange the porches.” He says that, before doing so, he took plaintiff on a journey through the city in order that she might observe other residences and pick out the style of porch she wanted built. She says she has no recollection of this. But whether she did or not, the facts are that defendant had the porch rebuilt at a cost of over $900. Mrs. Simpson offered some testimony showing that this porch or “gallery” was not constructed as it should have been. Defendant offered testimony showing that it was. But whether it was or not, Mrs. Simpson cannot now be heard to say that it was not, because she used the house for more than nine years without giving defendant written notice that any additional repairs were wanted.

The contract provides that before a forfeiture shall be declared the defendant “shall have thirty days Written notice of the exact matters in which he has failed to comply with the terms and conditions herein.” If these repairs were not properly made, Mrs. Simpson should have given defendant written notice to that effect. Having failed to give this written notice, she cannot now complain.

(2) Mrs. Simpson asks that she have judgment for $521.81 for items of expense which she incurred in making minor repairs between December 6,1920, and April 26, 1929, as set out on a list which she attached to her petition. She failed to prove all these items. But conceding that they are all correct, she cannot recover the amounts, for the reason that she made the repairs without first giving the defendant written notice that they were needed. She says he knew they were needed and refused to make them. If so, she should have served written notice as required by the contract. This she failed to do.

(3) On July 23, 1929, she served written notice on defendant setting out that he had *52 failed to comply with his obligation to beep the property in repair. This notice apparently has reference mainly to the house in which she lived on the Highland avenue, the one she sold to defendant, reserving the usufruct.

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Bluebook (online)
141 So. 50, 174 La. 530, 1932 La. LEXIS 1695, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simpson-v-simpson-la-1932.