Simpson v. Loftin

33 So. 2d 230, 160 Fla. 20, 1948 Fla. LEXIS 596
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJanuary 9, 1948
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 33 So. 2d 230 (Simpson v. Loftin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simpson v. Loftin, 33 So. 2d 230, 160 Fla. 20, 1948 Fla. LEXIS 596 (Fla. 1948).

Opinion

TERRELL, J.:

Appellees as complainants filed their amended bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Duval County to restrain appellants, as defendants, from collecting taxes levied and assessed by them against certain tangible and intangible personal property held by complainants on the first day of January, 1942 in their capacity as Trustees for the East Coast Railway Company. Epitomizing from the amended bill of complaint, the chancellor in his final decree catalogued said assessments as follows:

“ (1) 1942 Intangible Property tax:
Value Amount of Tax
Class A....................................$ 2,311,110.00 $ 115.55
Class B.................................... 769,150.00 769.15
Class D.........:.......................... 557,030.00 557.03
Total ....................................................$1,441.03
“(2) 1942 Tangible Personal Property Tax:
10% Penalty (Failure to Value Amount of Tax
the Return) -............$2,400.00 $36.01
3.60
Total $39.61

*22 and for the years 1943, 1944 and 1945 as follows:

"(3) 1943 Intangible Property Tax:
Value Amount of Tax
Class A ..................................$ 7,305,660.00 $ 365.28
Class B.................................... 766.220.00 766.22
Class D.................................... 941,870.00 941.87
Total ....................................................$2,074.37
“ (4) 1944 Intangible Property Tax:
Value Amount of Tax
Class A .................... $18,330,140.00 $ 916.50
Class B.................................... 766,330.00 766.33
Class D.................................... 1,061.920.00 1,016.92
Total ....................................................$2,699.75
“(5) 1945 Intangible Property Tax:
Value Amount of Tax
Class A ..................................$24,121,520.00 $1,206.08
Class B.................................... 759,270.00 759.27
Class D.................................... 1,252,950.00 1,252.95
Total ....................................................$3,218.30”

Motions to dismiss the amended bill were overruled and separate answers were filed by each defendant in which all material allegations were denied. The answer of the comptroller denied that the intangible personal property held by the plaintiffs as trustees were assessed by him as a comptroller or by the Railroad Assessment Board of which he was a member. A Master was appointed to take testimony and make findings of law and fact. In one of the most comprehensive reports we have had occasion to examine the master found both law and fact to be in favor of the plaintiffs and held the assessments to be illegal and void.

Exceptions to the master’s report were overruled and a final decree was entered by the chancellor confirming the master’s report. The final decree not only adjudicated the intangible personal property assessments for the years 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945 to be illegal and void, it enjoined the Tax *23 Collector of Duval County from issuing any process or otherwise attempting the collection of said taxes. This appeal is from the final decree.

It may be stated at the outset that there is no attempt here to evade payment of the taxes in question, neither is there any dispute about the amount or classification of the taxes. It appears admitted that the amounts assessed are perhaps correct. The whole controversy here revolves around that of who should legally impose and collect the taxes in question, the taxing officers of Duval County, or the Comptroller or the Railway Assessment Board.

The Comptroller was made a party to the amended bill of complaint because the original bill prayed cancellation of the second item listed above, being a $36.01 assessment on personal property. The said property was furnishings in the general offices of the Trustees for the East Coast Railway Company and their Counsel in the Graham Building in Jacksonville. Section 200.40. Florida Statutes 1941, contemplates that when personal property of this class is in litigation on account of taxes, the comptroller be made a party thereto and there was no objection to making him a party to this suit. In his report the Master held that the tangible personal properties represented by item 2 above, were owned and held by the East Coast Railway exclusively for railroad purposes and under the law were assessible by the Comptroller on the Railway Assessment Board. The Chancellor approved the Master’s findings and in his final decree voided the assessments, no assignment of error having been based thereon, the Chancellor’s decree became final as to this item.

The question of taxability of the item of tangible personal properties being concluded, there remains nothing to be adjudicated but the assault on the assessment of intangible personal properties detailed in items one, three, four and five above. In our view these items represent properties held and used exclusively for operating purposes and the taxes on them must be assessed and imposed by the Comptroller or the Railroad Assessment Board, and the County taxing authorities of Duval County have no authority whatever to impose taxes on them.

*24 This affirmation is predicated on Section 195.01, Florida Statutes 1941, under which what is commonly known as the unit system from taxing railroad properties was inaugurated. In so far as applicable here, this act requires every “railroad company or street railroad company or sleeping or parlor car company, or the receiver thereof, whose car, track or roadbed, or any part thereof is in this state, shall annually, on or before the first Monday in March, return to the Comptroller of the state, under their oath, the total length of such railroad, the total length and value of such main track, branch, switch and spur track, and side track, lots or parts of lots not leased or rented, and terminal facilities, in this state, and the total length and value thereof in each county, city or incorporated town in this state as of the first day of January. They shall also make return of the number and value of all locomotives, engines, passenger, sleeping, freight, parlor, platform construction and other cars and appurtenances (including shop equipment, tools), stock in warehouse and other personal property used or to be used in connection with the construction, operation or maintenance of the property of the company ...”

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Bluebook (online)
33 So. 2d 230, 160 Fla. 20, 1948 Fla. LEXIS 596, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simpson-v-loftin-fla-1948.