Simpson v. Kollasch

749 N.W.2d 671, 2008 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 50, 2008 WL 2313133
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMarch 28, 2008
Docket05-1410
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 749 N.W.2d 671 (Simpson v. Kollasch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Simpson v. Kollasch, 749 N.W.2d 671, 2008 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 50, 2008 WL 2313133 (iowa 2008).

Opinion

STREIT, Justice.

No one wants to live near a hog confinement operation. Neighbors of two proposed hog confinement facilities filed an anticipatory nuisance claim against the developers of the confinement facilities and the owners of the land where manure from the operations was to be spread. While the neighbors raised legitimate concerns, our role in this case is not akin to a zoning board. An injunction based on an anticipatory nuisance is an extraordinary remedy and requires proof a nuisance will necessarily result from the developers’ proposal. Because the neighbors have not met this high burden, we affirm the district court’s denial of an injunction.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

In early 2003, General Development L.L.C. 1 filed two separate applications with the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for permits to construct confined animal feeding operations (CA-FOs) in Sherman Township, Kossuth County. General Development referred to the operations, which were to be located approximately two miles apart, as “Sow 1” *673 and “Sow 2.” 2 The facilities were designed to store all manure in concrete pits under the buildings. According to a manure management plan for each facility, the manure would be spread once a year on nearby farmland.

In May 2003, General Development published notices in the Algona Upper Des Moines newspaper stating its intent to build the two CAFOs. A public meeting was held. The Kossuth County Board of Supervisors submitted a list of concerns to the DNR. In August 2003, the DNR issued permits for the construction of Sow 1 and Sow 2. In its “Notice of Issuance of Construction Permits” to the Board, the DNR addressed the concerns raised by the Board and rejected them.

Prior to the issuance of the permits, the plaintiffs, who are all neighbors of the proposed facilities (hereafter “neighbors”), filed this case alleging nuisance and anticipatory nuisance. General Development filed counterclaims, which were eventually dismissed without prejudice. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of General Development and dismissed the neighbors’ nuisance claim.

At the bench trial for the anticipatory nuisance claim, General Development presented evidence the permit for Sow 2 had expired. Luke Kollasch testified he had no current plans to build Sow 2 although he acknowledged he may later reapply for a permit for Sow 2. Luke testified his plans for Sow 1 were unchanged.. Sow 1 would house 10,900 pigs (5400 sows, 2500 gilts, and 3000 suckling pigs). General Development would compost approximately 2500 3 dead pigs a year and store and spread approximately five million gallons of manure. Several neighbors testified regarding their concerns about the proposed CAFOs. Both parties provided expert and lay testimony with respect to potential odors, water contamination, health effects, and reduction in property values. Additionally, several individuals testified concerning their negative experiences living near General Development’s existing CA-FOs. The district court found the neighbors failed to prove an anticipatory nuisance and dismissed their petition. On appeal, the neighbors allege the district court erred (1) by only considering the Sow 1 facility; (2) by considering DNR standards and regulations; and (3) by concluding Sow 1 would not necessarily constitute a nuisance. General Development claims the district court properly found the neighbors failed to meet their burden of proof. It notes the neighbors are free to bring a nuisance claim if their concerns are realized once Sow 1 is in operation.

II. Scope of Review.

Cases tried in equity are reviewed de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4. “[W]e give weight to the findings of fact made by the trial court in this case, especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by those findings.” Owens v. Brownlie, 610 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Iowa 2000).

III. Merits.

A. Whether the District Court Erred by Only Considering the Sow 1 Facility. The district court’s ruling did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to Sow 2, other than the permit had expired. The neighbors filed a motion requesting the court to enlarge and amend its ruling to address *674 Sow 2. The neighbors noted “nothing is preventing the Defendants from reapplying for and being granted the permit for Sow 2.... ” In its ruling on the motion to enlarge, the district court stated because “Sow Two is not presently threatening the Plaintiffs,” “there is no anticipated nuisance to be enjoined with respect to Sow Two.” On appeal, the neighbors contend the district court erred by not considering Sow 2. We disagree.

It would be entirely speculative to rule on Sow 2. At this juncture, General Development has no plans to construct Sow 2. When or if it decides to develop that CAFO, General Development must obtain a new construction permit from the DNR. We have no way of predicting future circumstances if that were to occur. For example, General Development may submit a revised plan, the law with respect to CAFOs may change, or some of the neighbors may move in the meantime. Since General Development applied for its original permits, the Kossuth County Board of Supervisors adopted the “master matrix” which requires anyone seeking a permit today to comply with the master matrix statute. See Iowa Code § 459.305. This statute also allows the Board to file a formal appeal with the DNR regarding the issuance of any new permits. See id. § 459.304. Thus, the issue with respect to Sow 2 is moot and the district court appropriately limited its ruling to Sow 1. See Rhiner v. State, 703 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Iowa 2005) (“[Cjourts do not decide cases when the underlying controversy is moot.”).

B. Whether the District Court Erred by Considering DNR Standards and Regulations. The district court allowed General Development to admit evidence of its compliance with DNR standards and regulations. The neighbors argue the district court should not have considered evidence of compliánce because “‘a lawful business, properly conducted, may still constitute a nuisance if the business interferes with another’s use of his own property.’ ” Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W.2d 454, 461 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Valasek v. Baer, 401 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Iowa 1987)). While compliance with regulations is not a defense to a nuisance claim, we agree with the district court this evidence was relevant. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.401 (defining relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). But see Andrews v.

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749 N.W.2d 671, 2008 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 50, 2008 WL 2313133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simpson-v-kollasch-iowa-2008.