Simpson v. Commissioner of Social Security

W.D. Washington

Simpson v. Commissioner of Social Security

DecidedAugust 26, 2021

Docket3:21-cv-05000

StatusUnknown

This text of Simpson v. Commissioner of Social Security (Simpson v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Simpson v. Commissioner of Social Security, (W.D. Wash. 2021).

Pincite

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 SAMANTHA LYNN SIMPSON, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C21-5000-MLP 10 v. ORDER 11 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income 15 and Disability Insurance Benefits. Plaintiff contends the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred 16 by rejecting the standing and walking limitations and need for position changes offered by a 17 medical provider. (Dkt. # 10.) As discussed below, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s 18 final decision and REMANDS the matter for further administrative proceedings under sentence 19 four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 20 II. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff was last insured through December 2019. AR at 17. Plaintiff was last gainfully 22 employed in February 1, 2014. Id. On August 24, 2018 and October 9, 2019, Plaintiff applied for 23 disability insurance and supplemental security benefits, respectively, alleging disability as of 1 February 2014. Id. at 15. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially, and on reconsideration, 2 and Plaintiff requested a hearing. Id. After the ALJ conducted a hearing on April 30, 2020, via 3 telephone due to COVID-19, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. Id. at 27. 4 As the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision is the

5 Commissioner’s final decision. AR at 1. Plaintiff appealed the final decision of the 6 Commissioner to this Court. (Dkt. # 1.) 7 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 8 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of social 9 security benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial 10 evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005). As a 11 general principle, an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is “inconsequential to the 12 ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) 13 (cited sources omitted). The Court looks to “the record as a whole to determine whether the error 14 alters the outcome of the case.” Id.

15 “Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such 16 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 17 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th 18 Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 19 testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 20 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may 21 neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. 22 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one 23 rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s conclusion that must be upheld. Id. 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. The ALJ Erred by Failing to Address Dr. Nolan’s Opinion 3 The Commissioner’s primary response to Plaintiff’s claim of error centers around the 4 application of the new regulations. The Commissioner argues that the regulations promulgated in

5 2017 changed the legal standards previously articulated by the Ninth Circuit. (Dkt. # 11 at 2-8.) 6 Under current Ninth Circuit precedent, an ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons to 7 reject an uncontradicted opinion from a treating or examining doctor, and “specific and 8 legitimate” reasons to reject a contradicted opinion from such doctor. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 9 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the 2017 regulations in 10 relation to its standards for the review of medical opinions. It is not, in any event, clear that the 11 Court’s consideration of the adequacy of an ALJ’s reasoning under the new regulations would 12 differ in any significant respect. The new regulations still require ALJs to explain their reasoning 13 with specific reference to how they considered the supportability and consistency factors, 20 14 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(b), 416.920c(a)-(b), and that reasoning must remain legitimate. See

15 Thomas S. v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 2020 WL 5494904, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2020). The 16 Court must, moreover, continue to consider whether the ALJ’s analysis has the support of 17 substantial evidence. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). With these regulations 18 and considerations in mind, the Court proceeds to its analysis of the medical evidence in this 19 case. 20 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of consultative examiner, 21 Raymond P. Nolan, M.D., regarding Plaintiff’s standing and walking limitations and her need for 22 position changes. (Dkt. # 10 at 3-4.) Dr. Nolan examined Plaintiff in January 2019 and found, as 23 1 to Plaintiff’s functional capabilities, that “she should be able to walk about two hours and stand 2 about two hours in an eight hour day with breaks as needed for comfort.” AR at 592. 3 The ALJ found Dr. Nolan’s opinion “somewhat persuasive.” AR at 25. Specifically, the 4 ALJ noted that:

5 The exertional limitations identified by the doctor are supported by the observation of the claimant’s ability to go from sitting to standing without difficulty, normal 6 gait, intact ability to do tandem walking on walk on heels and toes, and normal strength and sensation. However, while some signs of limited range of motion were 7 present in the lumbar spine and Patrick’s test resulted in anterior groin pain on the right, there is no objective support for the doctor’s opinion regarding the need for 8 breaks or ready access to a restroom.

9 Id. at 25. The ALJ then discussed Plaintiff’s issues with bowel function. Id. Yet, in the RFC, the 10 ALJ stated that Plaintiff could stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday despite the 11 limitation provided by Dr. Nolan that Plaintiff could only walk and stand about two hours in an 12 eight-hour day. AR at 20. The ALJ does not explain why she rejected this limitation, nor does 13 she explain why she rejected the breaks needed for comfort other than to say that there is no 14 support for finding the breaks are needed for comfort. Id. at 25-26. 15 The ALJ erred by failing to address why she rejected Dr. Nolan’s opinion that Plaintiff 16 was limited to being able to walk about two hours and stand about two hours in an eight-hour 17 day with breaks as needed for comfort. “Medical opinions are statements from physicians and 18 psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and 19 severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can 20 still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

1 2 3 4

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 SAMANTHA LYNN SIMPSON, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C21-5000-MLP 10 v. ORDER 11 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income 15 and Disability Insurance Benefits. Plaintiff contends the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred 16 by rejecting the standing and walking limitations and need for position changes offered by a 17 medical provider. (Dkt. # 10.) As discussed below, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s 18 final decision and REMANDS the matter for further administrative proceedings under sentence 19 four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 20 II. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff was last insured through December 2019. AR at 17. Plaintiff was last gainfully 22 employed in February 1, 2014. Id. On August 24, 2018 and October 9, 2019, Plaintiff applied for 23 disability insurance and supplemental security benefits, respectively, alleging disability as of 1 February 2014. Id. at 15. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially, and on reconsideration, 2 and Plaintiff requested a hearing. Id. After the ALJ conducted a hearing on April 30, 2020, via 3 telephone due to COVID-19, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. Id. at 27. 4 As the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision is the

5 Commissioner’s final decision. AR at 1. Plaintiff appealed the final decision of the 6 Commissioner to this Court. (Dkt. # 1.) 7 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 8 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of social 9 security benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial 10 evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005). As a 11 general principle, an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is “inconsequential to the 12 ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) 13 (cited sources omitted). The Court looks to “the record as a whole to determine whether the error 14 alters the outcome of the case.” Id.

15 “Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such 16 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 17 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th 18 Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 19 testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 20 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may 21 neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. 22 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one 23 rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s conclusion that must be upheld. Id. 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. The ALJ Erred by Failing to Address Dr. Nolan’s Opinion 3 The Commissioner’s primary response to Plaintiff’s claim of error centers around the 4 application of the new regulations. The Commissioner argues that the regulations promulgated in

5 2017 changed the legal standards previously articulated by the Ninth Circuit. (Dkt. # 11 at 2-8.) 6 Under current Ninth Circuit precedent, an ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons to 7 reject an uncontradicted opinion from a treating or examining doctor, and “specific and 8 legitimate” reasons to reject a contradicted opinion from such doctor. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 9 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the 2017 regulations in 10 relation to its standards for the review of medical opinions. It is not, in any event, clear that the 11 Court’s consideration of the adequacy of an ALJ’s reasoning under the new regulations would 12 differ in any significant respect. The new regulations still require ALJs to explain their reasoning 13 with specific reference to how they considered the supportability and consistency factors, 20 14 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(b), 416.920c(a)-(b), and that reasoning must remain legitimate. See

15 Thomas S. v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 2020 WL 5494904, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2020). The 16 Court must, moreover, continue to consider whether the ALJ’s analysis has the support of 17 substantial evidence. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). With these regulations 18 and considerations in mind, the Court proceeds to its analysis of the medical evidence in this 19 case. 20 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of consultative examiner, 21 Raymond P. Nolan, M.D., regarding Plaintiff’s standing and walking limitations and her need for 22 position changes. (Dkt. # 10 at 3-4.) Dr. Nolan examined Plaintiff in January 2019 and found, as 23 1 to Plaintiff’s functional capabilities, that “she should be able to walk about two hours and stand 2 about two hours in an eight hour day with breaks as needed for comfort.” AR at 592. 3 The ALJ found Dr. Nolan’s opinion “somewhat persuasive.” AR at 25. Specifically, the 4 ALJ noted that:

5 The exertional limitations identified by the doctor are supported by the observation of the claimant’s ability to go from sitting to standing without difficulty, normal 6 gait, intact ability to do tandem walking on walk on heels and toes, and normal strength and sensation. However, while some signs of limited range of motion were 7 present in the lumbar spine and Patrick’s test resulted in anterior groin pain on the right, there is no objective support for the doctor’s opinion regarding the need for 8 breaks or ready access to a restroom.

9 Id. at 25. The ALJ then discussed Plaintiff’s issues with bowel function. Id. Yet, in the RFC, the 10 ALJ stated that Plaintiff could stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday despite the 11 limitation provided by Dr. Nolan that Plaintiff could only walk and stand about two hours in an 12 eight-hour day. AR at 20. The ALJ does not explain why she rejected this limitation, nor does 13 she explain why she rejected the breaks needed for comfort other than to say that there is no 14 support for finding the breaks are needed for comfort. Id. at 25-26. 15 The ALJ erred by failing to address why she rejected Dr. Nolan’s opinion that Plaintiff 16 was limited to being able to walk about two hours and stand about two hours in an eight-hour 17 day with breaks as needed for comfort. “Medical opinions are statements from physicians and 18 psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and 19 severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can 20 still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. 21 §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). “The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence. 20 22 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b).” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the 23 ALJ failed to address Dr. Nolan’s medical opinion and harmfully erred by adopting an RFC in 1 contrast to the medical opinion. See SSR 96-8p (“If the RFC assessment conflicts with an 2 opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted.”) 3 V. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is REVERSED, and this

5 case is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 6 § 405(g). On remand, the ALJ should address all of Dr. Nolan’s medical opinions regarding 7 Plaintiff’s limitations. 8 Dated this 26th day of August, 2021. 9 10 A 11 MICHELLE L. PETERSON United States Magistrate Judge 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

Simpson v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simpson-v-commissioner-of-social-security-wawd-2021.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack