Simpson v. Burris

1961 OK 214, 365 P.2d 134, 15 Oil & Gas Rep. 496, 1961 Okla. LEXIS 417
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedSeptember 26, 1961
Docket39103
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 1961 OK 214 (Simpson v. Burris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simpson v. Burris, 1961 OK 214, 365 P.2d 134, 15 Oil & Gas Rep. 496, 1961 Okla. LEXIS 417 (Okla. 1961).

Opinion

BERRY, Justice.

On July 5, 1951, defendant in error, A. D. Burris, conveyed by warranty deed approximately 1,900 acres of land lying in LeFlore County, Oklahoma, to Leone Jowell and R. B. Jowell. Following the warranty clause in the deed, this provision was inserted:

“Except: It is understood and agreed that grantor conveys to grantees one-half of all of the oil, gas and other minerals and the rights thereunto appertaining which grantor holds at this time and that grantor retains unto himself, his heirs and assigns, an undivided one-half of all of the oil, gas and other minerals that he at this time holds with the surface of said land and said second parties shall have the exclusive right to lease said real estate for the production of oil, gas or other minerals and that grantor only reserves the right of the royalty payment in the proportionate interest that he retains.”

Prior to making the referred-to conveyance, Burris had executed an oil and gas lease'covering the minerals underlying the land conveyed to the Jowells. This lease, which apparently was for the primary term of ten years, provided for yearly delay rentals of $1 per acre. The rentals were paid by the lessee for each year that expired between date of lease and date of trial.

On January 5, 1956, Leone Jowell conveyed by warranty deed her interest in the land to plaintiff in error, O. L. Simpson. It was stated in said deed that the conveyance was subject to a mortgage and “Subject to oil and gas leases, mineral reservations and easements of record.”

On September 12, 1957, R. B. Jowell conveyed by warranty deed his interest in the land to Simpson. It was stated in the deed that the conveyance was subject to 1957 ad valorem taxes; to oil and gas leases; easements and mortgages of record, and “Subject, except as next provided, to all mineral reservations of record on January 6, 1956.” Following the quoted language this appears :

“Parties of the first part expressly warrant that the interest reserved by A. D. Burris in the oil, gas and other minerals lying in and under the above described property in his warranty deed dated July 5, 1951 in favor of Leone Jowell and R. B. Jowell filed for record on December 28, 1951 in the office of the County Clerk of Le-Flore County, Oklahoma, recorded in Book 308 at Page 520, was a royalty *136 interest only, and was not a reservation of any interest in the minerals or mineral rights. First parties warrant that the effect of said deed was to reserve to the grantor only the right to receive one-half of the share of royalties payable out of any production under any oil and gas lease upon said land attributable to the interest in the minerals thereunder owned by said A. D. Burris at the time of execution of said deed; that the interest reserved did not include the right to execute oil and gas leases; nor the right to receive any of the bonus consideration paid for oil and gas leases; nor the right to receive delay rentals payable under oil and gas leases on said land.”

By letter, under date of July 23, 1956, the assignee of the heretofore referred-to oil and gas lease, advised Burris that the reservation in the deed from Burris to the Jowells was “somewhat ambiguous in that in one place the deed reserves unto the grantor an interest in the oil, gas and other minerals, which would include rentals, royalties and other benefits which usually run with mineral ownership, and then the deed recites that the grantor only reserves the right to royalty payment, and our presumption is that it was intended that the grantees are to receive annual lease rentals which may be made under our above numbered leases, with the exception of the rentals on the 10 acres described in the second above described deed.” The as-signee requested that interested parties execute 'rental division orders covering the delay rentals payable in 1956 and subsequent years.

All delay rentals, paid for years prior to 1956 had been paid to Burris who in turn had paid over to the Jowells one-half of same.

Following receipt of the referred-to letter, Burris requested the Jowells to execute rental division orders upon the basis that Burris was entitled to one-half the delay rentals and the Jowells the remaining one-half. For reasons not made clear, an agreement was not reached concerning division of the rentals. For the year 1956 and subsequent years, the delay rentals were timely paid to a bank which presently retains same.

On January 9, 1957, Burris instituted this action in the lower court to reform the provision of his conveyance to the Jowells which is heretofore quoted. He alleged in substance in his petition that “all parties to (the deed) intended that (he) reserve full rights to one half of all minerals” but due to mutual mistake the attorney who prepared the deed inserted the clause to the effect that the Jowells should have exclusive right to lease the minerals and that Burris only reserved royalty payments in proportion to the mineral interest retained; that said clause “which purportedly gives the defendants the exclusive right to lease said real estate for the production of minerals and which purportedly only reserves the right to royalty payment on behalf of the plaintiff, being inserted in said deed by a clerical error, mistake, oversight or inadvertence, should be judicially reformed to comply with the intent to all parties of said instrument”; that said clause should be stricken from the deed; that Burris did not learn of the mistake in the deed until he received the hereinbefore referred-to letter from the assignee of the lease.

Simpson, the Jowells and a life insurance company were made parties defendant. The action as to the insurance company was dismissed prior to trial.

In his answer, Simpson denied generally the allegations of Burris’ amended petition. As an affirmative defense, he pleaded that Burris’ action was barred by limitations; that he was a bona fide purchaser of the land and minerals for a valuable consideration without notice.

The Jowells filed separate answers in which they each denied the general allegations of the amended petition and pleaded further that the action was barred by limitations.

Following trial of the case to the court, the court found and held in substance that *137 the provision of the deed in controversy “need not be reformed * * * for the reason that the reservation * * * is in the opinion of the court not ambiguous, but is clear and plain, and means * * * that the owner of the surface involved (Simpson) has the exclusive right to decide whether” to lease the minerals, but if he were to lease the minerals, Burris or his successor would be entitled to one-half the lease bonus, one-half the royalties and one-half of all other accruals; that delay rentals which had accrued but which had not been paid over by the depository bank and those that may be paid in the future under the oil and gas lease executed by Burris be paid one-half to Burris and one-half to Simpson.

From order denying Simpson’s motion for new trial, which was directed to the above referred-to judgment, Simpson perfected this appeal.

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Related

Knowles v. Freeman
649 P.2d 532 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1982)
Barry v. Frizzell
1962 OK 100 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1962)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1961 OK 214, 365 P.2d 134, 15 Oil & Gas Rep. 496, 1961 Okla. LEXIS 417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simpson-v-burris-okla-1961.