Simpson Development Corp.

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedJune 27, 2006
Docket54-03-05 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Simpson Development Corp. (Simpson Development Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simpson Development Corp., (Vt. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} In re: Simpson Development Corporation } Docket No. 54-3-05 Vtec (Appeal of Prelim. Plat } and PRD determinations) }

Decision

This matter concerns the subdivision and development of a 3.95± acre parcel of land in the scenic gateway of the Town of Norwich (Town). It was heard on the merits at the Windsor County District Court in White River Junction, Vermont, before Environmental Judge Thomas S. Durkin on October 14, 2005, November 4, 2005, and November 29, 2005. At the conclusion of the merits hearing and at the parties’ request, the Court afforded the parties an opportunity to file supplements to their proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as post-trial motions and memoranda. All such filings were completed on January 11, 2006, at which time the Court took this matter under advisement. This appeal was filed on behalf of the Applicant, Simpson Development Corporation, which is represented by Paul Gillies, Esq. The Town appeared in this proceeding and presented evidence and legal arguments through its attorney, Frank H. Olmstead, Esq. No other party participated or appeared in this proceeding.

Preliminary Issue – Motion to Strike Prior DRB Determination (Appellant’s Exhibit 3)

At trial, Appellant offered into evidence (as Exhibit 3) the October 28, 2004 Decision of the Norwich Development Review Board (DRB) regarding Appellant’s prior application for preliminary plan review of its proposed subdivision and Planned Residential Development (PRD) plans. The Norwich Subdivision Regulations (NSR) follow a practice common in a number of Vermont municipalities that includes a multi-phased review of proposed subdivisions, especially subdivisions which are deemed to be “major.” See NSR §§ 2.1 through 2.5, inclusive. The October 28 DRB Decision granted preliminary plan approval1 to Appellant-Applicant’s

1 NSR § 2.3 uses the term “determination.” However, the October 28 Decision specifically notes that the “DRB approves the Preliminary Site Plan based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law as outlined” in the Decision. October 28 DRB Decision at 4 (emphasis added). proposed subdivision and PRD plans. Preliminary subdivision approval is the second stage of a four-stage process for major subdivision review under NSR Article 2. The Town objected to the admission of Appellant’s Exhibit 3 and the Court initially ruled Exhibit 3 was inadmissible. However, during the course of the second day of trial, Appellant requested that the Court reconsider its admissibility ruling on Exhibit 3, based upon the general premise that this Court, when hearing appeals from municipal panels, stands in the place of the panel appealed from. We have been advised and cautioned that the "reach of the [environmental] court . . . is as broad as the powers of a zoning board of adjustment or a planning commission, but it is not broader." In re Torres, 154 Vt. 233, 235 (1990). In the present appeal, the Court is considering Appellant’s application for “intermediate plan review” under NSR § 2.4. During the course of the DRB’s consideration of Appellant’s application for intermediate plan approval, the DRB would have had before it the prior Decision granting preliminary plan approval. Over the Town’s objection, the Court granted Appellant’s request to reconsider and admitted Exhibit 3, for the purpose of establishing the record that would have been before the DRB, and therefore should be before the Court in this appeal, when considering Appellant’s application for intermediate plan review under NSR § 2.4. Now pending before the Court is the Town’s renewed Motion to Strike Exhibit 3. The Town in its Motion renews its objections to the admittance of Exhibit 3, particularly that the admission of this Exhibit would violate the very nature of de novo appeals, as outlined by our Supreme Court in In re Poole, 136 Vt. 242 (1978), Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Board, 151 Vt. 9 (1989) and In re Stowe Club Highlands, 164 Vt. 272 (1995). The Town’s reliance on the Poole, Chioffi and Stowe Clubs cases is mistaken, for the principal reason that Exhibit 3 is not a copy of the decision appealed from in this proceeding, but rather is a copy of a prior decision which was not appealed by any party. As such, Exhibit 3 does not violate the mandate from Poole and its progeny that de novo appeals require the reviewing court to hear “[a]ll the evidence anew” and to render its own factual determinations “as though no decision had previously been rendered.” Poole, at 245. Under Article 2 of the Norwich Subdivision Regulations, an applicant seeking intermediate or final subdivision approval must first submit a preliminary plan to the Norwich

Page 2. Planning Commission.2 NSR § 2.3. Thus, Exhibit 3 evidences that the Applicant here fulfilled at least one prerequisite for intermediate or final subdivision approval: submitting a preliminary subdivision plan and having it reviewed by the appropriate municipal panel. Exhibit 3 is relevant and admissible on those grounds. In response to the Town’s Motion to Strike, Appellant-Applicant raised a related issue: whether a preliminary subdivision determination that has not been appealed from is binding upon the parties, including the municipality, pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 4472. Preliminary, intermediate and final review of major subdivisions have been the subject of many appeals to this Court, but it appears that the issue of finality of preliminary subdivision determinations is one of first impression for us.3 Some guidance on this issue appears in the specific ordinance provisions. NSR § 2.4 emphasizes that “[a]pproval of the intermediate plan and associated plat shall not constitute approval of the final subdivision plan and plat.” No party here is suggesting that preliminary subdivision approval should constitute final subdivision approval. However, if preliminary determinations are to mean anything, Appellant asserts, they must be read as providing some finality on the issues decided and not appealed at the various stages of the subdivision review process. We agree. Our analysis begins with the importance of the basic premise of finality in land use litigation. Any party who fails to appeal an adverse determination made by an appropriate municipal panel is bound by that determination and may not “contest, either directly or indirectly, the decision . . . in any proceeding . . . .” 24 V.S.A. § 4472(d) (2005). The sometimes harsh reality of this finality rule, particularly as it relates to municipalities, was shown in In re Tekram Partners, et. al., 2005 Vt. 92, where a certificate of occupancy issued by a zoning administrator was held to bar a subsequent municipal enforcement action for alleged as-built deviations from the approved plans. The Supreme Court held that the municipality, like any aggrieved interested person as defined under 24 V.S.A. § 4465(b)(2), must file a timely appeal or be forever bound by the determination made below. In Tekram Partners, the Court specifically

2 Since Appellant-Applicant simultaneously submitted his preliminary subdivision plan with his PRD application under § 12 of the Norwich Zoning Regulations, the preliminary subdivision plan and PRD applications were reviewed concurrently by the DRB, and not the Planning Commission. 3 But see In re Appeal of Gulli, 174 Vt. 580 (2002), where the Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal by this Court of an appeal from a final subdivision determination. The Supreme Court noted that the failure of appellants to file a proper appeal from a prior DRB decision approving a subdivision and PUD application “deprives the environmental court of jurisdiction” to hear challenges to the subdivision and PUD approval in a later appeal of the DRB’s subsequent approval of the “Final Parcel Map” submitted by the developer. Id. at 581, 583.

Page 3.

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Related

In Re Stowe Club Highlands
668 A.2d 1271 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1995)
In Re Poole
388 A.2d 422 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1978)
Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Board
556 A.2d 103 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1989)
Village of Woodstock v. Bahramian
631 A.2d 1129 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1993)
In Re Appeals of Garen
807 A.2d 448 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2002)
In Re Appeal of Gulli
816 A.2d 485 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2002)
In re Glen M.
575 A.2d 193 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1990)
In re Appeal of Tekram Partners
2005 VT 92 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
Simpson Development Corp., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simpson-development-corp-vtsuperct-2006.