Simons v. City of Los Angeles

100 Cal. App. 3d 496, 161 Cal. Rptr. 67, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2463
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 27, 1979
DocketCiv. 55574
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 100 Cal. App. 3d 496 (Simons v. City of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simons v. City of Los Angeles, 100 Cal. App. 3d 496, 161 Cal. Rptr. 67, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinion

Opinion

COBEY, Acting P. J.

This appeal, from a judgment denying relief in mandamus, poses the question whether real party in interest, Los Angeles Police Revolver and Athletic Club, Inc. (hereafter Club), was properly granted permission by respondents, City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles City Planning Commission (hereafter City and Commission), to build two relocatable classrooms in a building on a portion of a *499 3.78-acre parcel primarily used for many years to provide vehicle parking for those using the directly adjoining Los Angeles Police Academy (hereafter Police Academy), through approval of the construction plans for the building involved by the Commission and the city council rather than through the issuance of a conditional use permit for this use of this property. For reasons that follow we intend to hold that the procedure followed was legally correct and, therefore, the judgment under appeal must be affirmed.

Facts

The Club has been incorporated since December 6, 1934, as a California nonprofit corporation. From at least January 1941 to at least August 1976 the already-mentioned 3.78-acre parcel was used as a part of the Police Academy primarily for parking and secondarily for training. 1 The Club leased the parcel from April 15, 1935, to April 15, 1946, when it acquired the land in fee.

The Police Academy is an educational institution which trains officers and prospective officers of the Los Angeles Police Department. It is operated by the Club through publicly paid personnel from the police department and the city attorney’s office. The bulk of the academy’s facilities are located on a 21.464-acre parcel in Elysian Park directly adjoining the smaller parcel. These facilities were originally contributed generally by the Club. The 21.464-acre parcel is in a R1-1 (residential one-story) zone. (See Simons v. City of Los Angeles (1976) 63 Cal. App.3d 455, 463-464 [133 Cal.Rptr. 721].)

The construction of the relocatable classroom building was paid entirely by the Los Angeles Police Academy trust, a privately endowed tax exempt trust administered solely by the Club for police training. The Club leases the 3.78-acre parcel to the trust on an annual basis at a nominal rate. The classroom building was completed in or about December 1976 and has apparently been in use ever since. 2

*500 There are no residences near the classroom building and the building does not expand the existing capacity of the Police Academy. Its use alleviates overcrowded teaching conditions elsewhere in the academy. The aforementioned parcel on which the building is located, however, is in the R1 (single family residence) zone. Prior to the adoption of the hereafter-mentioned comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1946, this parcel was in the R4 zone.

Discussion

A. Standing of Petitioners

Both respondent City and real party Club have challenged the standing of both petitioners, Grace E. Simons and Citizens’ Committee to Save Elysian Park, to maintain this suit. We agree with the trial court, however, that Mrs. Simons’ standing was inferentially adjudicated in the immediately prior lawsuit between these same three parties over exactly the same question at issue here—the legality of the City’s approval of this use of a portion of the 3.78-acre parcel as the site of the classroom building. The judgment in that lawsuit granted Mrs. Simons hearings before the Commission and by administrative appeal, the city council on the precise issue before us. 3 This judgment has long been final. Consequently her standing to sue in this case may not now be challenged. (See Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 810 [122 P.2d 892]; Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637 [134 P.2d 242].) 4

The committee is in a different position. It apparently did not participate in the municipal administrative proceedings under review, *501 and it was not a party in Mrs. Simons’ original petition for writ of mandate herein. 5 In the first amended petition for writ of mandate herein, in which it was first named as a party, it is described as a nonprofit association whose prime purpose is to protect and maintain the unique environment, etc., of Elysian Park and its environs, and many of its members are alleged to be property owners residing on the very edge of the park and in close proximity to the 3.78-acre parcel owned by the Club. The trial court sustained the general demurrers of the Club and the City, which were based, at least in part, on their claim that the committee lacked standing to sue herein. Upon the committee’s refusal to amend, the trial court orally directed a dismissal of this action as to it. But no such dismissal occurred.

Though we regard this issue as a close one, we hold, in view of the current trend toward relaxation of standing requirements for entities such as unincorporated associations, that the committee has standing to sue herein. As just stated, many of its members are alleged to be property owners residing on the very edge of Elysian Park and in close proximity to the site of the classroom building at issue. These people have an interest in the proper enforcement of land use ordinances affecting the quality of their neighborhood. (See Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 534, 541 [122 Cal.Rptr. 315]; Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 117, 122-124 [109 Cal.Rptr. 724].) As stated in the aforementioned Tus tin Heights Assn. v. Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 170 Cal.App.2d at pages 636-637, “[t]he petitioners are the owners of real property within the zoned area and as such they are restricted in the use of their property by the zoning ordinance. Each of such property owners has an interest in the enforcement of the ordinance which is peculiar to him. If the ordinance is violated, he suffers special damage that is distinguishable from that suffered by the public at large. . . .If [they] were to be prevented from going to court to seek redress for an alleged violation of [the zoning ordinance] by. . .any public official, certainly there would be a denial of equal protection of the law. The private citizen[s] would be subject to the burdens and obligations of the [ordinance], yet denied the right to protect the integrity and character of [their] property by the same ordinance.”

*502 B. Merits

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Bluebook (online)
100 Cal. App. 3d 496, 161 Cal. Rptr. 67, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2463, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simons-v-city-of-los-angeles-calctapp-1979.