FOTI, J.
The defendants appeal from the trial court’s decision rendering judgment for the plaintiffs in accordance with the report of the attorney trial referee. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) granted an injunction, (2) found an easement by prescriptive use by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title, (3) found that a right-of-way is appurtenant to the plaintiffs’ property, (4) determined that the plaintiffs had met their burden of proving that a right-of-way exists, (5) found that there had not been an abandonment of any right-of-way that may have existed, (6) decided that the Marketability of Title Act, General Statutes § 47-33b et seq., did not extinguish such a claimed easement, and (7) granted an injunction that did not set proper legal parameters of width, location, use, intensity and scope. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In their one count complaint, the plaintiffs, John D. Simonds and Delaine Simonds, claim the right to use a strip of land adjoining their property as a roadway over a portion of the land owned by the defendants, Raymond H. Shaw and Shirley M. Shaw, as a way of ingress and egress to Shetucket Turnpike in Voluntown. The plaintiffs allege that they have a right-of-way created by prescriptive easement because they and their predecessors in title have used and enjoyed the roadway for more than fifteen years in an open, adverse, visible, uninterrupted, notorious, and continuous manner. In May, 1986, the defendants obstructed the roadway to prevent the plaintiffs’ use of the strip of land. The plaintiffs seek an injunction to prevent the defendants from obstructing this roadway.
[685]*685After a trial, the attorney referee filed a twelve page report including specific factual findings. He listed a number of maps, plans and photographs that supported his finding that a right-of-way exists. He found that the right-of-way has been known over the years as Two Woods Road and Cooney Road. The attorney referee also referred to the testimony of previous owners and a land surveyor in support of a finding of a right-of-way. Although the defendants’ title does not mention the right-of-way, the defendants’ predecessors’ title mentions a “drift-way” crossing the rear portion of the property. The defendants’ property survey includes notations of a roadway passing across their property to the plaintiffs’ property. The attorney referee concluded that the plaintiffs had shown by a fair preponderance that they had an easement by prescription for the right-of-way. He determined that the right-of-way has existed since at least 1942, is appurtenant to the plaintiffs’ property, and was included in the plaintiffs’ and their predecessors’ deeds of conveyance, which transferred “all appurtenances.” He recommended that the court grant the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs.
The defendants filed a motion to correct pursuant to Practice Book § 438.1 The attorney referee filed a supplemental report denying the substance of the motion to correct.2 The defendants filed exceptions and [686]*686objections to the attorney referee’s report pursuant to Practice Book §§ 4393 and 440 4 The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment in accordance with the attorney referee’s report. On August 14, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the attorney referee’s report. This appeal followed.
I
The defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted an injunction. They contend that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because the plaintiffs had other access to their property and that there was an adequate remedy at law because the plaintiffs had alternate remedies through an award of damages or pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31. We do not agree.
The plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to § 47-37, the statutory provision defining a prescriptive easement. General Statutes § 47-37 provides: “No person may acquire a right-of-way or any other easement from, in, upon or over the land of another, by the adverse use or enjoyment thereof, unless the use has been continued uninterrupted for fifteen years.” General Statutes § 47-31 creates an action to quiet title that is not relevant [687]*687to a claim of an easement because actual ownership of the property is not at issue.
Injunctive relief is appropriate in an action to bar the closing, obstructing or interfering with the right-of-way. See, e.g., Westchester v. Greenwich, 227 Conn. 495, 502, 629 A.2d 1084 (1993); Expressway Associates II v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp. of Connecticut, 218 Conn. 474, 475, 590 A.2d 431 (1991); Chapul v. Clarke, 26 Conn. App. 785, 792, 603 A.2d 1195 (1992). In effect, the attorney referee, by awarding injunctive relief, concluded that damages were not an adequate remedy. We conclude that an award of injunctive relief was not improper.
II
The defendants claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of a prescriptive easement. They separate this argument into a number of individual claims, which we will address together. The defendants argue that there were interruptions in the use of the roadway, so that the use cannot be considered to be a continuous and uninterrupted period of time for at least fifteen years as required by § 47-37. They contend that the plaintiffs did not meet the burden of proof to establish that a right-of-way existed or does exist. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find that the plaintiffs had a right-of-way by prescriptive easement to use the roadway.
“[A] prescriptive easement is established by proving an open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted use for fifteen years made under a claim of right.” Gioielli v. Mallard, Cove Condominium Assn., Inc., 37 Conn. App. 822, 829, 658 A.2d 134 (1995). A prescriptive easement must be proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Soffer, 190 Conn. 184, 188, 459 A.2d 1027 (1983); Public Storage v. Eliot Street Ltd. Partnership, 20 Conn. App. 380, 385, 567 A.2d 389 (1989).
[688]*688“Whether the requirements for such a right have been met in a particular case presents a question for the trier of facts after the nature and character of the use and the surrounding circumstances have been considered.” Krohner v. Seyburt Associates Ltd. Partnership, 20 Conn. App. 298, 301, 566 A.2d 995 (1989), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 814, 569 A.2d 550 (1990). The attorney referee made subordinate factual findings based on the evidence that allowed him to conclude that the plaintiffs and their predecessors had a right-of-way through a prescriptive easement.
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FOTI, J.
The defendants appeal from the trial court’s decision rendering judgment for the plaintiffs in accordance with the report of the attorney trial referee. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) granted an injunction, (2) found an easement by prescriptive use by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title, (3) found that a right-of-way is appurtenant to the plaintiffs’ property, (4) determined that the plaintiffs had met their burden of proving that a right-of-way exists, (5) found that there had not been an abandonment of any right-of-way that may have existed, (6) decided that the Marketability of Title Act, General Statutes § 47-33b et seq., did not extinguish such a claimed easement, and (7) granted an injunction that did not set proper legal parameters of width, location, use, intensity and scope. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In their one count complaint, the plaintiffs, John D. Simonds and Delaine Simonds, claim the right to use a strip of land adjoining their property as a roadway over a portion of the land owned by the defendants, Raymond H. Shaw and Shirley M. Shaw, as a way of ingress and egress to Shetucket Turnpike in Voluntown. The plaintiffs allege that they have a right-of-way created by prescriptive easement because they and their predecessors in title have used and enjoyed the roadway for more than fifteen years in an open, adverse, visible, uninterrupted, notorious, and continuous manner. In May, 1986, the defendants obstructed the roadway to prevent the plaintiffs’ use of the strip of land. The plaintiffs seek an injunction to prevent the defendants from obstructing this roadway.
[685]*685After a trial, the attorney referee filed a twelve page report including specific factual findings. He listed a number of maps, plans and photographs that supported his finding that a right-of-way exists. He found that the right-of-way has been known over the years as Two Woods Road and Cooney Road. The attorney referee also referred to the testimony of previous owners and a land surveyor in support of a finding of a right-of-way. Although the defendants’ title does not mention the right-of-way, the defendants’ predecessors’ title mentions a “drift-way” crossing the rear portion of the property. The defendants’ property survey includes notations of a roadway passing across their property to the plaintiffs’ property. The attorney referee concluded that the plaintiffs had shown by a fair preponderance that they had an easement by prescription for the right-of-way. He determined that the right-of-way has existed since at least 1942, is appurtenant to the plaintiffs’ property, and was included in the plaintiffs’ and their predecessors’ deeds of conveyance, which transferred “all appurtenances.” He recommended that the court grant the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs.
The defendants filed a motion to correct pursuant to Practice Book § 438.1 The attorney referee filed a supplemental report denying the substance of the motion to correct.2 The defendants filed exceptions and [686]*686objections to the attorney referee’s report pursuant to Practice Book §§ 4393 and 440 4 The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment in accordance with the attorney referee’s report. On August 14, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the attorney referee’s report. This appeal followed.
I
The defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted an injunction. They contend that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because the plaintiffs had other access to their property and that there was an adequate remedy at law because the plaintiffs had alternate remedies through an award of damages or pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31. We do not agree.
The plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to § 47-37, the statutory provision defining a prescriptive easement. General Statutes § 47-37 provides: “No person may acquire a right-of-way or any other easement from, in, upon or over the land of another, by the adverse use or enjoyment thereof, unless the use has been continued uninterrupted for fifteen years.” General Statutes § 47-31 creates an action to quiet title that is not relevant [687]*687to a claim of an easement because actual ownership of the property is not at issue.
Injunctive relief is appropriate in an action to bar the closing, obstructing or interfering with the right-of-way. See, e.g., Westchester v. Greenwich, 227 Conn. 495, 502, 629 A.2d 1084 (1993); Expressway Associates II v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp. of Connecticut, 218 Conn. 474, 475, 590 A.2d 431 (1991); Chapul v. Clarke, 26 Conn. App. 785, 792, 603 A.2d 1195 (1992). In effect, the attorney referee, by awarding injunctive relief, concluded that damages were not an adequate remedy. We conclude that an award of injunctive relief was not improper.
II
The defendants claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of a prescriptive easement. They separate this argument into a number of individual claims, which we will address together. The defendants argue that there were interruptions in the use of the roadway, so that the use cannot be considered to be a continuous and uninterrupted period of time for at least fifteen years as required by § 47-37. They contend that the plaintiffs did not meet the burden of proof to establish that a right-of-way existed or does exist. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find that the plaintiffs had a right-of-way by prescriptive easement to use the roadway.
“[A] prescriptive easement is established by proving an open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted use for fifteen years made under a claim of right.” Gioielli v. Mallard, Cove Condominium Assn., Inc., 37 Conn. App. 822, 829, 658 A.2d 134 (1995). A prescriptive easement must be proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Soffer, 190 Conn. 184, 188, 459 A.2d 1027 (1983); Public Storage v. Eliot Street Ltd. Partnership, 20 Conn. App. 380, 385, 567 A.2d 389 (1989).
[688]*688“Whether the requirements for such a right have been met in a particular case presents a question for the trier of facts after the nature and character of the use and the surrounding circumstances have been considered.” Krohner v. Seyburt Associates Ltd. Partnership, 20 Conn. App. 298, 301, 566 A.2d 995 (1989), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 814, 569 A.2d 550 (1990). The attorney referee made subordinate factual findings based on the evidence that allowed him to conclude that the plaintiffs and their predecessors had a right-of-way through a prescriptive easement. He determined that the testimony of previous owners and a land surveyor, maps, plans and photographs, and other circumstances demonstrated continued and uninterrupted use for at least fifteen years.
The defendants also claim that the plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest had abandoned any right to the right-of-way that was obtained through prescriptive easement. “Whether there has been an abandonment is a question of intention to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances, and is a question of fact and not of law.” Richardson v. Tumbridge, 111 Conn. 90, 93, 149 A. 241 (1930). The plaintiffs and the two previous owners testified that they did not, nor did they intend to, abandon the right-of-way. There was sufficient evidence, therefore, to support the attorney referee’s conclusion that there had not been an abandonment of the easement.
The defendants further claim that the easement was not appurtenant to the plaintiffs’ land and that, therefore, the right-of-way should not have passed to the plaintiffs. Whether the right-of-way is appurtenant or in gross is resolved by ascertaining the intent of the parties. This intent is determined by considering the provisions of the deed in light of the then existing situation of the property and the current surrounding circumstances. Stiefel v. Lindeman, 33 Conn. App. 799, 807, [689]*689638 A.2d 642, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 914, 642 A.2d 1211 (1944). The deeds of conveyance of the plaintiffs and their predecessors included language that transferred “all appurtenances.” We have held that a habendum clause that included the phase “with appurtenances thereof’ was sufficient to convey a right-of-way. See Chaput v. Clarke, supra, 26 Conn. App. 791. The attorney referee determined that the easement was appurtenant and therefore passed by deed to the plaintiffs.
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the attorney referee’s conclusions. Applying the law to this factual determination, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that an easement by prescription existed granting the plaintiffs a right-of-way over the roadway on the defendants’ property.
Ill
The defendants argue that the Marketability of Title Act, General Statutes § 47-33b et seq., extinguished the claimed easement. We do not agree.
The purpose of that act is to limit title searches to some reasonable period of the immediate past, forty years in Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes § 47-33c,5 and thus to avoid the necessity of examining the [690]*690record back into distant time for each new transaction. Mizla v. DePalo, 183 Conn. 59, 64 438 A.2d 250 (1981).
The attorney referee found that the defendants had received ownership of their property by deed in 1977. He determined, on the basis on the testimony of previous owners and the plaintiffs, that there were acts of use in the forty years prior to 1977, and that, therefore, the right-of-way was not voided by the Marketability of Title Act.
Moreover, General Statutes § 47-33h6 expressly exempts easements from being extinguished by the Marketability of Title Act where the easement is evidenced by a road or other structure. A party cannot extinguish such easement if the interest is evidenced by the location of said easement on the land.
We conclude that the Marketability of Title Act did not prevent the trial court from finding that the plaintiffs had a right-of-way over the defendants’ property.
rv
The defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted an injunction that did not set legal parameters of width, location, use, intensity and scope. We are unpersuaded.
“A prescriptive right cannot be acquired unless the use defines its bounds with reasonable certainty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schulz v. Syvertsen, 219 Conn. 81, 92-93, 591 A.2d 804. “[W]hen an easement is established by prescription, the common [691]*691and ordinary use which established the right also limits and qualifies it. . . . The use of an easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kuras v. Kope, 205 Conn. 332, 341, 533 A.2d 1202 (1987).
The trial court did not need to set specific parameters for the easement because the roadway defines the right-of-way. See Hagist v. Washburn, 16 Conn. App. 83, 86, 546 A.2d 947 (1988). The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from preventing use of the easement. The defendants argued that there was no right-of-way; they did not claim that the plaintiffs were overusing the roadway. The trial court granted the injunction restraining the defendants from continuing to close, to obstruct, or to interfere with the right-of-way. The plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable use of the roadway.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.