SIMONDS v. BOYER

District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided October 8, 2025·No. 2:21-cv-00841·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MARSHA SIMONDS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) 2:21-cv-841 ) v. ) ) CHRISTINE BOYER; and ADAM ) ) THIMONS, ) Defendants. ) )

MEMORANDUM ORDER Before the Court are motions in limine filed by Plaintiff Marsha Simonds (ECF 122), jointly by Defendants Christine Boyer and Adam Thimons (ECF 120; ECF123; ECF 125; ECF 127; ECF 129), and by Defendant Adam Thimons (ECF 131). The parties also filed an amended joint exhibit list containing a chart summarizing proposed exhibits, objections to those exhibits, and responses to objections. ECF 134. The Court issues this omnibus order resolving the motions and ruling on exhibit objections, as follows. I. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons’s motion to exclude Ms. Simonds’s proposed exhibits. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons filed a joint motion in limine, arguing that Ms. Simonds had not sufficiently identified the 44 exhibits she seeks to introduce at trial. ECF 120, p. 2. The Court finds that Ms. Simonds cured this error by sufficiently identifying the proposed exhibits in the joint exhibit list filed at ECF 134. The Court therefore DENIES this motion and addresses each objected-to exhibit’s admissibility below. II. Ms. Simonds’s motion for an in camera hearing. Ms. Simonds seeks an in camera hearing to address potential privilege issues related to Matthew Simonds’s testimony. ECF 122. Ms. Simonds states that Mr. Simonds is a licensed attorney who represented Ms. Simonds and Vera Holdings “during portions of this case.” Id. Ms. Simonds does not elaborate further, only stating that Mr. Simonds’s testimony may be barred due to attorney-client privilege, spousal privilege, and attorney work-product. Id. There are no foundational documents that were submitted showing an attorney-client relationship, such as an engagement letter. Further, Ms. Simonds has submitted several exhibits containing what appear to be communications divulging privileged information, signaling that the privilege may be waived. ECF 134. If Ms. Simonds intends to invoke these privileges, she must establish a foundation for the privileges, as well as an explanation as to any sword-shield issues. Setting all that aside, it is clear from the parties’ exhibits that Mr. Simonds was involved in the course of dealing over the parking-lot disputes, and also in complaining to city officials after the incident at issue. So he will likely be a witness at trial. To avoid unnecessary sidebars at trial, the parties shall at the pre-trial conference proffer the scope of any anticipated testimony as to Mr. Simonds. The Court will thus DENY the motion for a formal in camera hearing, but the parties shall be prepared to address the parameters of Mr. Simonds’s trial testimony at the final pre-trial conference. III. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons’s motion to preclude Ms. Simonds from providing lay testimony regarding medical diagnoses and to limit damages. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons seek to preclude Ms. Simonds’s testimony about her medical diagnosis and asks the Court to limit damages to nominal damages. ECF 123. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons argue that Ms. Simonds has provided no evidence of injury or treatment for an injury resulting from the August 27, 2019, arrest (the event at issue here). Id., p. 1. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons submit that Ms. Simonds may only testify about the “her perception and experience of her arrest.” Id., p. 2. And because Ms. Simonds has provided no evidence of physical injury, “she is only entitled to nominal damages in absence of proof of actual injury.” Id. The Court agrees to a certain extent. As a preliminary matter, opinion testimony by a lay witness is allowed. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, a witness, who is not an expert, may testify in the form of an opinion that is “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Id. The Third Circuit has reasoned that the “expression of opinions or inferences by a lay witness is permitted because of the qualification in Rule 701(a) that the factual predicate of the testimony be within the witness’s perception and this qualification simply reflects a recognition of the limitation embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 602, that a witness must have ‘personal knowledge of the matter’ in order to testify to it.” Teen- Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980) (cleaned up). Ms. Simonds therefore may testify, as a lay witness, about her physical and emotional condition during and after the August 27, 2019, incident, her perceptions of injuries following the incident, and her personal perception of the event. The Court agrees with Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons in that that Ms. Simonds may not testify or opine on any sort of specific medical diagnosis, given that that would veer into expert testimony, and there doesn’t seem to be any foundation for that anyway (e.g., medical records and the like). Further, because Ms. Simonds will be allowed to testify about her physical and mental injuries as a lay witness, the Court finds that Ms. Simonds’s damages should not be limited to nominal damages at this juncture. As a result, the Court GRANTS the motion to exclude Ms. Simonds’s testimony about an alleged medical diagnosis, but DENIES the motion in all other respects. IV. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons’s motion to permit examination of Ms. Simonds regarding her prior FLSA violations. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons seek to call Ms. Simonds as a witness and cross- examine her about “conduct underlying her liability of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) violations” in a separate, unrelated case. ECF 125; ECF 126, p. 1. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons argue that this evidence is relevant pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 401. This Court disagrees, and finds that this evidence is irrelevant and even if probative, is barred under Rule 403. Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” The prior case involved an FLSA violation; evidence of Ms. Simonds’s involvement in a prior action related to FLSA has no bearing on the present causes of action and does not tend to make any material facts more or less probable. Further, even if this evidence were relevant in some manner (perhaps as impeachment), it is barred under Rule 403. The probative value of the evidence is so low, given that to even understand it, one would need to fully understand a completely separate case and credit the factfinder in that case (without a full understanding of the factual record). Relatedly, the prejudice is substantial; this evidence would necessitate a mini-trial and would certainly confuse the jury. It is barred by Rule 403. The Court therefore DENIES the motion to permit examination of Ms. Simonds regarding her prior alleged FLSA violations. V. Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons’s motion to exclude Ms. Simonds’s “synced video.” Ms. Boyer and Mr. Thimons seek to exclude a video that Ms. Simonds has proposed as exhibit “P44.” ECF 127; ECF 134. The proposed exhibit purportedly overlays a video of Ms. Simonds’s interaction with Ms. Boyer and a 911 call. ECF 128, p. 1. Defendants’ main objection is lack of authentication—i.e., the video combines multiple videos and a 911 call, and the author of the video was not proffered and the means of creating the video was not provided. Ms. Simonds’s only response is that she can at trial lay a foundation to authenticate th

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