Simon v. United States

46 Cust. Ct. 118
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedMarch 20, 1961
DocketC.D. 2243
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 46 Cust. Ct. 118 (Simon v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simon v. United States, 46 Cust. Ct. 118 (cusc 1961).

Opinion

Rao, Judge:

Certain wallpaper sample books, imported from France, were classified by the collector of customs at the port of entry, as manufactures of paper, not specially provided for, and, accordingly, were assessed with duty at the rate of 17% per centum ad valorem, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1413 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the Annecy Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 84 Treas. Dec. 403, T.D. 52373, supplemented by Presidential proclamation, 85 Treas. Dec. 116, T.D. 52462.

Plaintiff herein contends that said merchandise consists of samples entitled to free entry, by virtue of paragraph 1821 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by Public Law 85-211 (71 Stat. 486), approved August 28, 1957. An alternative claim for classification of the imported articles within the provisions of paragraph 1409 of said act, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 82 Treas. Dec. 305, T.D. 51802, for hanging paper, therein made dutiable at the rate of 1 cent per pound and 10 per centum ad valorem, has not been further pressed and is, therefore, deemed to have been abandoned.

The tariff provisions remaining in competition read, insofar as here pertinent, as follows:

Paragraph 1413, as modified, supra:

Manufactures of paper, or of which paper is the component material of chief value not specially provided for (except ribbon fly catchers or fly ribbons)_17%% ad val.

[120]*120Paragraph 1821, supra:

(a) Except as provided in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d), any sample to be used in the United States only for soliciting orders for products of foreign countries.
(b) Subparagraph (a) shall apply to a sample only if its value does not exceed $1, except that this limitation shall not apply to (1) any sample which is marked, torn, perforated, or otherwise treated, in such a manner that such sample is unsuitable “for sale or for use otherwise than as a sample, or (2) any sample which is covered by subparagraph (c) or (d).

The record shows that the involved wallpaper sample books were imported for the account of A. L. Diament & Co., a firm engaged in the wholesaling of wallpaper, fabrics, and furniture to interior decorators. The vice president of the company, who testified for the plaintiff, personally made the selection of the sample papers during a buying trip to France in late 1956 or early 1957. He chose those offerings of three French wallpaper houses which, in his opinion, and based upon his judgment, consistent with the standards of A. L. Diament & Co., would be .salable to decorators in the United States. The sample books were specially prepared for his company at a cost of $4.80 per copy, the charge being made by reason of the expense of manufacturing these books.

One of the imported wallpaper books is in evidence as plaintiff’s exhibit 1. It consists of some 97 sheets of wallpaper designs, each sheet approximately 12 inches by 20 inches. On the reverse side of each sheet, there appear the words, inter alia, “The Diament Collection,” and an order number having reference to the stock of A. L. Diament & Co.

After importation, a collection of Italian wallpaper samples was assembled with the French papers, and the books were distributed, unsolicited, to decorators throughout the United States, for the purpose of obtaining orders for the French and Italian wallpapers exhibited. Pursuant to customary procedure for such distribution in this trade, payment, or in lieu thereof, return of the book, is requested. Some, but not many of the recipients, remit payment; some return the books; others simply retain them without payment.

When the papers have exhausted their potential for current selection of wallpaper designs, those books that are returned are destroyed.

The witness testified that the individual sheets could1 not be used as wallpaper for not a sufficient area of matching patterns could be obtained to cover a wall. Moreover, the reverse side is printed with a quality of ink that quite frequently shows through the paper after paste is applied. He further stated that paper dealers would not be interested in the used books because the tempera color of the designs, being water soluble, would tend to change the composition of paper.

By the weight of the evidence, which was not controverted, and, indeed, by apparent concession of counsel for the defendant, there is [121]*121little doubt that the importations at bar consist of samples. The question arises, however, whether these are the kind of samples accorded free entry by the provisions of paragraph 1821, supra.

Counsel for the plaintiff asserts that, within the literal context of paragraph 1821(a), the importations are samples “to be used in the United States only for soliciting orders for products of foreign countries” and, being marked in such a manner as to be “unsuitable for sale or for use otherwise than as a sample,” the value limitation set by subdivision (b) is inapplicable. It is, therefore, contended that the instant samples are entitled to free entry as provided by said paragraph 1821(a).

The point is made by counsel for the defendant that the provisions of paragraph 1821 should be read in the light of the circumstances surrounding its enactment to the end that the purpose of the statute may be ascertained. Thus construed, it is contended, the language is confined to samples directly related to the solicitation of orders from foreign manufacturers, for the purpose of expanding international trade, and, hence, where an American concern purchases samples from abroad for distribution in this country, to its own potential customers, paragraph 1821 does not apply.

It is, of course, fundamental that the master rule for the construction of statutes is the ascertainment of legislative intent. L. R. Markell et al. v. United States, 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. 518, T.D. 43239; United States v. Clay Adams Co., Inc., 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 285, T.D. 46078. Ordinarily, where the legislative purpose is evident from the plain meaning of the written text, and the language is neither ambiguous nor uncertain, no occasion arises to consult extrinsic data for further elucidation. Thorens, Inc. v. United States, 31 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 125, C.A.D. 261; United States v. Good Neighbor Imports, Inc., 33 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 91, C.A.D. 321. Consideration of such material may, however, be resorted to where ambiguity in fact exists, or where not to do so would preclude the court from exercising its function of determining congressional intent. United States v. Durst Mfg. Co., Inc., 46 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 74, C.A.D. 700.

It is our opinion that the language of paragraph 1821, supra, is not so clear and certain as to admit of only one interpretation. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine existing data for the light it may shed upon the intendment of the provisions.

Considering, then, the legislative history of Public Law 85-211, supra, which added paragraph 1821 to the Tariff Act of 1930, we find that the law was designed to implement the International Convention to Facilitate the Importation of Commercial Samples and Advertising Material, to which Convention the United States became a signatory on May 28, 1953.

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46 Cust. Ct. 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simon-v-united-states-cusc-1961.