Simon v. Simon

29 A. 657, 163 Pa. 292, 1894 Pa. LEXIS 1181
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 12, 1894
DocketAppeal, No. 38
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 29 A. 657 (Simon v. Simon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simon v. Simon, 29 A. 657, 163 Pa. 292, 1894 Pa. LEXIS 1181 (Pa. 1894).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Green,

We think this case was correctly ruled by the learned court below. While it is entirely true that, in circumstances which have been well defined in several of the decisions of this court, equity will, upon proper occasion, intervene and set aside voluntarily executed deeds and other instruments, yet the power to do so is of an exceedingly delicate character, not to be lightly exercised, and only to be invoked when the manifest justice of the case requires it. An examination of the testimony shows that the leading facts and circumstances which induce judicial action in this class of cases are not present. There was no mental unsoundness or feebleness on the part of the grantor, there was no exertion of undue influence to procure the execution of the deed, there was no advantage taken of a confidential relation as was so eminently the case in Yardley v. Cuthbertson and Miskey’s Appeal, there was no want of knowledge of the true and full character of the act; and there was the concurrent advice and consent of the grantor’s husband to the making of the deed, and the deed was prepared at the office of an honorable and distinguished member of the bar to whom the grantors were in the habit of applying for legal ad[295]*295vice when they desired any. The testimony is not at all conflicting. Some witnesses state more circumstances than others, as is always the case, but they are not contradicted and there is really no conflict of testimony in the case. The plaintiff’s own personal testimony is practically fatal to her case, as it discloses the absence of the kind of facts, without which equity will not interfere in this kind of cases. She testified that she had signed many deeds with her husband for' the purpose of conveying different properties of his to other persons, and she therefore knew the effect of such transactions.

Upon her examination on her own behalf she testified as follows : “ My husband died September 29,1889. The deed from my husband and me to my three daughters, I remember; it was made about a month before his death. He was not well and wor-1 ried. He was worried about his business affairs. I don’t know whether that worriment had relation to his debts. He did not express that worriment to me but I knew .he was worried. Annie, my daughter, first spoke to me about making the deed. It was some time before it was made. She said that she was advised that if I would sign my property over they would be safe—the girls. She said I was to assign it to the three daughters. She said they-would be safe on account of the business affairs—the money matters. Things were in an unsettled condition—I don’t think she said that, but that is what she meant. There wasn’t much said about making this deed to me. When I speak about things being unsettled I mean the family affairs—Mr. Simon’s estate—I know there were debts pressing. There was nothing said by Annie as to how those debts would affect me. She did not say why she wanted the property conveyed to her and her sisters—only she would like to have it, as in that case they would be more safe. The property was my own. It came to me from my father’s estate. I think Annie spoke to me more than once about this deed. In speaking about making the conveyance, Annie wanted me to sign it to them that they would be safe, that they would have a home. I understood her to mean that they would have nothing to live on if it was not made over to them, on account of papa’s business affairs.' That was it. That was the reason I did it. I knew at the time .that it was not subject to my husband’s debts, but I did it in a fright and I didn’t know what I [296]*296was doing, I guess, or I would not have done it. Mr. Keiper came and had the deed made and brought it to me for my signature. ' Annie told me that Mr. Keiper had advised her to have me to make the deed to the girls. She didn’t tell me anything else that Mr. Keiper had advised her to have me do. Mr. Keiper brought the deed to me. He brought an alderman with him to take my acknowledgment. I don’t think anybody but the alderman and Mr. Keiper were present when the deed was acknowledged by me and my husband. The deed was read to me by Mr. Keiper. He said nothing to me at that time about making it—nothing at all.”

It will be at once seen from the foregoing testimony of the plaintiff that she understood perfectly well what she was doing, she knew the effect of a deed, she knew that she was-conveying the property to her three daughters, that she was not acting under the effect of any undue influence, that she-was not even importuned to make the deed, but merely asked by one of her daughters upon one or two occasions to do so, and a very good reason stated at the time why it had better be-done. She knew that her property was not liable for her husband’s debts, and she does not say that her daughter or any one else told her that it was. The master expressly finds that the-proofs fail to establish that allegation in the bill. But although a- married woman’s property is not liable for her husband’s-debts, it is not at all uncommon for married women to consent that their property may be mortgaged, or sold, in order to relieve their husbands from the pressure of embarrassing debts. The daughters of this plaintiff may well have felt alarmed at the situation of their father’s affairs, and were quite justified in asking their mother to at least secure them a home, by a: conveyance which would put it oiit of the power of their parents to sell or incumber their homestead even if they should desire to do so. We cannot say that a request of the daughters-in such circumstances was unreasonable or unwise. As they executed and delivered a deed to their mother for a life estate in the property simultaneously with the deed to themselves, they thus secured a home to their aged mother as well as to-themselves. The plaintiff admitted, and so testified, that the deed was read to her by Mr. Keiper before she signed, and it appears also by her testimonjr that both she and her husband [297]*297executed and acknowledged the deed, showing that her husband not only consented to it, but deprived himself of his curtesy in the property. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the conveyance was made consciously, advisedly, without undue influence or importunity, and with a full knowledge of its effect, if the case were to be adjudged by the plaintiff’s testimony alone. But the other testimony, both for the.plaintiff and defendants, confirms and completes the record against the plaintiff’s claim. Her son, Luther M. Simon, testifying on her behalf, said: “ I first knew of this deed-at noon or in the evening of the day it was signed. My impression is it was at the dinner table. I learned it from my mother herself.....She said to me after the rest had left the table, ‘ Oh! Lute, I gave the. girls a deéd to this property. ... I only done it for protection.’ I think that was the word she used.” As this occurred on the same day the deed was- executed it cannot be said that she did not know, and was not fully conscious of what she had done.

Samuel Keiper, the husband of one of the daughters, testified for the defendants, as follows: “ On August 26, 1889,1 called at the house of Mr. John B. Simon. Saw Mr. Simon, Mrs. Simon, and Annie and Clara. They were in the parlor. This was probably about 9 o’clock in the morning. Father and mother said they had concluded to give the girls the home and directed Annie to go to his office and ask his clerk for the old deeds. In a short time Annie returned saying the deed could not be found in the office.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 A. 657, 163 Pa. 292, 1894 Pa. LEXIS 1181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simon-v-simon-pa-1894.