Simon Stephen v. YSKJS LLC
This text of Simon Stephen v. YSKJS LLC (Simon Stephen v. YSKJS LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion issued August 28, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00558-CV ——————————— SIMON STEPHEN, Appellant V. YSKJS LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 165th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-29590
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case arises from a bill of review proceeding that challenged a default
judgment in a contract dispute. Appellant Simon Stephen contends that the trial
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because service of process was invalid.
We affirm. Background
Appellee YSKJS LLC sued Simon Stephen for breach of a commercial lease
agreement. Stephen was served at his residence, but he did not answer the lawsuit.
YSKJS sent him, via certified mail, two motions for default judgment and notices
of hearings on those motions. Stephen did not respond. The court entered a default
judgment against Stephen in December 2020.
After a court-ordered receiver executed on the default judgment, Stephen
filed a petition for bill of review to vacate the judgment. He argued that service
was defective because the citation prepared by the clerk misspelled his first name
as “Simom,” rather than Simon. Stephen moved for summary judgment on his bill
of review, but the trial court denied the motion. The parties entered an agreed
statement of facts; Stephen moved for reconsideration of the order denying his
motion for summary judgment; and both parties asked the trial court to enter
judgment in their respective favor. The trial court denied Stephen’s motion for
reconsideration of its denial of summary judgment and signed a final judgment
denying Stephen’s bill of review. Stephen appealed.
Service of Process
In his sole issue on appeal, Stephen contends that the trial court erroneously
denied his bill of review. He argues that the underlying default judgment is void
2 because the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction over him due to
improper service. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
A. Agreed Facts
The parties submitted agreed facts to the trial court. These facts included:
• The petition named the defendant as Simon Stephen, and the citation listed the defendant as “Simom Stephen.”
• The affidavit of service (return) stated that the citation and the original petition were delivered to “Stephen, Simon.”
• The process server testified by affidavit that she personally delivered the citation and petition to “a male who identified himself as ‘Simon Stephen’ at his residential address” in Missouri City, Texas.
• Simon Stephen was actually served with the citation and affidavit of service.
• Appellee mailed, via certified mail, copies of its motion for final default judgment to Simon Stephen at his residential address, and in December 2020, the court signed a final default judgment which references the plaintiff as Simon Stephen.
• Simon Stephen does not claim that he was misled by the citation listing the defendant as “Simom Stephen.”
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set
aside a prior judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new
trial or appeal. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004). Bill of review
plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the
underlying cause of action; (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by 3 the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, or official mistake,
(3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. Id. When a bill of
review plaintiff claims non-service, as Stephen does here, he is relieved from
proving the first two elements, but he still must prove the judgment was unmixed
with his own fault or negligence. Id. Where, as here, the parties submitted agreed
facts to the trial court, we review de novo the application of the law to the agreed
facts. See Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Tex. Gas Transmission Corp., 105 S.W.3d
88, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
A default judgment is void unless the record shows strict compliance with
the rules governing issuance, service, and return of citation. Huynh v. Vo, No. 01-
02-00295-CV, 2003 WL 1848607, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 10,
2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). There are no presumptions in favor of valid issuance,
service, or return of citation. Id. When the attempted service of process is invalid,
the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, and the default
judgment is void. Giles v. Giles, No. 01-20-00571-CV, 2022 WL 2251814, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). At the same
time, strict compliance with the rules does not require “obeisance to the minutest
detail.” Ortiz v. Avante Villa at Corpus Christi, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 608, 612–13
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1996, writ denied) (quoting Herbert v.
Greater Gulf Coast Enters., Inc., 915 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
4 Dist.] 1995, no writ) (op. on reh’g)). “Errors such as mistaken capitalization in the
defendant’s name and spelling errors too minor to raise any doubt that the correct
person was served are insufficient to invalidate service.” Ortiz, 926 S.W.2d at 613.
C. Analysis
Stephen contends the default judgment is void because the record does not
affirmatively show strict compliance with the rules governing issuance, service,
and return of citation because the citation was directed to “Simom Stephen” when
his name is “Simon Stephen.” Stephen cites numerous cases claiming that this is a
case of misidentification that requires reversal.
Texas courts recognize a distinction between misidentification and
misnomer. Giles, 2022 WL 2251814, at *3 (citing Enserch Corp. v. Parker, 794
S.W.2d 2, 4, (Tex. 1990)). The key difference is whether the mistake actually
created confusion about the proper party. Misidentification “arises when two
separate legal entities actually exist[,] and a plaintiff mistakenly sues the entity
with a name similar to that of the correct entity.” Reddy P’ship v. Harris Cty.
Appraisal Dist., 370 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
When a correct defendant is served under a wrong or misspelled name, the case is
not one of misidentification, but rather misnomer.* Huynh, 2003 WL 1848607, at
* See e.g., Giles v. Giles, No. 01-20-00571-CV, 2022 WL 2251814, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding citation served on “Christine Marie Giles” whose actual name was “Christina Marie Giles” 5 *2. “When the correct party . . . is sued under [an] incorrect name, the court
acquires jurisdiction after service with the misnomer if it is clear that no one was
misled or placed at a disadvantage by the error.” Reddy P’ship, 370 S.W.3d at 376
(internal quotations omitted). Misnomer of a defendant does not render a default
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Simon Stephen v. YSKJS LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simon-stephen-v-yskjs-llc-texapp-2025.