Filed 6/28/22 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
TIMOTHY SIMMS,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E075184
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1934524)
BEAR VALLEY COMMUNITY OPINION HEALTHCARE DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Keith D. Davis,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Timothy Simms, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kramer, DeBoer & Keane, Kathleen A. Stosuy, Deborah O. DeBoer, and Karla M.
Meier for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Timothy Simms wants to bring a medical malpractice
lawsuit against defendant and respondent Bear Valley Community Healthcare District
(Bear Valley). Representing himself, he appeals from a judgment denying his petition 1 under Government Code section 946.6, in which he sought relief from the requirement
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
1 in the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) that he timely present a claim to Bear
Valley before bringing a suit for damages. We reverse the judgment, finding that Simms
does not require relief from the claim presentation requirement because he in fact
submitted a timely claim, and the trial court erred by ruling he had not done so. Although
Simms’s claim was deficient in certain respects, its submission triggered a statutory duty
for Bear Valley to notify Simms of the defects, and the failure to notify him waived any
defense as to the claim’s sufficiency. As such, Simms should be permitted to file a
complaint.
In so ruling, we take sides in a split of California appellate authority that has
remained unresolved for decades. This split concerns whether petitioners seeking judicial
relief from claim requirements under section 946.6 may assert that they did present the
public entity with a timely claim, or whether that argument may be raised only by filing
suit and alleging compliance with claim requirements. We see no sound reason why a
petitioner should not be able to raise actual compliance in a section 946.6 petition, or why
the adjudicating court should be precluded from deciding that a submitted claim was
compliant if there are no disputed issues of fact that need to be left for a jury’s
determination.
BACKGROUND
Bear Valley is a local health care district organized under Health and Safety Code
section 32000 et seq. On December 8, 2017, Simms was injured in a fall and sought
treatment at Bear Valley’s emergency room. In December 2017 and January 2018,
2 Simms went to appointments with several Bear Valley medical providers to obtain
additional treatment for continuing pain from his injuries.
Simms was not satisfied with his experience at the follow-up appointments. On
two occasions—December 26, 2017, and January 26, 2018—he verbally “file[d] a
grievance” with Bear Valley, complaining that the providers who saw him had the
perception that he was trying to obtain drugs on false pretenses and thus were refusing to
investigate and treat his ongoing, chronic pain. Bear Valley responded to these
complaints with a letter dated January 30, 2018, explaining what the providers had
observed about Simms’s behavior during three visits. Several appointments in March
and April 2018 also did not meet Simms’s expectations. On April 24, 2018, Bear Valley
sent Simms a “formal notice” that Bear Valley would “no longer serve as [his] primary
care provider due to unresolved differences in treatment/care philosophy between
providers and patient.”
Simms sent Bear Valley a May 13, 2018 letter framed as a response to the January
30, 2018 letter. (According to Simms, he had been out of town and had not yet received
the April 24, 2018 notice when he sent his May 13 response.) In the May 2018 letter,
Simms detailed his experiences and denied any “drug seeking” behavior. He stated that
being “treated like a criminal by a couple of [Bear Valley] Providers” had “added to” his
chronic pain and given him “a tremendous amount of stress, anxiety, and severe mental
anguish.” Simms expressed dissatisfaction not only with the efforts of the Bear Valley
providers to help him control his “chronic pain,” including refusal to renew his
3 medications or transition him to different medications that would work better, but also
with their failure to order additional scans to investigate the source of his pain. He
demanded that all references to “drug seeking behavior” be removed from his medical
records. Simms also asked for a “written apology” from a particular Bear Valley doctor
“for his unprofessionalism, gross negligence and defamatory comments . . . which have
now spread throughout all of [Bear Valley].” Simms threatened that if he “continue[d] to
be defamed, harassed, mistreated and ignored by [Bear Valley]” he would “take [his]
concerns to a higher level” by “filing a lawsuit for restitution.” Bear Valley did not
respond to the letter.
On July 11, 2019, Simms sent Bear Valley a letter framed as a “90-Day Notice of
Intent to Sue as required by California Code of Civil Procedure § 364.” The notice was
addressed to the same Bear Valley employee as his May 2018 letter. In the notice,
Simms stated that he intended to file a medical malpractice lawsuit against Bear Valley.
He represented that on “July 18, 2018 and September 13, 2018” he received results of
MRI scans ordered by his new health care provider, scans that Bear Valley providers had
“refused to do.” The scans revealed spinal injuries from Simms’s December 2017 fall
that Bear Valley had failed to diagnose, “result[ing] in further physical damage . . .
coupled with an unnecessary delay of safe and proper treatment causing irreparable
damage” to his neck and back “which has resulted in recommended surgeries to avoid
paralysis.” Simms also complained of “severe withdrawal symptoms” due to Bear Valley
4 providers’ “refusal to provide continued care and/or prescribe [him] medications [he] had
been taking for two years (or prescribe a safe withdrawal plan).”
Bear Valley treated Simms’s July 11, 2019 letter as a claim under the Government
Claims Act and responded with a “Notice of Return of Late Claim.” The notice stated
that Simms’s claim was being returned “because it was not presented within six months
after the event or occurrence as required by law.” As required by statute, the notice
informed Simms that his “only recourse” was to apply for leave to present a late claim.
(See § 911.3, subd. (a).)
On July 30, 2019, Simms applied for leave to present a late claim. Bear Valley
denied the application on August 20, 2019. As required by statute, the denial notice
informed Simms that if he wished “to file a court action on this matter,” he must “first
petition the appropriate court for an order relieving [him] from the provisions of
Government Code Section 945.4 (claim presentation requirement). See Government
Code Section 946.6.” (See § 911.8, subd. (b).)
On November 18, 2019, Simms petitioned the trial court for an order relieving him
from the claim presentation requirement. Simms’s proposed claim, framed as a letter to
Bear Valley, is similar to his July 11, 2019 letter to Bear Valley and his proposed claim
attached to his July 30, 2019 application for leave to present a late claim, except that the
stated dates when he received MRI scan results are “October 13, 2018 and October 27,
2018” instead of the July and September dates. After a January 10, 2019, hearing, the
trial court denied the petition, finding that Simms’s May 2018 letter “did not comply with
5 the requirements of [the Government Claims Act] so as to be deemed either a claim or a
defective claim,” and that he had failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief from
the requirement of presenting a timely claim.
DISCUSSION
Simms contends that the trial court abused its discretion in several ways. The
argument that we find dispositive is that his May 2018 letter should have been treated by
Bear Valley as a claim, even if a defective one, and that by failing to do so, Bear Valley
waived any defense based on insufficiency of the claim. It follows, in Simms’s view, that
the trial court should have allowed him to proceed with a lawsuit alleging causes of
action encompassed by that claim against Bear Valley. We agree.
Before turning to this analysis, however, we must first address a threshold matter.
For decades, there has been an unresolved split of authority as to whether a plaintiff who
files a section 946.6 petition seeking relief from the claim presentation requirement may
assert that he actually submitted a timely claim, or whether that argument may be raised
only by filing a lawsuit in which the complaint alleges compliance with the claim
presentation requirement. (Compare, e.g., Ngo v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 946, 951–952 (Ngo) [must be raised in a complaint alleging compliance] and
Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 827-828
(Rason) [same] with Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 702, 711 (Santee) [may be addressed in a claim-relief proceeding] and Reyes
6 v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 584, 593-594 [same].) Our division of
the Court of Appeal has not considered the issue in a published opinion.
In our view, cases like Santee take the better approach. The purpose of the claim
requirement is to provide the public entity with sufficient information to avoid needless
litigation. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455 [purpose is “to
provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate
claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation”].) The Ngo
approach multiplies legal proceedings unnecessarily, effectively requiring claimants who
dispute a public entity’s determination of timeliness to pursue the dual track of both (1)
filing a civil lawsuit alleging compliance and (2) applying for relief first from the public
agency under section 911.4 and then, if denied, from the court under section 946.6.
As Ngo notes, “[a] proceeding under section 946.6 is not a trial of the action itself
and the court in those proceedings has no more power than would the court handling the
action itself to grant what amounts to a summary judgment so long as there are triable
issues of fact concerning whether or not the claims statutes were complied with.” (Ngo,
supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 951.) The flip side of the same coin, however, is that there is
no apparent reason why a court presiding over a section 946.6 proceeding would not have
the power to decide whether the claimant had presented a timely claim in the absence of
any triable issues of fact. Of course, there are cases where the issue of timeliness “should
be postponed, upon appropriate demand by a petitioner, to a determination by the jury as
in cases involving private defendants.” (Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 712.)
7 Santee does not hold that the question must be determined in a claim-relief proceeding,
only that it may be, under the right circumstances. (Id. at pp. 711-712.)
No doubt, given the split of appellate authority, a “careful practitioner” would take
the belt-and-suspenders approach of both filing a complaint alleging timely filing of a
claim and filing a claim-relief petition, as case law and practice guides advise. (Santee,
supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 712, fn. 6; see Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal
Injury (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 5:51.2.) Nevertheless, we do not think the law should
trap those who do not do so, as “the claims statute[s] ‘should not be applied to snare the
unwary where [their] purpose has been satisfied.’” (Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water
Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 446 (Stockett).)
Relatedly, we make the following observation about the notices that a public entity
is statutorily required to send to a claimant whose claim is denied as untimely, or who is
denied leave to submit an untimely claim. These notices are correct if the public entity is
correct that no timely claim was submitted. But they are simply inaccurate for claimants
who actually submitted a timely claim. In such a situation, an application for leave to
present a late claim is not such a claimant’s “only recourse.” (See § 911.3, subd. (a).) If
the initial claim was in fact timely, it is not required that such a claimant “first petition
the appropriate court” for relief from the claim’s presentation requirement before
bringing suit. (See § 911.8, subd. (b).) Rather, the claimant could also (or instead) file a
complaint alleging that a claim was timely presented to the public entity. (Santee, supra,
220 Cal.App.3d at p. 712, fn. 6; Ngo, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 951–952.)
8 This “trap for the unwary claimant who disputes the public entity’s determination
of timeliness” (at least under Ngo and Rason, the side of the caselaw split we reject) has
long been recognized by California appellate courts: “For such a claimant, the late
claims process is not the ‘only recourse;’ in fact it is no recourse because the claimant
cannot argue timeliness in a section 911.4 application nor in a section 946.6 petition.”
(Rason, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 828.) Even under the side of the caselaw split we
follow, the statutorily required notifications could mislead a claimant into failing to raise
actual compliance, having been told that the only possible recourse is obtaining the public
entity’s leave to file a late claim or persuading a court to excuse compliance with the
claim requirement. Under Ngo and similar cases, a claimant who does raise a meritorious
actual compliance argument in a section 946.6 petition may nevertheless forfeit the
argument by failing to raise it in a civil complaint. We see no good reason to interpret
the Government Claims Act in a manner that creates additional traps for the unwary, no
matter how well established the procedures that have been developed to avoid them and
that are routinely used by sophisticated claimants or those with the benefit of legal
counsel.
We conclude, therefore, that where the analysis does not rest on disputed issues of
fact better postponed for determination by a jury, “the issue of timely filing of a claim
may be determined in a claim-relief proceeding.” (Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at
711.) And where raised in an appeal from a claim-relief proceeding, after having been
“argued . . . fully in the trial court, and submitted . . . to us without reservation or
9 argument that the issue remains pending below,” the issue of actual compliance is 2 properly addressed on appeal. (Id. at p. 712.) Here, (1) Simms argued in his section
946.6 petition that his May 2018 letter should have been treated as a claim; (2) Bear
Valley opposed that argument on the merits and without objection that there were
disputed of issues of fact better left for determination by a jury, and (3) the trial court
issued an express finding on the merits that the May 2018 letter does not constitute a
claim. We turn, then, to the question of whether the trial court’s finding was correct.
A claim for personal injury against a public entity, such as Simms’s medical
malpractice claim, generally must be presented to the public entity “not later than six
months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) “In medical
malpractice cases, the action accrues on claimants’ actual or constructive discovery of the
malpractice.” (Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 705 (Phillips); see
Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5 [time for commencement of action against health care provider
is “three years after the date of injury” or one year after “the plaintiff discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury”].) “‘[F]ailure
to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from
filing a lawsuit against that entity.’” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42
Cal.4th 730, 738; § 945.4 [with limited exceptions, “no suit for money or damages may
be brought against a public entity . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to
2 We do not here decide what relief, if any, may be available on appeal for a claimant who failed to raise the actual compliance argument in the trial court, whether because they were misled by the statutory notices we discuss above or for other reasons.
10 the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been
rejected by the board”].)
A claim has been presented to the public entity when the public entity “receives a
document which contains the information required by section 910 and is signed by the
claimant . . . .” (Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 707; see § 910.2 [signature
requirement].) The information required by section 910 includes the “date, place, and
other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim
asserted” and “[a] general description of the . . . injury, damage or loss incurred so far as
it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.” (§ 910, subds. (c), (d).) Where
the claimant seeks less than $10,000, the claim must also state “the amount claimed,”
including an estimate of any prospective damages, “together with the basis of
computation of the amount claimed.” (Id., subd. (f).) Where the amount sought exceeds
$10,000, “no dollar amount shall be included in the claim,” but the claim “shall indicate
whether the claim would be a limited civil case.” (Ibid.) “[A] claim need not contain the
detail and specificity required of a pleading, but need only ‘fairly describe what [the]
entity is alleged to have done.’” (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 446.) Moreover,
“‘[w]here there has been an attempt to comply [with the claims statute] but the
compliance is defective, the test of substantial compliance controls.’” (Wood v. Riverside
General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118 (Wood).) “Substantial compliance
contemplates that there is at least some compliance with all of the statutory
11 requirements.” (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 (Del
Real).)
Simms’s May 2018 letter to Bear Valley is signed, and it was presented to Bear
Valley within six months of the alleged injuries, relating to appointments with Bear
Valley healthcare providers during the period between December 2017 and April 2018.
In other ways, however, it does not substantially comply with the requirements of section
910. The letter describes at some length the acts and omissions of Bear Valley providers
that Simms sees as having injured him. But the letter does not comply with section 910,
subdivision (f), by providing information about the amount of the claim; the letter neither
states a specific dollar amount and how it was calculated, as required for claims of less
than $10,000, nor indicates whether the claim would be a limited civil case, as required
for claims of more than $10,000. The letter does not even state an immediate demand for
a monetary payment. Instead, it demands changes to Simms’s medical records and an
apology from a doctor, and threatens that if his “concerns” were not addressed, he would
take them “to a higher level” by “filing a lawsuit for restitution.” Thus, the May 2018
letter does not itself satisfy the prerequisites for bringing suit against a public entity.
There is a recognized and important distinction, however, between a claim that is
inadequate because it does not substantially comply with the requirements of section 910
and a document that is not a claim at all. “A claim that fails to substantially comply with
sections 910 and 910.2 may still be considered a ‘claim as presented’ if it puts the public
entity on notice both that the claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation
12 will result if the matter is not resolved.” (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 769; see
§ 910.8 [requirement that public entity give notice “[i]f . . . a claim as presented fails to
comply substantially” with statutory requirements].) A “claim as presented” is also
sometimes called a “trigger-claim” because its receipt by a public entity “triggers a duty
by the public entity to notify the potential claimant of the claim’s insufficiency stating,
with particularity, the defects or omissions.” (Green v. State Center Community College
Dist. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1358, 1354 (Green); see § 910.8 [requiring notice of
insufficiency of claim]; see also § 911.3, subd. (a) [notice requirement for claims returned
as untimely].) “If the public entity fails to send this notice, it waives any defenses as to
the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission.” (Green, supra, 34
Cal.App.4th at p. 1358; see § 911 [waiver by failure to give notice of insufficiency]; see
also § 911.3, subd. (b) [waiver by failure to give notice of untimeliness].) In evaluating
whether Simms’s May 2018 letter to Bear Valley was a trigger-claim—or instead merely
correspondence—we remain mindful that the purpose of the claim “is to give the
government entity notice sufficient for it to investigate and evaluate the claim, not to
eliminate meritorious actions,” so “the claims statute[s] ‘should not be applied to snare
the unwary where [their] purpose has been satisfied.’” (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 3 446.)
3 At oral argument, Bear Valley argued that we should defer to the trial court’s “reasonable” interpretation of Simms’s May 2018 letter as lacking any demand for monetary damages, since the standard of review on a petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement is abuse of discretion. We are not persuaded. The determination of whether Simms’s May 2018 letters was a claim or defective claim rather [footnote continued on next page]
13 Simms’s May 2018 letter readily communicated that he felt he had compensable
claims for both defamation and medical malpractice against Bear Valley. The letter
focuses on the “defamatory” accusation that he was “‘lying’” and “‘bouncing around
from doctor to doctor trying to get drugs.’” Simms complained that a Bear Valley doctor
“verbally attacked” Simms by making such statements, and that the label “‘drug seeker’”
was disseminated to other Bear Valley medical providers and staff by its inclusion in his
medical records. The letter also expressed Simms’s belief that he was receiving
inadequate medical treatment, as to both alleviating his chronic pain and investigating the
underlying source of it, and that his doctor had engaged in “gross negligence.” The letter
expressly threatened litigation if Simms’s “concerns” about being “defamed, harassed,
mistreated and ignored” were not otherwise resolved. (Italics added.) Thus, the May
2018 letter constituted not merely correspondence expressing dissatisfaction, but a claim
for injuries arising from medical malpractice and defamation—an incomplete claim, but
adequate to trigger Bear Valley’s duty to give notice of the insufficiencies, on pain of
waiving “[a]ny defense as to the sufficiency of the claim.” (§ 911; see § 910.8.)
than mere correspondence is not a discretionary judgment call, but rather a question of law, and we need not defer to the trial court’s interpretation of the document. (See, e.g., Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 709-711 [discussing legal standard for making determination, which “depends not on a claimant’s state of mind but rather on the information imparted to the public entity”].)
14 Similar reasoning established that a letter in Foster v. McFadden (1973) 30
Cal.App.3d 943 (Foster) constituted a claim. There, the plaintiff was injured when struck
by a bulldozer driven by a sanitation district employee. (Id. at p. 945.) At issue was
whether a letter, sent by the plaintiff’s attorney to the employee with a copy to the
district, triggered the notice and defense waiver provisions of sections 910.8 and 911.
(Foster, supra, at p. 945.) The letter identified the plaintiff by name, stated the date and
place of the accident, and asked that the employee forward the letter to his insurance
carrier or, if not insured, to promptly “inform the attorney what he wished to do about the
matter.” (Ibid.) The letter “closed with the expressed hope that direct dealing between
the parties would avoid the necessity for ‘initiating formal proceedings.’” (Ibid.) The
letter did not substantially comply with the claim presentation requirements, or even use
the term “claim”; it told the district of only “an unlabeled and deficient claim by plaintiff
against the district for unstated damages for undescribed injuries he allegedly suffered in
an identified but undescribed recent accident involving a specified employee of the
district.” (Id. at p. 947.) Nevertheless, despite its deficiencies, the letter “afforded the
district the opportunity to make a prompt investigation of the accident,” and gave the
district “the opportunity to settle without suit, if it so desired.” (Id. at p. 949.) On that
basis, the Court of Appeal held the letter “should be treated as a claim” and reversed a
judgment issued due to the failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement.
(Id. at pp. 949, 945.)
15 Similarly, Simms’s May 2018 letter did not use the term “claim,” but told Bear
Valley at some length and detail of what Simms perceived as inadequate medical
treatment and defamatory statements by Bear Valley providers, and injuries (even if
unspecified in amount) that he contended he suffered as a result. The letter definitively
stated that litigation will ensue if Simms’s complaints were not addressed satisfactorily.
Applying Foster’s reasoning, this was more than enough to afford Bear Valley the
opportunity to investigate and, if it desired, to settle the matter with Simms. Simms’s
May 2018 letter therefore was, like the letter in Foster, a claim sufficient to trigger the
notice and defense waiver provisions of sections 910.8 and 911.
In arguing for a different conclusion, Bear Valley focuses on the phrasing of
Simms’s litigation threat—that he would file “a lawsuit for restitution”—asserting that
such a statement does not suggest he contemplated a suit for monetary damages. The
trial court agreed. We do not. “‘“‘Restitution’ is an ambiguous term, sometimes
referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to
compensation for injury done.”’” (People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd.
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 134.) In the context of Simms’s letter, however, there is no
ambiguity. Nothing in his letter suggests he might have been demanding the disgorging
of something that had been taken from him. On the contrary, the only reasonable way to
read Simms’s mention of a “lawsuit for restitution” is that he contemplated the possibility
of bringing suit to receive compensation for perceived injuries. The compensation
16 provided to plaintiffs who prove claims of defamation or medical malpractice is monetary 4 damages, at least primarily.
As Bear Valley notes, the purpose of the claim requirement is “‘to provide the
public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to
settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.’” (Stockett, supra, 34
Cal.4th at p. 446.) Bear Valley nevertheless wrongly asserts that there is “nothing in
[Simms’s May 2018 letter] to settle.” On the contrary, the letter is an offer to settle,
proposing that in exchange for Bear Valley removing offending statements from Simms’s
medical records and refraining from further treating Simms in a manner he found
objectionable, Simms would refrain from bringing a lawsuit. Certainly, Bear Valley
would need more information before it could agree to such a proposal, including
investigating Simms’s allegations of mistreatment and obtaining more detail about the
injuries he contends he suffered. But it is precisely such an investigation and dialogue
that the notice and defense waiver provisions of the Government Claims Act are designed
to motivate. (See Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 706 [“This possibility of waiver
encourages public entities to investigate claims promptly, and to make and notify
claimants of their determinations, thus enabling the claimants to perfect their claims”].)
4 A plaintiff who proves defamation may also receive posttrial injunctive relief, prohibiting the defendant from repeating statements adjudicated to have been defamatory. (See Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1155-1156.) The compensation for past defamatory statements, however, is money. (See, e.g., Khawar v. Globe Internat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 274 [discussing proof requirements for recovery of actual, presumed, or punitive damages in defamation actions].)
17 In contending that Simms’s May 2018 letter is not a claim because it “does not
make any claim for money damages,” Bear Valley relies in part on Wood, supra, 25
Cal.App.4th 1113. That reliance is misplaced. In Wood, the plaintiff’s mother (not the
plaintiff) submitted to a county hospital’s quality assurance department a “‘Patient
Problem/Complaint’” form and a subsequent “‘Supplemental Note,’” which “recit[ed] in
great detail numerous items of mistreatment.” (Wood, supra, at pp. 1116-1117.) The
Court of Appeal found that these documents did not substantially comply with statutory
requirements for claims against the county; they included no express claim of monetary
damages, the initial complaint form was not signed (though the “Supplemental Note” was
signed by the claimant’s mother), and the documents were not sent to the proper county
agency for handling claims. (Id. at p. 1117.) Bear Valley does not even grapple,
however, with comments in Wood regarding a hypothetical situation close to the facts of
our case: “Arguably, had plaintiff’s letters been sent to the appropriate agency for the
handling of claims (and, had [they] been transmitted to the persons designated by the
statute, [they] presumably would have been) the information supplied would have
enabled the agency to make an adequate investigation.” (Id. at p. 1118.) Bear Valley has
not contended that Simms’s May 2018 letter was sent to the wrong person or agency, and
indeed it was addressed to the same Bear Valley employee as his July 2019 letter, which
Bear Valley treated as a claim. Thus, Wood does not help Bear Valley here. The holding
and reasoning of the case is in concert with our conclusion that Simms’s May 2018 letter
does not substantially comply with the requirements of section 910, but that, despite its
18 deficiencies, it gave Bear Valley sufficient notice—both of Simms’s contentions, and that
litigation would result if the matter were not resolved—to trigger the notice and defense
waiver provisions of sections 910.8 and 911.
Bear Valley’s reliance on Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist.
(1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071 (Loehr) is also misplaced. In Loehr, the Court of Appeal
found that a letter sent by the plaintiff that expressly threatened litigation nevertheless
was not a claim. (Id. at p. 1083.) The threatened litigation, however, was apparently for
reinstatement to plaintiff’s former job, not money damages; the letter made only a
passing reference to damages being available under the federal Civil Rights Act, without
asserting any claim for damages or detailing facts that might give rise to a claim for
damages under that law. (Id. at p. 1083.) Moreover, many of the wrongs that the
plaintiff contended caused him to suffer damages were not even alleged to have occurred
until after that demand letter. (Ibid.) This case is different; Simms’s May 2018 letter
both threatened litigation to seek compensation for his perceived injuries from medical
malpractice and defamation and detailed the facts underlying the claims he contemplated
asserting.
Further, in treating Simms’s July 2019 letter as a claim, Bear Valley apparently
interpreted Simms’s comments about when he received MRI results—July 18, 2018 and
September 13, 2018, according to the July 2019 letter—as assertions of when Simms’s
medical malpractice claim accrued. In briefing on appeal, Bear Valley continues to do
so, arguing for example that “[i]f the first time [Simms] learned of the alleged medical
19 malpractice was not until July 18, 2018, then there is no way the May 13, 2018, letter
could be a claim for those injuries.” Simms’s discovery of the underlying cause of his
chronic pain, however, was not the first time he had actual or constructive notice of
alleged medical malpractice. (See Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 705.) Simms’s May
2018 letter to Bear Valley demonstrates that he was already aware of what he perceived
to be inadequate medical care, from which he was suffering ongoing harm; he was
complaining that he had chronic pain that was not being adequately treated by Bear
Valley providers, who rather than investigating the source of that pain and providing him
with appropriate treatment, jumped to the conclusion that he was merely “drug seeking.”
As such, when Simms sent Bear Valley his May 2018 letter, a medical malpractice claim
had already accrued. (See Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 705; see also Jolly v. Eli Lilly
& Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 [under discovery rule of Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5,
“the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that
her injury was caused by wrongdoing”].) The later scan results are evidence in support of
Simms’s claims, tending to suggest he was telling the truth about his pain, rather than
trying to obtain drugs, and that Bear Valley had failed to adequately investigate his
condition. The scans may also establish the existence of additional injuries resulting
from a delay in diagnosis, which Simms did not necessarily know or suspect in May
2018. But his receipt of the scan results was not the date Simms first discovered he had a
medical malpractice claim against Bear Valley.
20 Having concluded that Simms’s claims (or at least some of them) had accrued by
May 2018, we must address several timing issues that flow from that conclusion. First,
as Bear Valley notes, an application for leave to present a late claim must be presented to
the public entity “within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the
cause of action.” (§ 911.4, subd. (b).) Thus, “[f]iling a late-claim application within one
year after the accrual of a cause of action is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief
petition.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779.)
Simms’s November 2019 claim-relief petition was filed more than one year after
the cause of action accrued, so the trial court lacked jurisdiction to relieve him of the
section 945.4 requirement for presenting a timely claim. (See §§ 911.4, subd. (b), 946.6,
subd. (c) [trial court “shall relieve the petitioner from the requirements of § 945.4” if
application was made within a reasonable time not exceeding that specified by § 911.4,
subd. (b), and one of listed reasons for failing to file a timely claim applies].) We have
found, however, that Simms in fact presented a timely (albeit incomplete) claim in May
2018, and thus did not require relief from the requirements of section 945.4. While the
trial court could not relieve him from those requirements, there was no bar, jurisdictional
or otherwise, to the trial court finding that he presented a timely claim.
Our next timing issue is that, after a claim has been presented to a public entity,
the claimant must still file suit within the applicable statute of limitations period.
Simms’s filing of his petition does not satisfy this requirement. (See Orr v. City of
Stockton (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 622, 632 [petition for late claim-relief does not
21 constitute commencement of a suit]; see § 946.6, subd. (f) [if court grants petition
relieving claimant from claims requirements, “suit on the cause of action to which the
claim relates shall be filed with the court within 30 days”].) Rather, “[a] civil lawsuit is
generally commenced by the filing of a complaint.” (Orr, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p.
629; see Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 878
[“The primary attribute of a ‘suit,’ as that term is commonly understood, is that parties to
an action are involved in actual court proceedings initiated by the filing of a complaint”].)
Since Bear Valley did not respond to Simms’s May 2018 letter, the claim was deemed
denied 45 days after it was presented (§ 912.4, subd. (a)), and a limitations period of two
years from the accrual of the cause of action applies. (§ 945.6, subd. (a)(2); compare id.,
subd. (a)(1) [where written notice is given in accordance with section 913, limitations
period is “six months after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the
mail”].) Because Simms’s causes of action accrued no later than May 2018, his time to
file suit, even under the extended period provided by section 945.6, subdivision (a)(2),
normally would have expired by May 2020.
Here, however, there is compelling reason to toll the statute of limitations as of
January 10, 2020, when the trial court found that Simms’s May 2018 letter was neither a
claim nor even a “defective claim.” As we have discussed, prior to that date, Simms
could have taken the belt-and-suspenders approach of both filing a complaint alleging
compliance with the claim presentation requirements and pursuing relief through his
22 5 section 946.6 petition. After that date, however, Simms was bound by the trial court’s
ruling. His petition had been dismissed, and issue preclusion would have prohibited
Simms from raising the issue by filing a complaint as a new case. (See DKN Holdings,
LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 826-827 [issue preclusion bars “a party who had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first case but lost,” and therefore
“should not be allowed to relitigate the same issue in a new lawsuit”].) Equity requires
that Simms be placed in the position that he would have been had the trial court ruled
correctly that the May 2018 letter was a claim, albeit a defective one. (See Bollinger v.
National Fire Ins. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 399, 410 [equitably tolling statute of limitations
in favor of plaintiff who “through error of the trial court was not allowed to proceed to
trial”]; Paniagua v. Orange County Fire Authority (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 83, 88 [time
to bring suit on government claim tolled pending appeal from order denying petition for
relief from claim filing requirement, reasoning that running of the limitations period
should be suspended “‘when pending proceedings prevent an effective suit’”]; see also
Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. A-Mark Coin Co., Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 330, 336
[equitably tolling limitations period for malicious prosecution action until Court of
5 It arguably would be equitable to toll the statute of limitations earlier, as of the misleading notices Simms received about his options after his claim was denied as untimely and his application to present a late claim was denied. Nevertheless, even upon receiving the misleading section 911.3 notice, and the similarly misleading section 911.8 notice, Simms could still have performed the modicum of legal research necessary to discover that filing a complaint alleging compliance with the Government Claims Act was in fact an option. And in California we have consistently held self-represented litigants are held to the same standard of knowledge of law and procedure as an attorney. (E.g., Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.)
23 Appeal issues its remittitur].) As best as we can determine, at least a substantial portion
of Simms’s allegations against Bear Valley are based on events that occurred less than
two years before the trial court’s January 10, 2020 ruling, so with tolling applied, it 6 appears that he could file a complaint that would not be time barred.
In sum, the trial court erred by finding that Simms’s May 2018 letter to Bear
Valley did not constitute either a claim or a defective claim. We find that it was in fact a
defective claim, triggering Bear Valley’s duty to notify Simms of its insufficiencies.
(§ 910.8.) By failing to do so, Bear Valley waived any defenses based on the claim’s
insufficiencies (§ 911), and the claim was deemed denied by statute (§ 912.4, subd. (a)).
Simms has two years from the date his causes of action accrued to bring suit by filing a
complaint, but that limitations period is tolled from January 10, 2020 (the date of the trial
court’s erroneous ruling) through the issuance of our remittitur in this appeal.
6 We need not decide whether any of Simms’s causes of action accrued earlier than May 2018. It is conceivable that some portion of them accrued when he verbally complained to Bear Valley in December 2017 and January 2018. In opposing any complaint that Simms may file, Bear Valley may raise such statute of limitations arguments for determination by the trial court or by a jury, as appropriate.
24 DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to (1) vacate its January 10,
2020 order denying Simms’s petition and dismissing the case, and (2) to enter a new
order denying Simms’s request for relief from the requirements of section 945.4 without
prejudice to Simms filing a complaint and proceeding with a lawsuit against Bear Valley.
Simms is awarded costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.