Simmons v. Dickhaut

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided May 20, 1992·No. 91-2336·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


May 20, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

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No. 91-2336

PAUL SIMMONS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

PAUL G. DICKHAUT, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
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Paul Simmons on brief pro se.
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Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Andrea J. Cabral,
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Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees.

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Per Curiam. The appellant, Paul Simmons, appeals the
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grant of summary judgment in defendants' favor and the

dismissal of his complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

1983. We affirm.

In 1986, we reversed the district court's dismissal of

appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim. Simmons
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v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1986). We concluded that
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an allegation of intentional violation of the right of access

to the courts states a cause of action under 1983 and that

appellant had alleged facts adequate to show more than simply

a procedural due process/deprivation of property claim, but

rather an intentional deprivation of his right of access to

the courts, protected as a substantive, constitutional right.

Id. at 185. While we directed that his complaint be
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reinstated, we cautioned appellant that, on remand, he still

had to

fill[] in the particulars of his claim to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.
We intimate no opinion about the success
on the merits of Simmons's allegations.

Id.
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On remand, appellant sought to "fill[] in the

particulars of his claim" by attempting to show the injury

which he claimed resulted from the defendants' intentional

deprivation of his right of access to the courts. Appellant

claimed that, had he had his legal material, (1) he would

have been able to substantiate his claim of an involuntary

-2-

guilty plea to a 1981 charge of armed robbery; (2) the state

court would have revoked his sentence on the guilty plea; and

(3) an indictment on a different charge, which later was

brought forward and pursuant to which appellant received an

additional 18-20 years, would have been dismissed.

The district court did not address any aspect of

appellant's alleged injury. Rather, it concluded that

appellant's claim suffered from a failure of proof on an

antecedent element of his claim and granted defendants'

motion for summary judgment.

As we have recited countless times, we review the grant

of summary judgment de novo. E.g., Rodriques v. Furtado, 950
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F.2d 805, 808 (1st Cir. 1991). The question we face is

whether there is "any genuine factual issue[] that properly

can be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson
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v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In order
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to establish liability under 1983, appellant has to show an

intentional deprivation of his right of access to the courts

and that defendants' conduct was causally connected to that

deprivation. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553,
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559 (1st Cir. 1989).

The record essentially reduces to these competing

contentions.

Appellant claims: I had personal property,
including legal material, in my possession. I left it.

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The defendants took possession of my property.
Despite prison regulations which require the
defendants to forward my property to me, I had
to ask three times for my legal material.
When I got my property back, I was told the
legal material was not there.

The defendants respond: Appellant lived in an
unlocked dormitory, where other inmates had
access to his personal property. He never
requested that any legal material be
separately inventoried or stored in a secure
location. The property officer, who took
possession of appellant's property after
appellant's escape, including a box of
miscellaneous books and papers, never removed
or tampered with anything in that box while it
was in his custody. And, to the best of the
property officer's knowledge and belief, no
one removed or tampered with anything in that
box from the time it was taken from
appellant's room until it was retrieved by the
person authorized by appellant to do so.

Appellant claims that he had legal material among his

possessions. In any event, defendants do not deny that he

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