JOHN B. JONES, Senior District Judge.
Dayton Roads Development Company d/b/a Carriage House Meat and Provision Company, Inc. (“Carriage House”) brought this action against Simmons Poultry Farms, Inc. (“Simmons”) on a turkey processing venture. The case was tried to a jury on the theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Carriage House in the amount of $96,794.00 on the promissory estoppel claim. The District Court denied Simmons’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and Simmons now appeals that decision. We reverse.
I. Factual Background
In the summer of 1990 representatives from Carriage House and Hubbard Foods, Inc. (“Hubbard”) began discussing a business venture to process turkey into cutlets, tenders, chops and cold cuts (hereinafter called “the project”). Hubbard was to supply the raw meat and market the end products while Carriage House was to process and package the turkey for a fee. Prior to an agreement being reached on this venture, Simmons bought out Hubbard in September of 1990 and continued the negotiations on this venture with Carriage House.
The principal individuals involved in the negotiations were Mr. Ron Ketcham, President of Hubbard; Mr. Jeff Lea, Hubbard’s sales manager; Mr. Marvin Walter, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Carriage House; and Mr. Joe Cooper, Director and Plant Manager of Carriage House. Following the buy-out of Hubbard by Simmons, Ketcham continued as an employee for 90 days and was then replaced by general manager Mr. Mike Morris in November of 1990. Lea also remained as a transitional employee and was principally in charge of marketing the project. Mr. Craig Ford investigated the types of equipment needed and researched the market for the project while serving as a consultant on the project and being compensated by both Carriage House and Simmons.
The negotiations were conducted both orally and in writing. Walter testified that although he personally participated in some of the conversations with Simmons, Cooper as the plant manager was principally in charge of the project. On September 14,1990, Cooper wrote to Ketcham stating that Carriage House was definitely interested in going forward with the project. The letter informed Ketcham the cost of the equipment for the project to be purchased by Carriage House would be approximately $350,000. Cooper further explained that Carriage House would need a minimum of 2.6 million pounds of product per year, consisting of 20,000 to 30,-000 pounds for the first ten weeks of produc
tion and 50,000 pounds per week thereafter. Ketcham did not respond in writing to this letter.
Cooper wrote a memorandum to Walter on November 6, 1990 to report the results of a meeting held on November 2, 1990 between Cooper, Ketcham and Lea.
Walter incorporated this memorandum into a letter he wrote to Keteham on November 12, 1990 informing Ketcham that Carriage House was ready to proceed with the project.
Ketcham responded to Walter’s letter on November 14, 1990.
Carriage House purchased the necessary equipment in early 1991 and was ready to being processing turkey in April of 1991. However, Simmons’ efforts to market the end products of the project were unsuccessful. Simmons therefore did not supply and Carriage House did not process any significant amount of turkey using the equipment purchased by Carriage House for the project. Simmons paid one-half of Carriage House’s expenses relating to the project from May of 1991 to June of 1992.
Carriage House brought this action in March of 1998 claiming Simmons had guaranteed that after an initial start-up period it would supply 50,000 pounds of turkey per week for processing and packaging by Carriage House. During trial Carriage House claimed damages in the amount of $1,237,464 for out-of-pocket expenses and lost profits. The jury awarded $96,794 to Carriage House.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, using the same standards as the district court.
Smith v. World Insurance Co.,
38 F.3d 1456, 1460 (8th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). We have explained that:
A motion for judgment as a matter of law presents a legal question to the district court and this court on review: “whether there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict.”
White v. Pence,
961 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir.1992). We view the “evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and must not engage in a weighing or evaluation of the evidence or consider questions of credibility.”
Id.
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of the evidence points one way and is “susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining the position of the nonmoving party.”
Id.
Keenan v. Computer
Assoc.
Int'l, Inc.,
13 F.3d 1266, 1268-69 (8th Cir.1994).
III. Decision
To establish liability on the basis of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must establish three essential elements:
(1) A clear and definite agreement;
(2) Proof that the party seeking to enforce the agreement reasonably relied upon it to his detriment; and
(3) A finding that the equities support enforcement of the agreement.
Uhl v. City of Sioux City,
490 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa App.1992) (citations omitted). The jury found Carriage House established these elements.
The Iowa courts have not explicitly defined “a clear and definite agreement,” but the Supreme Court of Iowa compared and contrasted three cases involving this element.
National Bank of Waterloo v. Moeller,
434 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Iowa 1989) (discussing
In re Estate of Graham,
295 N.W.2d 414, 418-19 (Iowa 1980);
Johnson v. Pattison,
185 N.W.2d 790, 795-97 (Iowa 1971);
Miller v. Lawlor,
245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267, 272-75 (1954)). The
Moeller
court explained:
By way of distinguishing these cases, we observe that
Miller,
and
Pattison,
unlike
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JOHN B. JONES, Senior District Judge.
Dayton Roads Development Company d/b/a Carriage House Meat and Provision Company, Inc. (“Carriage House”) brought this action against Simmons Poultry Farms, Inc. (“Simmons”) on a turkey processing venture. The case was tried to a jury on the theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Carriage House in the amount of $96,794.00 on the promissory estoppel claim. The District Court denied Simmons’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and Simmons now appeals that decision. We reverse.
I. Factual Background
In the summer of 1990 representatives from Carriage House and Hubbard Foods, Inc. (“Hubbard”) began discussing a business venture to process turkey into cutlets, tenders, chops and cold cuts (hereinafter called “the project”). Hubbard was to supply the raw meat and market the end products while Carriage House was to process and package the turkey for a fee. Prior to an agreement being reached on this venture, Simmons bought out Hubbard in September of 1990 and continued the negotiations on this venture with Carriage House.
The principal individuals involved in the negotiations were Mr. Ron Ketcham, President of Hubbard; Mr. Jeff Lea, Hubbard’s sales manager; Mr. Marvin Walter, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Carriage House; and Mr. Joe Cooper, Director and Plant Manager of Carriage House. Following the buy-out of Hubbard by Simmons, Ketcham continued as an employee for 90 days and was then replaced by general manager Mr. Mike Morris in November of 1990. Lea also remained as a transitional employee and was principally in charge of marketing the project. Mr. Craig Ford investigated the types of equipment needed and researched the market for the project while serving as a consultant on the project and being compensated by both Carriage House and Simmons.
The negotiations were conducted both orally and in writing. Walter testified that although he personally participated in some of the conversations with Simmons, Cooper as the plant manager was principally in charge of the project. On September 14,1990, Cooper wrote to Ketcham stating that Carriage House was definitely interested in going forward with the project. The letter informed Ketcham the cost of the equipment for the project to be purchased by Carriage House would be approximately $350,000. Cooper further explained that Carriage House would need a minimum of 2.6 million pounds of product per year, consisting of 20,000 to 30,-000 pounds for the first ten weeks of produc
tion and 50,000 pounds per week thereafter. Ketcham did not respond in writing to this letter.
Cooper wrote a memorandum to Walter on November 6, 1990 to report the results of a meeting held on November 2, 1990 between Cooper, Ketcham and Lea.
Walter incorporated this memorandum into a letter he wrote to Keteham on November 12, 1990 informing Ketcham that Carriage House was ready to proceed with the project.
Ketcham responded to Walter’s letter on November 14, 1990.
Carriage House purchased the necessary equipment in early 1991 and was ready to being processing turkey in April of 1991. However, Simmons’ efforts to market the end products of the project were unsuccessful. Simmons therefore did not supply and Carriage House did not process any significant amount of turkey using the equipment purchased by Carriage House for the project. Simmons paid one-half of Carriage House’s expenses relating to the project from May of 1991 to June of 1992.
Carriage House brought this action in March of 1998 claiming Simmons had guaranteed that after an initial start-up period it would supply 50,000 pounds of turkey per week for processing and packaging by Carriage House. During trial Carriage House claimed damages in the amount of $1,237,464 for out-of-pocket expenses and lost profits. The jury awarded $96,794 to Carriage House.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, using the same standards as the district court.
Smith v. World Insurance Co.,
38 F.3d 1456, 1460 (8th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). We have explained that:
A motion for judgment as a matter of law presents a legal question to the district court and this court on review: “whether there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict.”
White v. Pence,
961 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir.1992). We view the “evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and must not engage in a weighing or evaluation of the evidence or consider questions of credibility.”
Id.
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of the evidence points one way and is “susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining the position of the nonmoving party.”
Id.
Keenan v. Computer
Assoc.
Int'l, Inc.,
13 F.3d 1266, 1268-69 (8th Cir.1994).
III. Decision
To establish liability on the basis of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must establish three essential elements:
(1) A clear and definite agreement;
(2) Proof that the party seeking to enforce the agreement reasonably relied upon it to his detriment; and
(3) A finding that the equities support enforcement of the agreement.
Uhl v. City of Sioux City,
490 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa App.1992) (citations omitted). The jury found Carriage House established these elements.
The Iowa courts have not explicitly defined “a clear and definite agreement,” but the Supreme Court of Iowa compared and contrasted three cases involving this element.
National Bank of Waterloo v. Moeller,
434 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Iowa 1989) (discussing
In re Estate of Graham,
295 N.W.2d 414, 418-19 (Iowa 1980);
Johnson v. Pattison,
185 N.W.2d 790, 795-97 (Iowa 1971);
Miller v. Lawlor,
245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267, 272-75 (1954)). The
Moeller
court explained:
By way of distinguishing these cases, we observe that
Miller,
and
Pattison,
unlike
Graham,
demonstrated a clear understanding by the promisor that the promis-ee was seeking an assurance upon which he could rely and without which he would not act.
See Miller,
245 Iowa at 1165, 66 N.W.2d at 274. This dual emphasis on clarity and inducement parallels the Restatement (Second) definition of an agreement for purposes of promissory estoppel as “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action ... on the part of the promisee.” Restatement (Second) of Contract § 90 (1981).
434 N.W.2d at 889.
Simmons admits it had an agreement with Carriage House whereby Simmons would supply raw turkey meat, Carriage House would process and package it and Simmons would market the end products. Simmons, however, claims there is not sufficient evidence in the
record from
which a reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that Simmons made an oral guarantee to supply 50,000 pounds of turkey per
week to Carriage House for processing following an initial start-up period. Rather Simmons asserts the 50,000 pounds per week figure was a goal that all parties hoped to achieve and even surpass. We agree with Simmons and find the evidence is not susceptible to a reasonable inference that the parties had a clear and definite agreement containing a poundage guarantee by Simmons.
The evidence in the record does not point toward the existence of a poundage
guarantee
by Simmons, rather it points toward the existence of a 50,000 pound per week
goal or projection
by the parties. The only evidence of such a guarantee is the testimony of Walter who stated in a general manner that Simmons made a poundage guarantee at some unidentified point in time. Walter identified Ron Keteham and Jeff Lea as the individuals that “indicated to us” that 50,000 pounds per week “would be the minimum.” Appellant’s Appendix, p. 71. Walter does not identify to whom such an “indication” was made or when it was allegedly made. There is no evidence of an actual conversation wherein an individual representing Simmons stated to someone representing Carriage House that Simmons would
guarantee
Carriage House would receive 50,-000 pounds of turkey per week to process and package. When considered in light of the documentary evidence Walter’s testimony is not susceptible to a reasonable inference that a clear and definite agreement containing a poundage guarantee existed between the parties.
Although Walter testified he would not have proceeded with the project without a poundage guarantee from Simmons, there is no evidence that Simmons was aware of this information. Rather, Walter informed Simmons in his November 12, 1990 letter that Carriage House was going forward with the project despite not having a formal contract with minimal guarantees. See footnote 2,
supra.
Therefore, Simmons did not have “a clear understanding” that Carriage House “was seeking an assurance upon which [it] could rely and without which [it] would not act.”
Moeller,
434 N.W.2d at 889.
Cooper, the individual principally in charge of the project for Carriage House, never testified that anyone from Simmons made a poundage guarantee. Rather he testified the “input” he was getting from Jeff Lea was that 50,000 pounds per week “was probably on the light side.” Appellant’s Appendix, p. 110. Cooper spoke in terms of “projections” rather than “guarantees” when asked whether Simmons made a poundage guarantee.
Id.
at 118. Cooper’s testimony is not susceptible to a reasonable inference that Simmons made a poundage guarantee to Carriage House.
The written communications between the parties establish that Simmons refused to guarantee 50,000 pounds per week. The November 6, 1990 memorandum written by Cooper, Carriage House’s principal negotiator in this project, stated that Keteham would not make a poundage guarantee and even if Simmons did it would be less than the 50,000 pounds per week suggested by Carriage House. See footnote 1,
supra
Walter incorporated this memorandum in his November 12, 1990 letter in which he informed Keteham that Carriage House was going forward with the project and would be purchasing the necessary equipment. See footnote 2,
supra
Walter stated in this letter that Carriage House would act on the basis of the Cooper memorandum and he acknowledged that Carriage House was proceeding without a formal contract containing minimal guarantees.
Id.
The written communications between the parties points only toward the nonexistence of a poundage guarantee on the part of Simmons.
As we have found insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of a clear and definite agreement, it is not necessary to discuss the two remaining elements of a promissory estoppel claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the district court and grant Simmons’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.