Simeza v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 6, 2026
Docket23-2962
StatusUnpublished

This text of Simeza v. Bondi (Simeza v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simeza v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE SIMEZA, No. 23-2962 Agency No. Petitioner, A098-609-578 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 2, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Lawrence Simeza, a native and citizen of Zambia, petitions for review of a

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen his

immigration proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we

deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). In 2011, Simeza received a Notice to Appear (NTA) in immigration

proceedings. He conceded removability but sought adjustment of status and

cancellation of removal. The immigration judge denied both forms of relief.

Simeza appealed, and the Board dismissed his appeal. Simeza did not petition for

review but instead filed a motion to reopen. Relying on Pereira v. Sessions, 585

U.S. 198 (2018), and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), Simeza argued

that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his immigration proceedings

because his NTA was defective. He also argued that the defective NTA violated

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). The Board denied reopening, holding that the jurisdictional

objection was foreclosed by United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187

(9th Cir. 2022) (en banc), and that Simeza forfeited his statutory objection by

waiting until reopening to raise that issue.

1. Simeza argues that Bastide-Hernandez was wrongly decided and that,

contrary to the holding of that case, the defects in his NTA deprived the

immigration court of jurisdiction over the proceedings against him. But “a

published decision of this court constitutes binding authority which ‘must be

followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so.’” Gonzalez v.

Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Hart v.

Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001)), aff’d, Arizona v. Inter Tribal

Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013). The Board correctly held, based on

2 23-2962 Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th at 1190–94, that omissions from Simeza’s NTA did

not affect the immigration court’s jurisdiction.

2. We reject Simeza’s challenges to the Board’s determination that he

forfeited his statutory objection to the NTA. Simeza contends that he “raised the

objection at the first available moment once the relevant law changed,” but that is

incorrect. Simeza’s appeal was still pending before the Board when Pereira and

Niz-Chavez were decided, and Simeza could have sought to file a supplemental

brief to bring those cases before the Board. See Theagene v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d

1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). Because Simeza could have raised his statutory

challenge to his NTA during his appeal, he forfeited the argument by presenting it

to the Board for the first time on reopening. Matter of Nchifor, 28 I. & N. Dec.

585, 589 (B.I.A. 2022).

Simeza now contends that the Board should have addressed equitable factors

when it ruled on forfeiture, but his reopening motion did not address equitable

considerations. We agree with the government that Simeza failed to exhaust his

equitable argument, so we may not consider it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Suate-

Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024) (exhaustion requirement

of section 1252(d)(1) is “mandatory” if a party “properly raises it” (citations

omitted)).

The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied.

3 23-2962 PETITION DENIED.

4 23-2962

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Jesus Gonzalez v. State of Arizona
677 F.3d 383 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.
133 S. Ct. 2247 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Pereira v. Sessions
585 U.S. 198 (Supreme Court, 2018)
NCHIFOR
28 I. & N. Dec. 585 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2022)
United States v. Juan Bastide-Hernandez
39 F.4th 1187 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Ninoska Suate-Orellana v. Merrick Garland
101 F.4th 624 (Ninth Circuit, 2024)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Simeza v. Bondi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/simeza-v-bondi-ca9-2026.