Silverman v. Swift Co.

18 Conn. Super. Ct. 453, 18 Conn. Supp. 453, 1954 Conn. Super. LEXIS 74
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 2, 1954
DocketFile 74252
StatusPublished

This text of 18 Conn. Super. Ct. 453 (Silverman v. Swift Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Silverman v. Swift Co., 18 Conn. Super. Ct. 453, 18 Conn. Supp. 453, 1954 Conn. Super. LEXIS 74 (Colo. Ct. App. 1954).

Opinion

Bordon, J.

On August 20, 1949, the three plaintiffs and Mrs. Silverman were traveling to Copalce, New York, to spend the day at Dr. Groopman’s farm. On route they stopped at George’s Market in Watertown and purchased a five- or five-and one-half-pound loin of pork to be cooked and eaten picnic style. They arrived at the farm about noon and immediately started a wood fire in the open fireplace. They then put the loin of pork on a spit in the fireplace and cooked it for about four to four and one-half hours. The pork became charred and black on the outside and grayish-white on the inside, indicating that it had been cooked long and hot enough to kill any trichinae in the meat. Dr. Groopman knew that pork was likely to contain trichinae and that it required adequate cooking to kill them and thus render the meat wholesome and edible. He had, on several occasions, eaten pork cooked on the same open fire in the same way, with no ill effects. Within two weeks the three plaintiffs became ill, with similar symptoms and complaints. Mrs. Silver-man, who had not eaten any of the pork, did not become ill. The Groopmans had returned to New York after the outing and became ill there and Silverman became ill in New Haven. None of the plaintiffs had eaten pork after the day in question. The illness of all three plaintiffs was found to be trichinosis, and undoubtedly resulted from eating the pork on August 20.

The pork in question was purchased by the defendant grocers from the defendant Swift and Company. In the absence of any contract relationship between the plaintiffs and Swift and Company, no recovery is available against this defendant for breach of warranty. A right of recovery in tort may *455 be available to one injured through the seller’s negligence even though he is not in privity of contract with the seller. However, a generally recognized obstacle to the extension of benefit of implied warranty beyond the immediate seller is that the remedy is based on contract and, therefore, limited to parties and privies thereto. Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92; Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44.

Failure to prove negligence by defendant Swift and Company calls for a ruling in its favor.

The question then revolves around the liability of George’s Market for selling pork containing trichinae. In this state our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that upon the sale of food to be immediately put to domestic uses, there is, as between dealer and buyer-consumer, an implied warranty of wholesomeness and fitness to be eaten, including freedom from foreign substances which may be injurious to the consumer. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249; Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., supra; Sapiente v. Waltuch, 127 Conn. 224.

There are no cases in this state defining a breach of warranty in the sale of pork. To free the defendants, George’s Market, from liability, it is virtually necessary to hold that the sale of pork does not carry with it an implied warranty of wholesomeness or fitness for human consumption or freedom from trichinae. There are many cases in various jurisdictions holding that one who sells pork infested with trichinae is not liable for breach of warranty if the buyer is infected when the pork was eaten without proper cooking, since if it had been properly cooked he would not have suffered. Williston, Sales (Rev. Ed.) § 243a. The court’s dilemma is created by a vicious circle that leads nowhere. If pork is sold with the knowledge that it is infested with trichinae and, therefore, cannot be eaten without *456 adequate cooking, the burden is then put on the buyer to cook it adequately. In the case of Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21, it was held that ordinary domestic cooking was adequate, and if trichinosis resulted after eating a ham so cooked, the seller is liable. In that case the actionable warranty was not that the food was fit to eat without cooking, but that it was fit to eat after ordinary domestic cooking. In the case of Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, the Court of Appeals sustained a plaintiff’s verdict on the ground of implied warranty of fitness for human consumption of a loin of pork, infested with trichinae, eaten after cooking. In the case of Mc-Spedon v. Kuns, 271 N.Y. 131, the defendants were held liable on the ground that they should have employed a known method of eradicating trichinae, but failed to do so. This decision was rendered by a divided court, with three of the judges dissenting vigorously. In the ease of Greco v. S.S.Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, recovery for breach of warranty in the sale of frankfurters was sustained on the ground that they were warranted as fit for human consumption without further treatment by the buyer.

An analysis of cases dealing with the subject at hand leads to the conclusion that buyers of raw pork are aware of the presence of trichinae in the meat and that a seller of such pork does not warrant it to be free from trichinae or fit for human consumption without adequate cooking. It is a known fact that trichinae will be killed by heat of 137 degrees Fahrenheit. Therefore, the burden is put on the buyer to make sure that every part of the pork, inside and out, is reached by the requisite heat. If that is done the pork cannot be harmful; it thereupon becomes wholesome. If eating results in trichinosis, it means that it was not cooked enough; at least, it means that some innermost part of the meat was not heated to 137 degrees.

*457 The warranty of fitness should be applied only to food used in the usual, rather than in an unusual and improper manner. Thus no implied warranty arises that meat, such as a pork product, generally fit to be eaten only when properly cooked, is wholesome when eaten raw or cooked in an unusual or improper manner. 77 C.J.S. 1213; Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690; Feinstein v. David Reeves, Inc., 14 F.Sup. 167.

The Cheli case, supra, seems particularly in point. It appears in that case, as in the instant case, that there is no known, practicable or feasible method of determining whether hogs are infected with trichinae. The bacteria can be detected only by microscopic inspection of the entire carcass of the animal, although the organism is generally found in the muscles. Until 1906 it was the practice of the government to make such examinations, but this practice was finally discontinued because it was found to be ineffective. The known treatments generally effective in killing trichinae remove from the meat the quality of freshness demanded by the public. In that case, as in this, all the ordinary, usual and reasonable precautions taken by the meat-packing industry and retailer were observed. No one is held by the law to a higher degree of care than the average in the trade or business in which he is engaged. Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 F. 921, 931.

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Related

Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co.
15 A.2d 181 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1940)
Burkhardt v. Armour & Co.
161 A. 385 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1932)
Sapiente v. Waltuch
15 A.2d 417 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1940)
Borucki v. MacKenzie Brothers Co., Inc.
3 A.2d 224 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1938)
Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co.
255 N.W. 414 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1934)
Rinaldi v. . Mohican Co.
121 N.E. 471 (New York Court of Appeals, 1918)
Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co.
12 N.E.2d 557 (New York Court of Appeals, 1938)
McSpedon v. Kunz
2 N.E.2d 513 (New York Court of Appeals, 1936)
Holt v. Mann
200 N.E. 403 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1936)
Ketterer v. Armour & Co.
247 F. 921 (Second Circuit, 1917)

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Bluebook (online)
18 Conn. Super. Ct. 453, 18 Conn. Supp. 453, 1954 Conn. Super. LEXIS 74, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/silverman-v-swift-co-connsuperct-1954.