Silverglade v. Dean

86 F. Supp. 449, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2226
CourtDistrict Court, D. North Dakota
DecidedOctober 21, 1949
DocketCiv. No. 1484
StatusPublished

This text of 86 F. Supp. 449 (Silverglade v. Dean) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. North Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Silverglade v. Dean, 86 F. Supp. 449, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2226 (D.N.D. 1949).

Opinion

DONOVAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a citizen of Florida, brings suit to recover commission as a real estate broker. Defendants, residents of North Dakota, deny they employed plaintiff, and deny he rendered service to them in any manner.

The case was tried to the court without a jury. On motion of defendants, the action was dismissed as to defendants Royce S. Dean and Elmer Osking, co-partners doing business as Dean-Osking Co.

The sole issue for determination is whether plaintiff rendered services as a real estate broker to defendants Royce S. Dean and Elmer Osking for which they agreed to pay him a commission. The controversy presents an issue of fact for determination by the court. Plaintiff’s contention is concisely set forth in the complaint.1

[450]*450It is not disputed that plaintiff was a licensed real estate broker in Florida during the period we are here concerned with; that Belle Glade Canning Company, owned by a partnership consisting of Willoughby J. Rothrock, W. W. Thrasher, Linton A. Thrasher and John H. Rothrock, operated a canning plant in Belle Glade, Florida, and that they desired to sell said plant. Officing with plaintiff was one James L. Bolger, a certified public accountant, who acted as auditor on occasions for a Mr. Eugene Borchardt, a Florida farmer. Borchardt was associated with defendants in the handling of their seed potatoes and a fresh pack business, for which purpose Borchardt and defendants built a fresh pack shed at Belle Glade in 1945. At the suggestion of Bolger, Willoughby J. Rothrock called at plaintiff’s office and had some talk with plaintiff’s son-in-law and employee, Walter R. Cunningham. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a plan for the sale of the plant. During all of this time defendants’ associate Borchardt was endeavoring to negotiate the purchase of the canning plant by himself and defendants from the Belle Glade Canning Company.

Willoughby J. Rothrock testified that up to March, 1946, he had never heard of or met plaintiff, and that he met Bolger for the first time in Borchardt’s office in Belle Glade when Bolger was introduced as “Borchardt’s packing house auditor.” Later, on April 2, 1946, Borchardt invited Willoughby to accompany him to Bolger’s home in Miami. Willoughby limits plaintiff’s connection with the matter here in suit to an inspection of the plant so as to “familiarize himself with it.” 2

[451]*451Obviously, the Canning Company was interested in but one thing, and that was to sell its plant for the best price obtainable. Plaintiff inspected the plant. So did Borchardt. Up to this point plaintiff was laying the foundation for the sale of his services as a real estate broker, and Borchardt was primarily interested in expanding his own interests in the community.

. On April 5, 1946, plaintiff, without benefit of an invitation from defendant, journeyed to Grand Forks, North Dakota, to interview defendants, and for the first time plaintiff and defendants met. At this meeting plaintiff contends he advised defendants of the conditions and terms governing the purchase of the Belle Glade Canning .Company plant. Borchardt was also present. Defendants contend nothing was said or done during this visit, other than plaintiff’s sales talk as a tax expert, and that they confined their discussion relative to the business operations of the Canning Company to their associate, Borchardt. As stated by counsel for plaintiff, Borchardt would appear to be “a very important witness in this case. Both sides * * * made an effort to get his testimony.” That he did not testify was no fault of the plaintiff.’

Willoughby says plaintiff was not hired to sell this property, and explains plaintiff’s connection as employment for the purpose of selling plants of the Sunrise Products, Inc., at points in Florida other than Belle Glade. Plaintiff’s testimony, of courge, opposes Willoughby’s, and defendants’ claim that plaintiff had nothing to do with the sale of the property. On April 19,1946, defendants were given an option to buy the Canning Company plant at Belle Glade, and with reference to the entire matter Willoughby testified:

“The Belle Glade Canning Company did not at any time employ Mr. Silverglade in any capacity.” Plaintiff and Cunningham were present in the offices of the Canning Company’s lawyer in Philadelphia when the transaction we are here concerned with was closed. Defendants deny inviting plaintiff to be present or having knowledge as to why plaintiff attended, claiming he was an “interloper” at best. Ultimately the original option was changed, reducing the purchase price from $380,000 to $267,000. The written instrument clears the Canning Company of liability for any commission arising out of the sale; hence Willoughby’s testimony is quoted, supra, as that of a material witness in the case, and the one being the least interested in the outcome of the suit.

The claims and testimony of plaintiff and defendants are sharply in conflict. Plaintiff’s testimony described a contract entered into by him with plaintiff in North Dakota. The property is located in Florida. The situs of the real estate is not controlling. Campbell v. Duncan, et al., D.C., 84 F.Supp. 732. Whether the contract is based on North Dakota or Florida law is of no great significance, as those states are agreed on the fundamentals of the applicable law. Fulton et al. v. Cretian, 17 N.D. 335, 117 N.W. 344. See Annotations, 44 L.R.A. 321, 43 A.L.R. 1103.

Whether or not the plaintiff was employed by defendants is a question of fact. Paulson v. Reeds, 48 N.D. 90, 183 N.W. 641. Plaintiff does not claim that he had the exclusive agency to bring about the purchase. Whether plaintiff was the procuring cause of sale is also a question of fact. Jackson v. Lenox Hotel Co., D.C., 79 F.Supp. 969.

The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish that he was 'hired by defendants, and that he was the procuring cause of the sale. The fact that the controlling contract releases the vendor from [452]*452any liability for a commission would not bind the vendees to pay the same without appropriate commitment by defendants to pay such commission.

A broker who produces one willing to sell upon the terms of the buyer, as here claimed by plaintiff, if supported by the evidence, would necessitate payment of the commission agreed upon. Does the evidence support the burden here placed upon plaintiff? To answer in the affirmative not only would require the trier of the facts to deny credence to the testimony of each of the defendants positively denying the claim of plaintiff in the respect claimed by him, -but also calls upon the court to view the testimony of Willoughby J. Rothrock, in the words of plaintiff’s counsel, as “entirely unbelievable.” I am noit convinced that such a conclusion finds support in the record.

True, in the agreement between Belle Glade Canning Company and defendants, it is expressly agreed that the vendor “shall not be liable for any commission.” But this agreement creates no privity between any of the parties thereto with plaintiff. The evidence is insufficient to show plaintiff was employed as a broker by defendants. Clearly, I cannot say from the record of this case that the plaintiff was the efficient and effective cause of bringing about the actual sale of the property. A broker does not earn his commission simply by telling the purchaser that the property is for sale, or showing the purchaser the broker’s plan for concluding the deal.

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Related

Campbell v. Duncan
84 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Arkansas, 1949)
Howell v. Blackburn
129 So. 341 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1930)
Segerstrom v. Webb
244 N.W. 49 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1932)
Stevens v. Brimmer
251 P. 1 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1926)
Whitcomb v. Bacon
49 N.E. 742 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1898)
Hoadley v. Savings Bank
44 L.R.A. 321 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1899)
Fulton v. Cretian
117 N.W. 344 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1908)
Kane v. Sherman
130 N.W. 222 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1911)
Paulson v. Reeds
183 N.W. 641 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1921)
Woods v. Palmer
115 N.W. 242 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1908)
Dickinson v. Hanley
160 N.W. 389 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1916)
Jackson v. Lenox Hotel Co.
79 F. Supp. 969 (D. Minnesota, 1948)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
86 F. Supp. 449, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2226, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/silverglade-v-dean-ndd-1949.