Silverberg v. District of Columbia

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 30, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2851
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAM SILVERBERG,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 23-cv-2851 (TSC)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Sam Silverberg owns property located at 6820 32nd Street N.W., Washington,

District of Columbia 20015. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1. The District of Columbia determined that

the property was vacant and reassessed Silverberg’s annual property tax bill from $9,000 to

$45,000. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he listed his property “for sale or for lease” because of this

“high tax bill” after the District “decided to force homeowners, whose properties are deemed to

be vacant, to rent or sale their property by increasing their property tax.” Id. He filed suit,

claiming that the District’s “physical appropriation” of his “rights to use and enjoy the property,

and the right to select the time of sale or lease of the property” constitutes an unconstitutional

taking under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 4.

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this

case and that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction has already been litigated and decided

against Plaintiff. Mot. to Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 6.

This suit represents Plaintiff’s second attempt to recover damages on the same set of

facts. Three years ago, Plaintiff filed a substantively identical suit in this court under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging that the District’s assessment and tax increase constituted an unconstitutional

Page 1 of 4 taking under the 5th and 14th Amendments. Silverberg v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-2144-

TSC (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2021) (“Silverberg I”). This court dismissed the prior complaint for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Circuit affirmed. Mem. Op. at 2, Silverberg I, ECF No.

17; Order, Silverberg v. District of Columbia, No. 22-7133 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2023) (“Silverberg

II”). For the same reasons the court has previously explained, it will GRANT the pending

motion to dismiss.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they may only hear cases within the

limits “authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus all litigants—including those proceeding pro se—must establish that

the court has subject-matter jurisdiction in a particular matter. See, e.g., Bickford v. United

States, 808 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2011). Congress has also limited this court’s ability to

hear challenges to the District of Columbia’s tax assessments and has instead given that

jurisdiction to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. District of Columbia Court

Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 11-501, 84 Stat. 473, 477

(codified at D.C. Code. § 11-921(a)(3)(B) (“[T]he Superior court has jurisdiction of any civil

action or other matter . . . [that] involves an appeal from or petition for review of any assessment

of tax (or civil penalty thereon) made by the District of Columbia.”). That jurisdiction is

exclusive—all challenges must be brought in Superior Court. Id. at § 11-1202, 84 Stat. 473, 489

(codified at D.C. Code. § 11-1202).

In this iteration of his suit, Silverberg argues that separate statutes—the federal and D.C.

Tax Injunction Acts, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 and D.C. Code § 47–3307—bar federal courts from

exercising jurisdiction only in cases “in which state taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling

them to avoid paying state taxes.” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 70 F. Supp. 3d 58, 67

Page 2 of 4 (D.D.C. 2014); Opp’n to Mot. at 3, ECF No. 11. He argues that this court’s and the Circuit’s

prior decisions did not explain why cases involving these statutes do not apply equally to his suit.

Opp’n to Mot. at 5. Put simply, those cases do not apply because Plaintiff seeks to avoid paying

state taxes. And the difference between Plaintiff’s suit and Coleman is that the plaintiff there did

“not seek a court order nullifying his property tax obligation.” Coleman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 68.

Plaintiff’s allegation that he “is not challenging the defendant’s right to impose the tax” does not

make it so. Compl. at 4. As the Circuit has already concluded, Plaintiff’s “takings claim arises

directly from his tax assessment.” Order, Silverberg II. He therefore challenges the District’s

right to collect the tax owed and seeks a federal court order enabling him to avoid paying state

taxes, which renders his authority inapposite.

Plaintiff’s challenge instead involves “an appeal from or petition for review” of an

“assessment of tax . . . made by the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code. § 11-921(a)(3)(B). It is

therefore subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

As this court has explained, “Congress unambiguously intended to vest in the District of

Columbia courts exclusive jurisdiction over all challenges to District of Columbia taxes

including those involving federal statutory or constitutional claims in lieu of (rather than

concurrently with) jurisdiction in the federal courts.” Jenkins v. Washington Convention Ctr.,

236 F.3d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2001). That limitation includes constitutional takings claims. See id.

at 9; see also Johnson v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-2686, 2022 WL 4130843 at *3 (D.D.C.

Sept. 12, 2022).

Page 3 of 4 Given the clear statutory and precedential requirement that Silverberg bring his case in

Superior Court, this court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6. The case

will be closed.

Date: September 30, 2024

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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