FORD, P. J.
—As a taxpayer residing in the City of Los Angeles the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant city and the named officers from making any payment to captains of the city’s fire department under the provisions of an ordi1 The superior court denied the relief sought and the plaintiff has appealed.
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.
On May 13, 1965, the city council adopted an ordinance amending Ordinance No. 89,935 which was known as the “Salary Standardization Ordinance for Firemen and Police[559]*559men of the City of Los Angeles.” The portion of the amendment here relevant is that which placed the position of captain of the fire department in salary schedule number 50. On May 22, 1965, the mayor returned the ordinance to the council without his approval.
On May 26, 1965, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 130,143, which was approved by the mayor on that date and, pursuant to section 4 thereof, was to become operative on July 1, 1965. That ordinance amended Ordinance No. 89,935, the ordinance known as the “Salary Standardization Ordinance for Firemen and Policemen of the City of Los Angeles. ’ ’ The portion of the amendment here relevant is that which placed the position of captain of the fire department in salary schedule number 48.
On June 8, 1965, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 130,266, by which Ordinance No. 89,935 (hereinabove noted in this opinion) was amended in certain particulars, the portion of the amendment herein involved being that which placed the position of captain of the fire department in salary schedule number 50. It is to be noted that that salary schedule was the same as that set forth in the ordinance of May 13,1965, which the mayor returned to the council without his approval. The minutes of the council for its meeting of June 8, 1965, refer to the ordinance of May 13, 1965, which was returned by the mayor on May 24, 1965, without his approval and are in part as follows: “Upon calling the roll, said ordinance was again adopted notwithstanding the objections of the Mayor, by the following vote: Ayes . . . (12); Noes . . . (3).”2 No claim is made that Ordinance No. 130,266 was not timely adopted by the requisite number of votes of members of the city council. [560]*560In section 4 thereof it was provided that the ordinance should become operative on July 1,1965.
On or before June 1, 1965, the mayor submitted to the city council a proposed budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1965, and ending June 30, 1966.3 Therein the provisions with respect to salaries in the fire department included the following: “Firemen . . . $33,225,710,” but there was no designation of amounts with respect to specific positions within that general classification. In the supporting data which disclosed the basis for the proposed appropriation, the positions and salaries were set forth, including the position of “Captain Fire Department” with a monthly salary of $865-$966 but without a designation of a schedule number. The total number of firemen was given as 3,430 and the salary budget was stated to be $33,225,710.4
The city council thereafter modified the budget with respect to the fire department by changing the appropriation for the salaries of firemen from $33,225,710 to $33,559,574.5 The defendants concede that the increase of $333,864 corresponded with the difference between the amount estimated to be required to pay fire captains expected to be employed for one year at schedule number 48 and that estimated to be required to pay such captains for one year pursuant to schedule number 50.
On June 21, 1965, the mayor returned the budget to the council with his modifications and his reasons therefor, a por[561]*561tion of his communication being as follows: “I cannot in good conscience allow this item to remain in the budget and am therefore vetoing the addition of $333,864 to the Fire Department. I am also requesting that the Council immediately take the appropriate action to rescind the extra raise for this one category of employees [captain, fire department] singled out for such favored expensive treatment. ...” The minutes of the council for its meeting of June 24, 1965, show that a motion that the disapproval of the mayor of the increase in the salary appropriation for firemen “be not concurred in” failed to obtain the requisite number of votes, nine members of the council voting in favor of the motion and three voting against the motion.6
At the trial on October 14, 1965, the plaintiff called as a witness the City Administrative Officer, Dr. Piper. Portions of his testimony were : “ If schedule 50 were paid [to fire department captains], and if there were no other adjustments made in accounts within the fire department and no further appropriation by the council, then the salary account for firemen would exceed the figure that is included in the budget. . . . By the amount of the fire captain’s raise, the difference between schedule 48 and schedule 50, which is roughly $333,000 plus.” In response to a question by counsel for the defendants as to whether his office ever allows any city department to overspend the allotted appropriations, Dr. Piper stated: ‘1 No, sir. There is an automatic cut-off on it in that the Controller will not pay the bill, and he has the copy of the expenditure program, and each expenditure is cheeked against this program. ’ ’
As to the procedure in the event it appears that a salary appropriation will be exhausted before the end of the fiscal year, Dr. Piper testified: "The matter would be referred to us [562]*562for a recommendation back to either the department or to the city council. We would examine all of the accounts of that department, and if there is a surplus in aiijr account and we could transfer the amount needed from one account to another, we would do so. . . . That would be customary. The department could, on its own, reduce personnel, leave positions vacant to make up the difference in expenditures • or, if they choose to keep the personnel on the job in the same numbers and at the same rates, they could request an additional or supplemental appropriation from the city council. This would require an action by the council and approval by the mayor to appropriate funds from the unappropriated balance to the salary account of that particular department.”
The plaintiff states that his challenge is not as to the manner of the adoption of Ordinance No. 130,266 but is directed to the manner of its application. He contends that the provision for the increase in salary for the position of captain of the fire department did not become effective because the mayor eliminated the amount of $333,864 which the city council had added to the appropriation for salaries of firemen. For reasons which will be stated, that contention is untenable.
The power to determine the salaries of firemen is placed by the charter in the council.7 That power is not restricted by the charter so that it can only be exercised as a part of the process of adopting the budget. Unlike the situation in Sullivan v. McKinley, 14 Cal.2d 113 [92 P.2d 892], the charter does not embody any provision governing the time within which the matter of salary increases must be determined for a particular fiscal year.
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FORD, P. J.
—As a taxpayer residing in the City of Los Angeles the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant city and the named officers from making any payment to captains of the city’s fire department under the provisions of an ordi1 The superior court denied the relief sought and the plaintiff has appealed.
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.
On May 13, 1965, the city council adopted an ordinance amending Ordinance No. 89,935 which was known as the “Salary Standardization Ordinance for Firemen and Police[559]*559men of the City of Los Angeles.” The portion of the amendment here relevant is that which placed the position of captain of the fire department in salary schedule number 50. On May 22, 1965, the mayor returned the ordinance to the council without his approval.
On May 26, 1965, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 130,143, which was approved by the mayor on that date and, pursuant to section 4 thereof, was to become operative on July 1, 1965. That ordinance amended Ordinance No. 89,935, the ordinance known as the “Salary Standardization Ordinance for Firemen and Policemen of the City of Los Angeles. ’ ’ The portion of the amendment here relevant is that which placed the position of captain of the fire department in salary schedule number 48.
On June 8, 1965, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 130,266, by which Ordinance No. 89,935 (hereinabove noted in this opinion) was amended in certain particulars, the portion of the amendment herein involved being that which placed the position of captain of the fire department in salary schedule number 50. It is to be noted that that salary schedule was the same as that set forth in the ordinance of May 13,1965, which the mayor returned to the council without his approval. The minutes of the council for its meeting of June 8, 1965, refer to the ordinance of May 13, 1965, which was returned by the mayor on May 24, 1965, without his approval and are in part as follows: “Upon calling the roll, said ordinance was again adopted notwithstanding the objections of the Mayor, by the following vote: Ayes . . . (12); Noes . . . (3).”2 No claim is made that Ordinance No. 130,266 was not timely adopted by the requisite number of votes of members of the city council. [560]*560In section 4 thereof it was provided that the ordinance should become operative on July 1,1965.
On or before June 1, 1965, the mayor submitted to the city council a proposed budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1965, and ending June 30, 1966.3 Therein the provisions with respect to salaries in the fire department included the following: “Firemen . . . $33,225,710,” but there was no designation of amounts with respect to specific positions within that general classification. In the supporting data which disclosed the basis for the proposed appropriation, the positions and salaries were set forth, including the position of “Captain Fire Department” with a monthly salary of $865-$966 but without a designation of a schedule number. The total number of firemen was given as 3,430 and the salary budget was stated to be $33,225,710.4
The city council thereafter modified the budget with respect to the fire department by changing the appropriation for the salaries of firemen from $33,225,710 to $33,559,574.5 The defendants concede that the increase of $333,864 corresponded with the difference between the amount estimated to be required to pay fire captains expected to be employed for one year at schedule number 48 and that estimated to be required to pay such captains for one year pursuant to schedule number 50.
On June 21, 1965, the mayor returned the budget to the council with his modifications and his reasons therefor, a por[561]*561tion of his communication being as follows: “I cannot in good conscience allow this item to remain in the budget and am therefore vetoing the addition of $333,864 to the Fire Department. I am also requesting that the Council immediately take the appropriate action to rescind the extra raise for this one category of employees [captain, fire department] singled out for such favored expensive treatment. ...” The minutes of the council for its meeting of June 24, 1965, show that a motion that the disapproval of the mayor of the increase in the salary appropriation for firemen “be not concurred in” failed to obtain the requisite number of votes, nine members of the council voting in favor of the motion and three voting against the motion.6
At the trial on October 14, 1965, the plaintiff called as a witness the City Administrative Officer, Dr. Piper. Portions of his testimony were : “ If schedule 50 were paid [to fire department captains], and if there were no other adjustments made in accounts within the fire department and no further appropriation by the council, then the salary account for firemen would exceed the figure that is included in the budget. . . . By the amount of the fire captain’s raise, the difference between schedule 48 and schedule 50, which is roughly $333,000 plus.” In response to a question by counsel for the defendants as to whether his office ever allows any city department to overspend the allotted appropriations, Dr. Piper stated: ‘1 No, sir. There is an automatic cut-off on it in that the Controller will not pay the bill, and he has the copy of the expenditure program, and each expenditure is cheeked against this program. ’ ’
As to the procedure in the event it appears that a salary appropriation will be exhausted before the end of the fiscal year, Dr. Piper testified: "The matter would be referred to us [562]*562for a recommendation back to either the department or to the city council. We would examine all of the accounts of that department, and if there is a surplus in aiijr account and we could transfer the amount needed from one account to another, we would do so. . . . That would be customary. The department could, on its own, reduce personnel, leave positions vacant to make up the difference in expenditures • or, if they choose to keep the personnel on the job in the same numbers and at the same rates, they could request an additional or supplemental appropriation from the city council. This would require an action by the council and approval by the mayor to appropriate funds from the unappropriated balance to the salary account of that particular department.”
The plaintiff states that his challenge is not as to the manner of the adoption of Ordinance No. 130,266 but is directed to the manner of its application. He contends that the provision for the increase in salary for the position of captain of the fire department did not become effective because the mayor eliminated the amount of $333,864 which the city council had added to the appropriation for salaries of firemen. For reasons which will be stated, that contention is untenable.
The power to determine the salaries of firemen is placed by the charter in the council.7 That power is not restricted by the charter so that it can only be exercised as a part of the process of adopting the budget. Unlike the situation in Sullivan v. McKinley, 14 Cal.2d 113 [92 P.2d 892], the charter does not embody any provision governing the time within which the matter of salary increases must be determined for a particular fiscal year. The item in the budget, as adopted, with respect to the salaries of firemen was in the amount of $33,225,710 and contained no designation of specific rates of compensation or of specific amounts to be used in payment of persons holding particular positions in the department. Consequently, since Ordinance No. 130,266 had been effectively adopted in accordance with the applicable provisions of the charter, there was no impropriety in the payment of the increased salary for the position of captain of [563]*563the fire department out of the general appropriation in the budget for salaries of firemen.
It is, of course, true that the failure of the council to overcome the action of the mayor in vetoing the addition of $333,864 to the appropriation for salaries of firemen left unresolved the problem of the probable insufficiency of the appropriation actually made. But, as noted in the testimony of the City Administrative Officer, ways were open for the subsequent resolution of that problem in harmony with the provisions of the charter. (Charter, §§ 354, 354.1 and 355.) Until the taking of such appropriate action the total expenditure of money for salaries of firemen was limited to the amount set fortli in the budget as adopted.8 The unsolved problem remained in the hands of those entrusted by the charter with the exercise of judgment with respect thereto and did not afford a basis for judicial intervention. (See Muchenberger v. City of Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 635, 646 [275 P. 803].)
Since there was involved no illegal expenditure of funds of the city (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a), the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief which he sought.
The judgment is affirmed.
Cobey, J., and Moss, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 21, 1968.