Sikousis Legacy Inc. v. B-Gas Limited

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-5272
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SIKOUSIS LEGACY INC., No. 24-5272 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-03273-CRB K INVESTMENTS INC.; BAHLA BEAUTY, INC., MEMORANDUM*

Intervenor-Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

B-GAS LIMITED, a/k/a Bepalo LPG Shipping Ltd.; B-GAS AS; BERGSHAV SHIPPING LTD.; B-GAS HOLDING LTD.; BERGSHAV AFRAMAX LTD.; BERGSHAV SHIPHOLDING AS; BERGSHAV INVEST AS; LPG INVEST AS; ATLE BERGSHAVEN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 22, 2025 San Francisco, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Before: CLIFTON, OWENS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellants Sikousis Legacy, Inc., K Investments, Inc., and Bahla

Beauty, Inc. (collectively, “Sikousis”) appeal the district court’s denial of their Rule

60(b)(5) motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Sikousis sought relief

from the vacatur of a prejudgment attachment under Rule B of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure’s Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims, and from

a judgment of dismissal of the case. We affirm.

1. We first address our subject-matter jurisdiction. See Herklotz v. Parkinson,

848 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2017). Subject-matter jurisdiction in in rem or in quasi

in rem cases depends on continued personal jurisdiction over the res. See United

States v. 66 Pieces of Jade & Gold Jewelry, 760 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1985);

Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214, 221 (1900). Defendant-Appellee Bergshav

Aframax Ltd. (“Aframax”) claims there is no longer personal jurisdiction over the

res here. Aframax argues that the exhaustion of direct appeals in Sikousis Legacy,

Inc. v. B-Gas Ltd., 97 F.4th 622 (9th Cir. 2024), necessarily vacated personal

jurisdiction over the res.

We disagree. A federal court’s quasi in rem jurisdiction depends on whether

the res was properly attached at the beginning of suit, unless the res is voluntarily

released or any judgment would be “useless” because the res is outside the court’s

or any litigant’s control. See Ventura Packers, Inc. v. F/V Jeanine Kathleen, 424

2 24-5272 F.3d 852, 860-61 (9th Cir. 2005). In this case, the vessel M/T Berica was properly

attached at the start of proceedings and was substituted by a letter of understanding

with no express termination date. Given this, Ventura Packers confirms our

continued subject-matter jurisdiction. For the same reasons, this case is not moot

because relief could still be provided through the substitute res.

2. The district court denied the Rule 60(b)(5) motion because it ruled that the

vacatur order could not be applied “prospectively.” But because of a change in

circumstances in the case, we need not review the correctness of that decision. See

Afewerki v. Anaya L. Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 777 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We may affirm on

any basis supported by the record.”) (simplified). Sikousis’s motion was based

entirely on factual findings made by a Norwegian district court after the dismissal

order. But a Norwegian appellate court later reversed the Norwegian district court’s

judgment. Thus, the premise of the Rule 60(b)(5) motion has been invalidated. See

Ornellas v. Oakley, 618 F.2d 1351, 1356 (9th Cir. 1980) (“A reversed or dismissed

judgment cannot serve as the basis for a disposition on the ground of res judicata or

collateral estoppel.”). And as the district court pointed out, though the evidence

underlying those findings might have supported a motion for relief under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(2), Sikousis is time-barred from bringing such a motion because more

than a year has passed since the orders it is challenging. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

Given these events, we see no basis to grant a Rule 60(b)(5) motion.

3 24-5272 We thus AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(5) motion. We

also DENY the motion to dismiss, Dkt. 41, and DENY as moot the motion to

supplement the record, Dkt. 13. Each side to bear its own costs.

4 24-5272