Signature Financial LLC v. Shtayner

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 28, 2020
Docket1:18-cv-04676
StatusUnknown

This text of Signature Financial LLC v. Shtayner (Signature Financial LLC v. Shtayner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Signature Financial LLC v. Shtayner, (N.D. Ill. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE FINANCIAL LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) 18 C 4676 ) vs. ) Judge Gary Feinerman ) YASYA SHTAYNER, SEMYON SHTAYNER, 2ND ) AVENUE TAXI CORP., 3 ANGELS CAB CORP., 3RD ) AVENUE TAXI CORP., 6TH AVENUE TAXI CORP., ) 7TH AVENUE TAXI CORP., 8TH AVENUE TAXI ) CORP., 9TH AVENUE TAXI CORP., ASHLAND ) AVENUE TAXI CORP., ASPIRE CAB CORP., ) CARROLL AVENUE TAXI CORP., EMPIRE TAXI ) INCORPORATED, GREY GOOSE CAB CO., HANDY ) CAB TAXI CORP., LEXINGTON TAXI CORP., ) MADISON TAXI CORP., MONSOON TAXI CORP., ) RIVERSIDE TAXI CORP., SAM & SONS TAXI ) CORP., SECOND CITY TAXI CORP., STOLI CAB ) CO., WEST END TAXI CORP., and YORK AVENUE ) TAXI CORP., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In August 2019, the court entered a large judgment for Signature Financial LLC against Semyon Shtayner, Yasya Shtayner, and numerous corporations of which they are the principal shareholders. Docs. 92-93. After the court denied Signature’s initial motion for writs of execution on property that the Shtayners asserted they did not own, Doc. 100, Signature issued citations to discover assets on them, Doc. 104. In compliance with the citations, the Shtayners produced documents regarding their assets and the assets of the corporate defendants, and they appeared for their depositions. Doc. 123-3; Doc. 123-4; Doc. 137 at 3. Before the court are two motions filed by Signature. The first is a motion for the issuance of charging orders against the Shtayners’ distributional interests in certain non-party limited liability companies. Doc. 120. The second is a motion for a turnover order and writ of execution directing the Shtayners and most of the corporate defendants—2nd Avenue Taxi Corp., 3rd Avenue Taxi Corp., 6th Avenue Taxi Corp., 7th Avenue Taxi Corp., 8th Avenue Taxi Corp., 9th Avenue Taxi Corp., Ashland Avenue Taxi Corp., Aspire Cab Corp., Carroll Avenue Taxi Corp.,

Empire Taxi Incorporated, Grey Goose Cab Co., Lexington Taxi Corp., West End Taxi Corp., and York Avenue Taxi Corp. (“Entity Judgment Debtors”)—to turn over certain taxi medallions and shares in a certain non-party corporation. Doc. 123. The motion for issuance of charging orders is denied, and the motion for a turnover order and writ of execution is granted as to Entity Judgment Debtors and denied as to the Shtayners. Discussion Civil Rule 69 provides that post-judgment execution proceedings are governed by state procedural law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (“The procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.”). Both

sides agree that that Section 2-1402 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1402, governs here. Docs. 133-134, 136-137. Section 2-1402(b-1) provides: “Any citation served upon a judgment debtor who is a natural person shall be served by personal service or abode service as provided in Supreme Court Rule 105 and shall include a copy of the Income and Asset Form set forth in subsection (b-5).” 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b-1). Section 2-1402(b-10) provides: “Any action properly initiated under this Section may proceed notwithstanding an absent or incomplete Income and Asset Form, and a judgment debtor may be examined for the purpose of allowing the judgment creditor to discover income and assets belonging to the judgment debtor or in which the judgment debtor has an interest.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b-10). Section 2-1402(c) provides that “[w]hen assets or income of the judgment debtor not exempt from the satisfaction of a judgment … are discovered, the court may, by appropriate order or judgment[,] … [c]ompel the judgment debtor to deliver up … [the assets] so discovered, … [or] [c]ompel any person cited, other than the judgment debtor, to deliver up any assets so discovered, to be applied in

satisfaction of the judgment … when … the judgment debtor … could recover them in specie or obtain a judgment for the proceeds or value thereof.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(c). And Section 2- 1402(c-5) provides: “If a citation is directed to a judgment debtor who is a natural person, no payment order shall be entered under subsection (c) unless the Income and Asset Form was served upon the judgment debtor as required by subsection (b-1), the judgment debtor has had an opportunity to assert exemptions, and the payments are from non-exempt sources.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(c-5). The Shtayners oppose Signature’s motions on two grounds, which are considered in turn. I. Service of the Citations The Shtayners argue that Signature’s motions should be denied because it did not personally serve the citations on them by personal or abode service, as required by Section 2-

1402(b-1). Doc. 133 at 7-9; Doc. 134 at 7-9. Signature concedes that it did not personally serve the citations on the Shtayners. But it is undisputed that Signature provided the citations to the attorney who at the time was representing the Shtayners in this suit. Doc. 120-2 at 2-6, 11-15; Doc. 133 at 3; Doc. 134 at 3. And it also is undisputed that the Shtayners received actual notice of the citations, as they produced documents and sat for depositions in compliance therewith. Doc. 123-3; Doc. 123-4; Doc. 137 at 3. The question here, then, is whether Signature’s failure to effect personal service in accord with Section 2-1402(b-1) requires that its motions be denied even though the Shtayners received actual notice of the citations and then complied with them. “In general,” and consistent with Section 2-1402(b-1), “personal service is required for service of a citation to discover assets.” Martin v. C.D. Gray, Inc., 110 F.R.D. 398, 401 (N.D. Ill. 1986). However, because “the essence of the service requirements is to provide due process,” the failure to effect personal service on a judgment debtor may be excused where it is

clear the debtor “received actual notice” of the citation. Ibid.; see also Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Loop Corp., 2011 WL 10604426, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2011) (same, reasoning: “[T]he service rules exist primarily to ensure that due process requirements are met, and this court has been reluctant to elevate form over substance in these matters. Due process requires reasonable assurance that notice was actually given to the party.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); In re GGSI Liquidation Inc., 2007 WL 1958597, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 2, 2007) (same, reasoning: “Illinois law appears to leave the procedure to be followed in supplementary proceedings largely to the judge’s discretion. Rule 69(a) does not require this court to apply the entire procedural law of Illinois; rather, this court may proceed in any way that satisfies the requirements of due process.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because it is

beyond dispute that the Shtayners received actual notice of the citations, Signature’s failure to effect personal service under Section 2-1402(b-1) does not defeat their motions. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260

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Signature Financial LLC v. Shtayner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/signature-financial-llc-v-shtayner-ilnd-2020.