THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
December 16, 2025
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A1902. SIGNAL MACHINE COMPANY, INC. et al. v. FRIENDLY-ABLE et al. A25A1924. CLUB CAR, LLC v. FRIENDLY-ABLE et al.
PADGETT, Judge.
These companion appeals arise out of a lawsuit filed by Chrystal Friendly-Able
against Club Car, LLC (“Club Car”), Signal Machine Company, Inc., and Signal
Solutions of Tennessee, LLC (collectively, the “Signal Appellants”) for the wrongful
death of Alyssa Drinkard, who was killed in an industrial accident involving an
allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous conveyor belt system while working
at Club Car’s manufacturing plant in Evans, Georgia. Club Car and the Signal
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to transfer
venue pursuant to the forum non conveniens statute, OCGA § 9-10-31.1. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The relevant facts for purposes of the motion to transfer venue are not in
dispute. According to Friendly-Able’s complaint, Drinkard was working as a contract
worker at Club Car’s manufacturing plant in Evans, Georgia, on the night of March
8, 2024, when she became entangled in the conveyor belt system. A witness activated
an emergency stop button, attempting to halt the conveyor belt system, but that
emergency mechanism failed and maintenance personnel were called to manually shut
down the conveyor belt system. Emergency responders, including deputies,
firefighters, and EMTs, had to cut through the system’s metal frame in order to
extricate Drinkard. Drinkard was transported to Doctors’ Hospital in Augusta, where
she was later pronounced dead.
At the time of her death, Drinkard was a resident of Columbia County, and
Club Car’s manufacturing plant where Drinkard sustained her fatal injuries, as well
as its principal place of business, was in Columbia County. Friendly-Able, Drinkard’s
next-of-kin and administrator of her estate,1 also is a resident of Columbia County.
1 At the time the complaint was filed, Drinkard’s estate was pending in the Probate Court of Columbia County. 2 Friendly-Able brought suit against Club Car, the Signal Appellants,2 and
another defendant, Tennessee Engineering Services, Inc. (“TES”)3 in the State Court
of Gwinnett County, where Club Car’s registered agent for service of process, CT
Corporation System, was located, alleging that Drinkard’s death was “caused by the
unsafe working conditions, malfunctioning safety equipment, and lack of adequate
training and protocols maintained” by Club Car, the Signal Appellants, and TES. In
her complaint, she asserts claims for negligence against Club Car based on its alleged
failure “to inspect, maintain, and remedy dangerous and hazardous conditions on [its]
premises, particularly with respect to the [c]onveyor [b]elt [s]ystem,” and its alleged
failure to properly safeguard the conveyor belt system and to properly train, supervise,
2 The Signal Appellants are considered residents of Catoosa County, Georgia. 3 TES was a Tennessee corporation with its principal place of business in Chattanooga, Tennessee, that specially designed and built the conveyor belt system as a custom order for Club Car’s Columbia County manufacturing facility. In 2023, the Signal Appellants purchased certain assets and assumed certain operating liabilities of TES, and TES thereafter was dissolved on or about May 1, 2024. Friendly-Able did not initially effect service on TES, but the record contains affidavits attesting to service by statutory overnight delivery 20 days after the trial court’s order denying the motions to transfer venue and 17 days before this Court granted applications for interlocutory appeal. The record does not include any answer or other responsive pleading by TES. As a result, we will not consider TES in evaluating whether the trial court erred in denying the motions to transfer. 3 and warn workers such as Drinkard “about the hidden dangers” of the system. She
also asserts claims for negligence and strict product liability against the Signal
Appellants and TES, alleging the conveyor belt system was defectively designed,
manufactured, installed, and maintained, and that the Signal Appellants and TES
failed to warn of the risks and dangers inherent within the design, manufacture,
placement, use, and operation of the system at Club Car’s manufacturing plant.4
Club Car and the Signal Appellants answered and moved to transfer the case
to the Superior Court of Columbia County based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, as codified at OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a). They argued in their motions to
transfer that because the only connection the case had to Gwinnett County was the
presence of Club Car’s registered agent for service of process, venue was more proper
in Columbia County, where the premises and product involved in the incident,
witnesses, and other evidence were located, and where Friendly-Able and Drinkard
resided.
4 Friendly-Able also seeks punitive damages under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 and attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 against all defendants. 4 The trial court denied the motions to transfer venue and issued a certificate of
immediate review. This Court granted Club Car’s and the Signal Appellants’
applications for interlocutory appeals. These appeals followed.
When considering a motion to transfer based on forum non conveniens, a trial
court must apply the standard set out in OCGA § 9-10-31.1, which provides:
If a court of this state, on written motion of a party, finds that in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses a claim or action would be more properly heard in a forum . . . in a different county of proper venue within this state, the court shall decline to adjudicate the matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. . . . [and] the venue shall be transferred to the appropriate county. In determining whether to grant a motion . . . to transfer venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court shall give consideration to the following factors:
(1) Relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) Availability and cost of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses;
(3) Possibility of viewing of the premises, if viewing would be appropriate to the action;
(4) Unnecessary expense or trouble to the defendant not necessary
5 to the plaintiff’s own right to pursue his or her remedy;
(5) Administrative difficulties for the forum courts;
(6) Existence of local interests in deciding the case locally; and
(7) The traditional deference given to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.
OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a). The burden is on the movant to show that the factors set out
in OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) support transfer, and application of the statutory standard to
the unique circumstances of a particular case is committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. McInerney v. McInerney, 313 Ga. 462, 469(2)(c) (870 SE2d 721) (2022).
However, “the discretion of the trial court is not without some limits,” and our task
is to determine “whether the decision of the trial court was a reasoned and reasonable
one in the light of the standard set out, and factors enumerated, in OCGA § 9-10-
31.1(a).” Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568, 570–71(1) (740 SE2d 136) (2013). For, as our
Supreme Court has cautioned, “a proper venue is not necessarily the most convenient
venue,” and “the issue is not whether venue was proper where the action was filed,
but whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that ‘in the interest
of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses a claim or action would
6 be more properly heard in a [different] forum[.]’” McInerney, 313 Ga. at 469(2)(c)
(citing OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)). And where the trial court’s exercise of discretion is
“infected by a significant legal error,” we will find an abuse of discretion. McInerney,
313 Ga. at 470(2)(c) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Bearing in mind the overarching standard of “in the interest of justice and for
the convenience of the parties and witnesses,” we examine the trial court’s analysis
of the comparative propriety of Gwinnett County and Columbia County, in light of the
seven factors set out in OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a). See Federal Ins .Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co.,
281 Ga. App. 152, 154–55 (635 SE2d 411) (2006) (requiring that the trial court
compare the two venues, guided by the seven statutory factors, to determine which,
in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, is “more
proper” (emphasis in original)), overruled in part on other grounds by Wang, 292 Ga.
at 571(1).
1. Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
Here, the trial court did not weigh the relative ease of access to sources of proof
as between Gwinnett County and Columbia County. Rather, the trial court asserted
that the “parties will have relatively easy access to sources of proof in Gwinnett
7 County” because discovery can be conducted electronically, and the record did not
establish that Club Car and the Signal Appellants “will be unable to access sources of
proof with relative ease” with venue in Gwinnett County, “even if some witnesses or
evidence is located closer to or in Columbia County.”
The trial court’s assertions reflect a legally incorrect understanding and analysis
of the factor set forth in OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(1). The inquiry this factor requires is
not whether it is “relatively easy” for the parties to access evidence in one forum or
whether the record fails to show that the parties would be incapable of accessing proof
in that forum. The correct evaluation the trial court must undertake is to compare the
relative ease of access, as between the two venues, to sources of proof, not just during
the discovery phase of the litigation, but for trial as well. And in making that
evaluation, the trial court should include “[c]onsiderations of witness convenience
and efficient access to other evidence.” See McInerney, 313 Ga. at 470(2)(c)
(explaining that witness convenience and efficient access to evidence are properly
included within the first statutory factor). The record demonstrates that, in addition
to party witnesses Friendly-Able and Club Car, nonparty witnesses, including Club
Car personnel who are most familiar with and performed routine maintenance and
8 repairs to, the allegedly defective conveyor belt system, are located in Columbia
County. Similarly, the conveyor belt system itself, documents related to its operation,
maintenance, and inspection, and the premises that Friendly-Able alleges were
negligently maintained are in Columbia County. The record likewise indicates that
additional nonparty witnesses, including co-workers who trained and supervised
Drinkard, those who witnessed the accident, and first responders and medical
personnel are either in or near Columbia County. Nowhere does the record
demonstrate that any witnesses or other sources of proof are located in Gwinnett
County, or even closer to Gwinnett County than Columbia County.
Thus, the trial court erred in evaluating this first statutory factor merely as
whether the parties would be capable of conducting discovery with venue in Gwinnett
County, in failing to evaluate the comparative or relative ease and efficiency of access
to witnesses, including nonparty witnesses, and other sources of proof as between the
existing and proposed venues, and in omitting any consideration of the comparative
convenience to witnesses in attending trial between the two venues.5 See OCGA § 9-
5 Witness (and party) convenience is necessarily a function of proximity, with adjacent venues or venues that are near to each other producing less inconvenience than those that are greater distances apart. See, e.g., Gowdy v. Schley, 317 Ga. App. 693, 696(2) and n.13 (732 SE2d 774) (2012) (noting the trial court’s consideration of 9 10-31.1(a)(1); McInerney, 313 Ga. at 470(2)(c). Indeed, in contravention of OCGA §
9-10-31.1(a), the trial court’s order is devoid of any reference to, let alone
consideration of, the convenience of witnesses. Yet where, as here, the facts and
allegations arise out of events occurring in the proposed transferee venue and “most
of the likely witnesses” are located within that proposed venue, our Supreme Court
has held that the relative ease of access to sources of proof favor that proposed venue
over the existing venue. See Hawthorn Suites Golf Resorts v. Feneck, 282 Ga. 554,
556–57(3) (651 SE2d 664) (2007).
2. Availability and Cost of Compulsory Process for Unwilling Witnesses
With respect to the second factor, the trial court found that the record “fail[ed]
to show that there are unwilling witnesses” and “that the cost of . . . compulsory
process is so much greater in Gwinnett County than in Columbia County that transfer
is proper.”
the close proximity of Muscogee County, Georgia and Russell County, Alabama in connection with considering the comparative inconvenience to the parties and witnesses in denying the forum non conveniens motion, and suggesting that a cause of action arising in a forum farther away with witnesses located in that distant forum may yield a different outcome). Here, the parties do not dispute that the State Court of Gwinnett County is approximately 130 miles from Columbia County. 10 While the trial court was correct in noting that the record at this point in time
does not show that there are unwilling witnesses,6 it erred in its analysis that the cost
of compulsory process in one venue over another must be of an unspecified greater
magnitude in order to, by itself, support transfer. Rather, the correct legal analysis
requires that the trial court consider the demonstrated (or, if more appropriate at the
given stage of the litigation, the expected) cost of compulsory process associated with
each venue, and where cost is greater in one venue over the other and hence favors
transfer to the latter venue, that factor joins with the remaining six statutory factors
in determining whether, “in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses,” the case is “more properly” heard in the proposed transferee
venue. OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a).7
6 We recognize that moving to transfer at the outset of litigation may conserve judicial resources, but does not necessarily lend itself to precisely identifying witnesses who will not agree to appear voluntarily at a trial many months, if not years, in the future. 7 Even at this early stage of litigation, the trial court can evaluate, as a matter of law, the likely cost associated with compulsory process for witness attendance at trial in each venue, in the event such process is needed. See OCGA § 24-13-25 (setting out witness fees as $25 per diem, and when a witness resides outside the county where the testimony is to be given, an additional 45¢ per mile for travel between the witness’s residence and the place of testimony). As noted above, the record here does establish that there are party and nonparty likely witnesses who are located in Columbia 11 3. Possibility of Viewing the Premises, if Appropriate
OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(3) requires the trial court consider the “[p]ossibility of
viewing the premises, if viewing would be appropriate to the action.” Once again, the
trial court erred in its legal interpretation of this factor. While the trial court conceded
that “it would be more convenient” to view the premises (which premises would
include the conveyor belt system, risk-mitigation features of the system or the
premises, and warnings, or lack thereof) if the case was transferred to Columbia
County, it nonetheless disregarded that finding on the basis that “the record fails to
show that viewing the premises is likely.” “Likely” viewing the premises is not the
standard called for by the third statutory factor. By the plain language of the statute,
the standard requires an inquiry into the comparative ability, from each venue, to
achieve a viewing of the premises, if a viewing would be appropriate given the nature
of the action and claims asserted (for instance, a premises liability and industrial
product liability action versus a divorce or a contract action). The statute
contemplates the possibility and achievability of viewing the premises; it does not
require a showing, particularly at the outset of the litigation, that a jury view is
County, but the record does not reveal any likely witnesses located in Gwinnett County. 12 “likely.” See OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(3). See also Hawthorn Suites, 282 Ga. at 556(3)
(recounting trial court’s appropriate consideration that “to the extent that any
premises would need to be viewed” in action arising out of agreement for property
management services, that viewing would occur in the alternate forum, thereby
supporting dismissal based on forum non conveniens). The trial court erred both in
its legal interpretation of this statutory factor and in disregarding its own finding that
this factor favored Columbia County as the more convenient forum for a viewing of
the premises.
4. Unnecessary Expense or Trouble to Defendant Not Necessary to Plaintiff’s Right
to Pursue Remedy
With respect to the fourth factor, the trial court again found that litigating in
Gwinnett County would have Club Car and the Signal Appellants “incur additional
costs” for witnesses to appear at trial,8 but then erred in discounting that finding,
suggesting that “witnesses often appear at trial via video deposition,” and that those
additional costs were “not so expensive or troublesome” to transfer the case from the
8 The trial court’s order was silent on the additional cost to Club Car for itself, as a party, attending trial in Gwinnett County, rather than in Columbia County, near its and Friendly-Able’s home. 13 plaintiff’s choice of venue. It concluded that the import and magnitude of those
greater costs fell by the wayside where Friendly-Able chose to file the case in
Gwinnett County.
The trial court did not correctly apply this fourth factor in light of the larger
statutory standard. Here, the trial court acknowledged that venue in Gwinnett County
would cause Club Car and the Signal Appellants to incur additional costs they
otherwise would not if the case was transferred to Columbia County, but incorrectly
failed to: (a) recognize and give weight to our Civil Practice Act’s directive that
testimony at trial be taken orally in open court, OCGA § 9-11-43(a); (b) continue to
credit its own finding of additional cost balanced against, collectively, the other six
factors; (c) examine the “trouble” or inconvenience that Club Car and the Signal
Appellants would encounter in litigating and attending trial in a forum distant from
both Club Car and Friendly-Able; or (d) determine whether its finding of additional
cost or its required, but not analyzed, inquiry into the trouble Club Car and the Signal
Appellants would shoulder by having the case heard in Gwinnett County was
unnecessary to Friendly-Able’s right to pursue the remedy she sought. On the latter
issue, it is important to note that in the particular circumstances presented here, there
14 is no difference in the substantive law that would be applied in the State Court of
Gwinnett County and the Superior Court of Columbia County; the only difference
between the venues as contemplated by this fourth statutory factor is that the
courthouse would be located in, and the jurors would be from, Friendly-Able’s home
county of Columbia County as opposed to the county of one defendant’s registered
agent. As a matter of law, Friendly-Able’s right to pursue her remedy would not be
adversely affected and would remain fully intact if the case were to be heard in
Columbia County.
5. Administrative Difficulties for the Forum Courts
In addressing the fifth factor, directing that the administrative difficulties of the
plural “forum courts” be considered, the trial court again erred by simply concluding
that “[t]he record fails to show that Gwinnett County will have difficulty
administering this action.” The inquiry presented by this factor is not whether the
State Court of Gwinnett County would or would not encounter administrative
difficulties in hearing the case. The inquiry involves comparing the administrative
difficulties for the State Court of Gwinnett County and the Superior Court of
Columbia County, and determining whether those potential difficulties are greater in
15 one of the two venues. See Chicago Ins., 281 Ga. App. at 154 n.5. This comparison
typically would include consideration of each venue’s relative case load or calendar
congestion, whether one venue is likely to require more court involvement or court
expense than the other on matters related to its location (such as issuing and enforcing
compulsory process, or accomplishing a jury view), and each venue’s familiarity with
the governing law.
6. Existence of Local Interests in Deciding the Case Locally
With respect to the sixth factor, the trial court found that “[b]ecause the
incident occurred in Columbia County, that county has some interest in having the
case decided” there, but that Gwinnett County also had “an interest” in deciding the
case because Club Car chose a registered agent located in Gwinnett County.
The record belies the trial court’s conclusory assertion that Gwinnett County
and Columbia County have arguably equal “local interests in deciding the case
locally.” Here, the record demonstrates not simply that the incident occurred in
Columbia County, but that Drinkard and Friendly-Able were residents of Columbia
County, that Club Car has its principal place of business in Columbia County, that the
premises and product that allegedly give rise to liability are located in Columbia
16 County, and that all fact witnesses — including first responders who serve the public
within their community and who would have differing amounts of time away from
their service depending on where the case is heard — are in or near Columbia County.
Conversely, the only “local interest” Gwinnett County arguably can be said to have
in deciding the case locally is that one of three served defendants had a corporate
registered agent located in Gwinnett County. Casting that as a local interest sufficient
to outweigh and overcome the countervailing local interest held by Columbia County
on the particular facts of this case is inconsistent with our doctrine of forum non
conveniens. See AT&T v. Sigala, 274 Ga. 137, 138 (549 SE2d 373) (2001) (“[t]here is
a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home (quoting Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 US 501, 508 (67 SCt 839, 91 LEd 1055) (1947) (punctuation
omitted; emphasis added)), superseded by statute as stated in LaFontaine v. Signature
Research, 305 Ga. 107, 109 n.3 (823 SE2d 791) (2019); Hawkins v. Blair, 334 Ga. App.
898, 904(3)(f) (780 SE2d 515) (2015) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court
determined that metro Atlanta forum had “no local interests” favoring it,
notwithstanding allegation that defendant illegally transferred money from bank
17 located in Atlanta via bank employees, where both parties were residents of alternate
forum and alleged injuries occurred in that alternate forum).
Furthermore, full consideration of the sixth factor should include an evaluation
of the comparative interest in, or burden of, requiring each of the venues to bear the
expense of funding a jury, particularly where the events giving rise to the controversy
or litigation occurred in one, but not the other, venue. Sigala, 274 Ga. at 138 (“Jury
duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which
has no relation to the litigation.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
7. Traditional Deference Given to a Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum
In its consideration of the seventh and final factor, the trial court stated simply
that Friendly-Able’s decision to file the action in Gwinnett County was entitled to
“some deference,” yet, as discussed supra, when considering other statutory factors,
the trial court repeatedly invoked her choice of forum as the basis for discounting or
diminishing factual analyses of other factors that favored Columbia County as the
more proper forum. In doing so, the trial court committed legal error.
According to the language of the statute, the seventh factor requires a trial court
to consider the “traditional deference” given to a plaintiff’s choice of forum. OCGA
18 § 9-10-31.1(a)(7). Although the statute has existed for only 20 years9 and does not
define “traditional,” we are cognizant of previous decisions of this Court and our
Supreme Court declining to accede to the principle that “traditional deference”
conveys greater weight to the plaintiff’s choice of forum than that afforded the six
preceding statutory factors or that it can act to diminish findings made in
consideration of other factors. See Hawthorn Suites, 282 Ga. at 556–57(3) (holding trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiff’s “decision to litigate
the case in Georgia could not override the clear implication of the preceding factors”
indicating that the case was more properly heard in Louisiana); Woodard Events v.
Coffee House Indus., 341 Ga. App. 526, 529 (e) (801 SE2d 322) (2017) (rejecting
argument that trial court abused its discretion by not placing greater weight on the
sixth and seventh factors of local interests and plaintiff’s choice of forum); Collier v.
Wehmeier, 313 Ga. App. 421, 424 (2) (721 SE2d 919) (2011) (rejecting argument that
“traditional deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum” should be given greater
weight than other factors or that “in the absence of a clear showing of inconvenience
to defendants,” deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum “trumps the other
9 Ga. L. 2005, Act 1, § 2 (effective Feb. 16, 2005). 19 factors”). If our legislature had intended for this last of the seven factors to carry more
weight than the previous six or for it to serve as a countervailing analytical force within
each of those other six factors, it could have said so, but it did not.
Particularly in the peculiar circumstances presented here, where a plaintiff
chooses a forum that is both distant from plaintiff’s home county and which forum’s
only connection to the case is the presence of one defendant’s corporate registered
agent, and where the plaintiff, that defendant, the events giving rise to the action, the
class of witnesses of record, and other evidence, including the allegedly defective
industrial product and the premises which allegedly give rise to liability, are all located
in or much nearer to the proposed forum, we hold that the factor of plaintiff’s choice
of such a distant forum as presented here, in and of itself, is insufficient to warrant
retention of venue.10 See Hawkins, 334 Ga. App. at 904(3)(g) (“in light of the totality
of the circumstances,” plaintiff’s choice of forum was not enough to retain venue in
Fulton County).
10 This is even more so where, as here, the presence of one defendant’s corporate registered agent is the sole, non-substantive hook that establishes venue as to alleged joint tortfeasors, the Signal Appellants, who have no connection — corporate, liability-based, or otherwise — to the venue. 20 We conclude by reiterating that the full inquiry into the standard set out in our
forum non conveniens statute is not whether the case is capable of being heard in a
proper forum “in the interest[ ] of justice and the convenience of [only] the parties,”
as the trial court held, but whether it is “more properly” heard in a forum different
than that chosen by the plaintiff, “in the interest of justice and the convenience of the
parties and witnesses,”as guided by a comparison of the fora according to the factors
set forth in OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a). And to that latter endeavor, we add that where a
trial court applies the statutory factors that guide evaluation of that overarching
standard in a manner that permits the plaintiff’s choice of forum to discount and
supersede undisputed facts and trial court findings that, on balance, favor transfer or
dismissal, it effectively renders our forum non conveniens statute meaningless and
thereby commits an abuse of discretion.
We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the cases for the
trial court to reconsider, pursuant to the proper framework of OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)
and in accordance with this opinion, whether, “in the interest of justice and for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses” and as guided by comparative consideration
21 of the statute’s seven enumerated factors, the case would be “more properly” heard
in the Superior Court of Columbia County.
Judgments vacated and cases remanded with direction. Doyle, P. J., and Markle, J.,
concur.