Opinion
ROTH, P. J.
Petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate its order imposing sanctions on petitioner for his refusal to obtain information from his own expert witnesses, at his own expense, with which to answer interrogatories under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030. We affirm the order.
Facts
Real Party in Interest (the Church) filed suit in March 1967 against petitioner, a painting subcontractor, and the general contractor, for fire damage allegedly resulting from their negligence in performing repairs to the church building. The Church claims that the fire was caused by a drop-cloth left by petitioner over three high-intensity flood lamps at the close of a work day, and that the lamps ignited the cloth when turned on. To determine whether this was possible, petitioner contracted with Vollmer Engineering Laboratories (Vollmer) to test the same drop-cloth material with the same type of lamp.
On July 23, 1971, the Church served petitioner written interrogatories under section 2030
which included questions as to whether any such expert witness had been hired and had conducted any such tests and if so,
the nature of the tests. Question 20 then asked for detailed information regarding the specialized knowledge, experience and qualifications of any such expert. In his answers, petitioner named Vollmer the expert he intended to call as a witness and described the basic details of the tests made. Petitioner replied to question 20 (see fn. 4, infra) as follows: “Information unknown, other than Mr. Vollmer is a Professional Engineer California No. 14229.”
Questions 21, 22 and 25, and petitioner’s answers were as follows:
“21. Has any person listed in your answer to the preceding interrogatory arrived at or formed any opinion as to any subject with respect to which he was consulted by you or concerning which he has advised you?”
Answer: “Yes.
“22. If your answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the affirmative, is the opinion of each such person based on facts personally perceived by or personally known tO' him? a. If so-, state specifically and in detail each fact personally perceived by or personally known to him.
Answer: “Objected to as attorney’s work and product.”
“25. List by author, title and publisher each scientific, technical or professional text, treatise, journal or other .publication which each person listed in your answer to interrogatory No. 20 referred to, considered or relied upon in arriving at or forming his opinion.”
Answer: “None that we know of except common sense.”
After a hearing on October 5, 1971, the court granted the Church’s motion to require petitioner to give further answers to questions 20, 22 and 25 and others not pertinent here. In his supplemental answers petitioner then stated that he had no additional information on the subject of the crucial question 20 here in issue and objected that he should not be required to pay Vollmer for his time in furnishing to him the information necessary to answer.
He further stated that he would have no objection to the Church’s obtaining the information by taking Vollmer’s deposition. Petitioner gave further answers to Nos. 22 and 25 as follows:
“22. To the best of my knowledge the opinion of Mr. Vollmer is based upon facts personally perceived by him when he performed certain tests using a 300 watt indoor flood lamp and a duck cloth painter’s tarp.
“(a) Results of the tests referred to performed by Mr. Vollmer indicate
that the tarp can be caused to smolder within one inch of the illuminating glass surface of the light bulb. The tarp did not burst into flames, but merely smoldered.”
“23.
Not applicable because of answer to Interrogatory No: 22.”
The Church moved for sanctions against petitioner for his refusal to answer 20 adequately, attaching the declaration of its process server who declared he had unsuccessfully tried twice at his office and five times at his residence, all on different dates, to serve a subpoena on Vollmer for a deposition.
One day before the hearing petitioner filed another “Supplemental Answer” to question 20 stating only that Vollmer had refused to furnish him the information required.
After hearing on November 3, 1971, the respondent court found that petitioner had wilfully refused to comply with its order of October 5th.
Sanctions were imposed: (a) pay a $350 attorney’s fee to the Church; (b)
submit Vollmer for deposition within 10 days, and (c) in effect pay Vollmer for his time at the deposition. In the absence of compliance the use of Vollmer or of any other expert at trial on the same factual issue and “to avoid the last minute change of experts which would also frustrate this discovery” was barred. Trial had been set for November 23.
Petitioner contends, in effect, that the court abused its discretion in making the order because: (1) written interrogatories to a party cannot be used to force him to obtain information from his expert witness at his own expense, and (2) the sanctions imposed were punitive rather than designed to further discovery.
Discovery
The controversy at bench is centered on petitioner’s failure to respond to interrogatory 20.
Interrogatory 20 is limited in scope to the discovery of petitioner’s expert qualifications. Significantly, petitioner has answered interrogatories 22 and 25 which were directed at “. . . each fact personally perceived by or personally known ... by the expert. Having revealed the substance of the expert’s findings, petitioner now refuses to make discovery relative to matters which shed light on that expert’s status as an (expert) witness.
The discovery laws in California are designed to expedite the trial of civil matters.
(Burke
v.
Superior Court,
71 Cal.2d 276, 280 [78 Cal.Rptr. 481, 455 P.2d 409].) Liberal use-of interrogatories for the pur
pose of clarifying and narrowing issues should be, and is, encouraged by the courts.
(Burke
v.
Superior Court,
p. 281.) The qualifications, or lack thereof, of an expert is clearly an issue which, if resolved favorably to petitioner prior to trial, eliminates incidental issues and promotes a more expeditious trial of the substantive issues.
We agree with the general observation of the Court of Appeal in
Scotsman Mfg. Co.
v.
Superior Court,
242 Cal.App.2d 527 [51 Cal.Rptr. 511], that “. . .
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Opinion
ROTH, P. J.
Petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate its order imposing sanctions on petitioner for his refusal to obtain information from his own expert witnesses, at his own expense, with which to answer interrogatories under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030. We affirm the order.
Facts
Real Party in Interest (the Church) filed suit in March 1967 against petitioner, a painting subcontractor, and the general contractor, for fire damage allegedly resulting from their negligence in performing repairs to the church building. The Church claims that the fire was caused by a drop-cloth left by petitioner over three high-intensity flood lamps at the close of a work day, and that the lamps ignited the cloth when turned on. To determine whether this was possible, petitioner contracted with Vollmer Engineering Laboratories (Vollmer) to test the same drop-cloth material with the same type of lamp.
On July 23, 1971, the Church served petitioner written interrogatories under section 2030
which included questions as to whether any such expert witness had been hired and had conducted any such tests and if so,
the nature of the tests. Question 20 then asked for detailed information regarding the specialized knowledge, experience and qualifications of any such expert. In his answers, petitioner named Vollmer the expert he intended to call as a witness and described the basic details of the tests made. Petitioner replied to question 20 (see fn. 4, infra) as follows: “Information unknown, other than Mr. Vollmer is a Professional Engineer California No. 14229.”
Questions 21, 22 and 25, and petitioner’s answers were as follows:
“21. Has any person listed in your answer to the preceding interrogatory arrived at or formed any opinion as to any subject with respect to which he was consulted by you or concerning which he has advised you?”
Answer: “Yes.
“22. If your answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the affirmative, is the opinion of each such person based on facts personally perceived by or personally known tO' him? a. If so-, state specifically and in detail each fact personally perceived by or personally known to him.
Answer: “Objected to as attorney’s work and product.”
“25. List by author, title and publisher each scientific, technical or professional text, treatise, journal or other .publication which each person listed in your answer to interrogatory No. 20 referred to, considered or relied upon in arriving at or forming his opinion.”
Answer: “None that we know of except common sense.”
After a hearing on October 5, 1971, the court granted the Church’s motion to require petitioner to give further answers to questions 20, 22 and 25 and others not pertinent here. In his supplemental answers petitioner then stated that he had no additional information on the subject of the crucial question 20 here in issue and objected that he should not be required to pay Vollmer for his time in furnishing to him the information necessary to answer.
He further stated that he would have no objection to the Church’s obtaining the information by taking Vollmer’s deposition. Petitioner gave further answers to Nos. 22 and 25 as follows:
“22. To the best of my knowledge the opinion of Mr. Vollmer is based upon facts personally perceived by him when he performed certain tests using a 300 watt indoor flood lamp and a duck cloth painter’s tarp.
“(a) Results of the tests referred to performed by Mr. Vollmer indicate
that the tarp can be caused to smolder within one inch of the illuminating glass surface of the light bulb. The tarp did not burst into flames, but merely smoldered.”
“23.
Not applicable because of answer to Interrogatory No: 22.”
The Church moved for sanctions against petitioner for his refusal to answer 20 adequately, attaching the declaration of its process server who declared he had unsuccessfully tried twice at his office and five times at his residence, all on different dates, to serve a subpoena on Vollmer for a deposition.
One day before the hearing petitioner filed another “Supplemental Answer” to question 20 stating only that Vollmer had refused to furnish him the information required.
After hearing on November 3, 1971, the respondent court found that petitioner had wilfully refused to comply with its order of October 5th.
Sanctions were imposed: (a) pay a $350 attorney’s fee to the Church; (b)
submit Vollmer for deposition within 10 days, and (c) in effect pay Vollmer for his time at the deposition. In the absence of compliance the use of Vollmer or of any other expert at trial on the same factual issue and “to avoid the last minute change of experts which would also frustrate this discovery” was barred. Trial had been set for November 23.
Petitioner contends, in effect, that the court abused its discretion in making the order because: (1) written interrogatories to a party cannot be used to force him to obtain information from his expert witness at his own expense, and (2) the sanctions imposed were punitive rather than designed to further discovery.
Discovery
The controversy at bench is centered on petitioner’s failure to respond to interrogatory 20.
Interrogatory 20 is limited in scope to the discovery of petitioner’s expert qualifications. Significantly, petitioner has answered interrogatories 22 and 25 which were directed at “. . . each fact personally perceived by or personally known ... by the expert. Having revealed the substance of the expert’s findings, petitioner now refuses to make discovery relative to matters which shed light on that expert’s status as an (expert) witness.
The discovery laws in California are designed to expedite the trial of civil matters.
(Burke
v.
Superior Court,
71 Cal.2d 276, 280 [78 Cal.Rptr. 481, 455 P.2d 409].) Liberal use-of interrogatories for the pur
pose of clarifying and narrowing issues should be, and is, encouraged by the courts.
(Burke
v.
Superior Court,
p. 281.) The qualifications, or lack thereof, of an expert is clearly an issue which, if resolved favorably to petitioner prior to trial, eliminates incidental issues and promotes a more expeditious trial of the substantive issues.
We agree with the general observation of the Court of Appeal in
Scotsman Mfg. Co.
v.
Superior Court,
242 Cal.App.2d 527 [51 Cal.Rptr. 511], that “. . . the information and opinions of the expert
relevant to his status as a witness
may be discovered through interrogation and deposition procedures.” (Italics added.) (242 Cal.App.2d at p. 532.) Arguments propounded by petitioner that the expert here was not under his “control”
(Volkswagen of America, Inc.
v.
Superior Court,
18 Cal.App.3d 477 [96 Cal.Rptr. 205]) are inapposite, if only for the pragmatic reason that, unlike
Volkswagen,
petitioner was not required to produce the expert Vollmer, but had affirmed in answer to interrogatory 13 that he intended to use him as an expert and was merely asked by his adversary to supply such information about his expert’s qualifications as one might assume every attorney will obtain about an expert who he expects to call and upon whose opinions he proposes to rely and expects the court to accept. Moreover, it appears that the thrust of petitioner’s objection below was not that Vollmer was not under his control but that the interrogatory was burdensome in that he would have to get the sought-for information from Vollmer personally. It is noted, too, that petitioner does not unequivocally state that he does not have the information (see fn. 3). Petitioner stubbornly takes the position that he has no duty to imrart the information and that the Church must depose Vollmer to get it. Further, it occurs to us that any trial lawyer who calls an expert witness vouches for his competence, and that if petitioner didn’t have the information when question 20 was first propounded, he would charge himself with the duty of getting it and verifying that he was in fact going to produce a competent expert.
Vollmer’s years of experience, his training and education, cannot, even if he is a diplómate of the country’s most select institutions, be so extensive as to require “burdensome” hours to impart the data to petitioner’s counsel. However, granted that petitioner was required to make an effort to obtain the data requested, there is no rule which holds that proper discovery is limited to interrogatories which may be answered without effort or loss of time.
We note Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 26(b)(4) (see
Burke
v.
Superior Court, supra,
71 Cal.2d 276, 281) which makes provision for the discovery of the “substance of the facts and opinions to which the ex-
pert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.” Rule 26(b)(4) is an unequivocal indication, even though not binding on us, of the liberality with which even the subject matter of the expert’s expected testimony is made available to the opposing party through discovery procedures. As noted, it appears that at bench that substantive opinion of the expert has already been discovered. It cannot be that the procurement of the expert’s qualifications through discovery proceedings is barred while his opinion itself is discoverable through interrogatories.
Finally, we have determined that the sanctions imposed by the court were, in light of the foregoing, a proper exercise of its discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034, subd. (b)(2)(iv).) The order is designed, as it should be, to lend effectiveness to our discovery statutes. We note, too, that rule 26(b)(4) requires the party seeking discovery to pay expert’s witness fees only when, in addition to the matters outlined above, the court orders “further discovery” by other means. Petitioner’s complaints as to the financial burden, implicit in listing his expert’s qualifications, are without merit.
The order is affirmed. The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ is denied. The real party in interest to recover costs.
Fleming, J., and Compton, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 7, 1972, and on March 9, 1972, the judgment was modified to read as printed above. Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 6, 1972.