Sifford v. Cutler

94 N.E. 156, 248 Ill. 340
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 25, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 94 N.E. 156 (Sifford v. Cutler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sifford v. Cutler, 94 N.E. 156, 248 Ill. 340 (Ill. 1911).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Farmer

delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellee, as administrator de bonis non of the estate of Malinda Graver, deceased, filed a petition in the county court of Union county for the sale of lands to pay debts. The petition was originally filed to the June term, 1908, of the county court of said Union county, and alleged liabilities on the part of the estate, on account of claims allowed and t’o be allowed and costs of administration, of $5361.26, and that after disbursing the proceeds of the personal estate there would be a deficit of $4954.05. The petition alleged Malinda Graver died seized in fee of 505.82 acres of land in section 16, township 13, south, range 2, west of the third principal meridian, Union county, Illinois; also lot 141 in Grammer’s addition to the city'of Jonesboro, Illinois; the undivided one-half interest in 112 acres of land in section 30, township 12,1 south, range 1, west of the third principal meridian, and the undivided one-half of lots 142, 143, 144, 145, 146 and' 147 in Grammer’s addition to the city of •Jonesboro, Illinois; that said Malinda Graver died intestate October 3, 1907, but that on October 1, 1907, she made a pretended deed of her undivided one-half of the 112 acres of land and lots in Jonesboro to appellant, Mattie Cutler. The petition further alleged that.the land so conveyed to appellant was worth $6000, and that the residue of the lands of deceased was not sufficient to pay the debts and liabilities of the estate and costs of administration; that the pretended conveyance to appellant was a cloud upon the title of deceased, and should be removed for the reason that the said deceased, at the time of the alleged making thereof, and before said time, was in her dotage, being of the age of eighty years, and was greatly weakened and emaciated in body and in a senile condition, and her mind and memory 'were so weakened and impaired that she was wholly incapacitated and unable to make said deed, and that said deceased died two days after the time of the making of said alleged deed, of senility. The petition also alleged the deed was procured by the appellant by undue influence. Appellant answered the petition, denying that the deed was invalid or a cloud upon the title of deceased; denying that deceased was mentally incapable of making the deed or that it was procured by undue influence, and averring that deceased was of sound mind and memory and mentally capable of making the deed and understanding the nature and effect of it. The answer alleged that prior to the filing of the petition appellant and Alice Graver, the owner of the other undivided one-half of the 112 acres and the lots in Jonesboro, made a parol partition between themselves and exchanged deeds for their respective parcels, and that the appellant had executed a mortgage to J. W. Roy upon her portion of the premises, except the lots mentioned, to secure a note for $600, which note was unpaid. A trial was had before the county court and a decree entered setting aside the deed as in fraud of creditors. The case was brought to this court for review by writ of error. There was no certificate of evidence, and as it appeared from the decree that the ground upon which the deed was set aside was that the conveyance was void because made in fraud of creditors, said decree was reversed on the ground that' the administrator could not maintain an action to set aside a conveyance made by his intestate in fraud of creditors. (Sifford, v. Cutler, 244 Ill. 234.) Upon the filing of the remanding order in the county court we understand from the statement of counsel in their briefs, although this is not made to appear in the record or the abstract, that appellee amended the petition by the insertion of an allegation that the deed was never delivered to the grantee by the grantor. Appellánt also filed an amendment to her answer, in which she averred that Malinda Graver and her brother, James Graver, took appellant into their family when "she was a small child; that she lived with them from the time she was nine years old until she attained her majority, during which time she worked in the fields, gardens, about the house and in milking cows, for which she received nothing except her board and clothes; that said James and Malinda Graver led her to believe they would leave her their property upon their deaths; that they were old, sick and infirm; that before his death James Graver, who died some years before Malinda Graver, owned the lands conveyed to appellant but prior to his death conveyed them tó Malinda Graver, subject to whatever equities appellant had in them. The amendment further alleged that it was agreed between appellant and Malinda Graver that as a part of the consideration for the deed the appellant was to furnish a home for Annie Hileman, a sister of Malinda Graver, during the life of said Annie Hileman, and that this agreement, which was incorporated in the deed, has been kept and performed by appellant. The amendment further alleged that the judgment of this court reversing the decree and remanding the case was a final judgment and that the county court had no jurisdiction to again try the issues made under the petition. After a trial before the court a decree was entered finding the liabilities of the estate exceeded the amount received from personal property $7443; that the conveyance from the deceased to appellant was obtained by undue influence, and “that said Malinda Graver was not mentally capable of making said deed; that there was no delivery of the same; that the same was not the deed of the grantor; that said deed was and is a cloud upon the title of said deceased.” The decree further found that appellant and Alice Graver had made a parol partition of the premises between themselves and each had taken possession of her parcel, and this partition was confirmed by the decree of the court. The decree ordered and adjudged that the deed made by Malinda Graver, deceased, to appellant be set aside as a cloud upon the title of deceased, and the deed from Alice Graver to appellant, pursuant to the parol partition, be set aside. ' It was further ordered that all of the real estate owned by Malinda Graver at the time of her death, or so much thereof as may be necessary, including that portion of the 112 acres and the lots in Jonesboro allotted to appellant in the parol partition between her and Alice Graver, be sold for the payment of the debts of said Malinda Graver, deceased. The $1000 mortgage on the lands in section 16 and the $600 mortgage to Roy on the 112 acres were ordered paid out of the proceeds of the sale and the lands were decreed to be sold free and clear of those encumbrances. From that decree Mattie Cutler has appealed to this court.

The former judgment of this court was not a final judgment of the cause and binding upon the county court except in so far as it was decided that the court could not, at the suit of the administrator, decree that the deed be set aside as a fraud upon creditors. There was no adjudication in the former decree of the county court upon the mental capacity of Malinda Graver to make a deed or whether the deed was delivered or whether it was procured by the undue influence of the grantee, and the judgment of this court did not conclude the appellant from trying those questions after the reversal of the decree and the remanding of the case. (Dinsmoor v. Rowse, 211 Ill. 317; Prentice v. Crane, 240 id.

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Bluebook (online)
94 N.E. 156, 248 Ill. 340, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sifford-v-cutler-ill-1911.