Sierra v. D'Apuzzo

28 Misc. 3d 171
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 10, 2010
StatusPublished

This text of 28 Misc. 3d 171 (Sierra v. D'Apuzzo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sierra v. D'Apuzzo, 28 Misc. 3d 171 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2010).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Robert J. Miller, J.

In this action seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff Alana Sierra when she was descending a staircase from the third to the second floor located in a building at 100 Smith Street, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant building owner Steven D’Apuzzo (D’Apuzzo or owner) moves for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint. D’Apuzzo asserts that the defects alleged by the plaintiff are not actionable because the owner had no notice of any defects and the plaintiff cannot show that the staircase was defective or unsafe or that there were any building code violations. Plaintiff opposes the motion asserting that there are questions of fact as to whether there was a wobbly banister, and whether the steps were unsafe, in that there was a defective condition since the stairwell had poor lighting and loose carpeting which was too dark a color to distinguish the different steps.

Liability can be imposed on a building’s owner if the owner either caused or created the alleged condition or had actual or constructive notice of it. (Hayden v Waldbaum, Inc., 63 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2009].) The defendant is said to have constructive notice of a defect when it is visible and apparent and existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident that it could have been discovered. (Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836 [1986].)

Plaintiff testified that her accident occurred as she left the third floor where she worked as a child-care giver for a tenant of the building, Mr. Jay Weiner. Plaintiff stated that she worked at that location since September of 2007 and had been at the location about five times per week up to the date of the accident, December 3, 2007. She testified that her accident happened when she was on the fourth step between the third and second floors when the carpet moved with her foot and she slipped and fell on the landing. When asked if there was anything about the stairs themselves that made her fall, she answered that is was “the carpeting” and that “it was hard to see the edge of the stairs being that the carpeting was so dark, it was dark out and the lighting was dim. Carpeting itself was slightly loose, and the [173]*173handle itself was wobbly.” Plaintiff said she noticed the loose condition of the carpet since she had started working at the building. She never complained to anyone.

A tenant of the building and employer of the plaintiff, Weiner testified at deposition that at the time of the plaintiffs fall, he responded to her accident and spoke with the plaintiff. His “impression was that she did not know what caused her to fall.” Weiner testified that he had lived in the apartment for approximately six years and that the carpeting was newly installed sometime after he moved in. He described the carpeting as “not shaggy,” industrial and placed on the steps in a continuous piece. Weiner testified that he did not make any complaints to the owner about the condition of the carpeting or the lighting of the stairwell. Weiner testified about lighting in the stairwell and indicated that there was a window on the third floor, a light fixture on the landings between the first and second floors and the second and third floors. The fixtures had energy-saving fluorescent bulbs hanging down, and an additional lighting wall fixture between the second and third floors with a light bulb that he couldn’t describe. When asked if he recalled if all the lights were working on December 3, 2007, Weiner stated that he did not have a specific recollection but “would say almost certainly, yes.”

An affidavit from D’Apuzzo indicated that prior to December 3, 2007, he never received any complaints from Weiner or anyone else regarding the staircase between the second and third floors and was not aware of any dangerous or defective condition or a need of repair. D’Apuzzo stated that he had replaced the carpeting on the steps a few years prior to the plaintiff’s accident. He indicated that he had some work performed on the steps between the second and third floors a few years before because the steps were squeaking. He did not replace the steps or alter the steps in any way.

The defendant asserts that he has established, based on the testimony of the plaintiff and the tenant and the affidavits of Mark Marpet, a mechanical engineer, and John Chester, a field investigator, that the defendant landlord did not have actual or constructive notice of any defect in the stairs nor did he cause or create a dangerous or defective condition. The defendant also asserts that the plaintiffs testimony stating that the handrail was slightly loose does not create an issue of fact or establish that the landlord caused and/or created a defective condition. Lastly, the defendant claims that all applicable building codes were met.

[174]*174In opposition, the plaintiff submits that the plaintiff’s testimony along with the plaintiffs expert’s report by a professional engineer, Mr. Robert L. Schwartzberg, establishes that there are material issues of fact as to whether the owner caused or created the condition, that the stairs do not conform with building codes, that the defendant created a defective or dangerous condition because the steps were covered in a dark material which caused a lack of demarcation between the steps, and that there was a lack of adequate lighting.

Expert Opinions

Before the court considers whether the landlord caused or created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of the condition, the court must first address the threshold issue of whether the plaintiffs expert’s affidavit should be considered in opposition to the defendant’s motion. The defendant in reply to the plaintiffs opposition asserts that the court should reject the plaintiffs expert’s report pursuant to Construction by Singletree, Inc. v Lowe (55 AD3d 861 [2d Dept 2008]). The Appellate Division in Singletree rejected an appellant’s expert’s affidavit in opposition to the respondent’s motion for summary judgment because the appellant’s expert was not identified until after the note of issue and certificate of readiness were filed and the appellant offered no valid excuse for failure to give notice of the expert.

Here, plaintiff filed her note of issue and certificate of readiness attesting to the completion of discovery on July 29, 2009. The defendant moved for summary judgment on September 25, 2009. Plaintiff served her CPLR 3101 (d) response on October 12, 2009 and did not serve her expert’s affidavit until she served her opposition to the defendant’s summary judgment motion. Plaintiff offers no excuse for the delay.

However, at oral argument on the motion, the plaintiff raised the issue that the defendant did not serve his expert’s affidavit until the defendant submitted his summary judgment motion. The court has not been provided with any discovery orders issued prior to the note of issue and certificate of readiness and therefore cannot opine on what demand or schedule of exchange may have been agreed upon by the parties. Any expert reports to be used in a summary judgment motion should have been exchanged prior to the note of issue and certificate of readiness following the ruling in Singletree.

The court notes that the plaintiff’s expert Robert L. Schwartzberg’s report indicates he visited the scene of the ac[175]*175cident on July 27, 2009 (two days prior to the day the note of issue and certificate of readiness were filed) and wrote a report dated August 20, 2009.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
28 Misc. 3d 171, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sierra-v-dapuzzo-nysupct-2010.