Sierra Pacific Properties, Inc. v. Kimberlyn Taylor
Opinion
1 2 3 6 7 SIERRA PACIFIC PROPERTIES, INC., Case No. 18-cv-07709-SK
8 Plaintiff, REFERRAL FOR REASSIGNMENT 9 v. AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO REMAND 11 Defendant.
12 13 Defendant Kimberlyn Taylor, proceeding pro se, removed this unlawful detainer action to 14 federal court. The parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and therefore the Court does not have authority to make a dispositive ruling in this 15 case. Accordingly, the Court orders that this case be REASSIGNED to a district judge. 16 The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the single claim in the 17 complaint arises exclusively under state law and the amount in controversy is less than $10,000. 18 Further, because the Defendant is a resident of California, removal was improper. 19 BACKGROUND 20 On November 2, 2018, Plaintiff Sierra Pacific Properties, Inc. filed an unlawful detainer 21 action against Defendant in Contra Costa County Superior Court (“Superior Court”). (Dkt. 1.) 22 Plaintiff seeks possession of 135 Acorn Lane, #235, Pittsburg, California (the “Premises”). (Id.) 23 Following a three-day notice to vacate the Premises for failure to pay rent given on October 22, 24 2018, Defendant refused to deliver possession on October 26, 2018, and therefore Plaintiff filed 25 the unlawful detainer action. (Id.) The action specifies that the amount demanded does not 26 exceed $10,000. (Id.) 27 Defendant removed the case to federal district court on December 24, 2018. (Id.) Included 1 with the removal is an answer to the Complaint, that does not appear to have been filed in Superior 2 Court. (Id.) The matter was assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge. 3 Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis which the undersigned granted. 4 (Dkts. 2 and 4.) Neither party has consented to the jurisdiction of this magistrate judge. 6 A federal court has an independent duty to ascertain its jurisdiction and may remand a case 7 sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 8 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., 9 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, the burden of 10 establishing federal jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the party seeking removal, and the 11 removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 12 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 13 “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 14 instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 15 The Court does not have federal question or diversity jurisdiction over this matter. “The 16 presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 17 rule.’” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 382, 392 (1987). The well-pleaded complaint rule 18 recognizes that the plaintiff is the master of his or her claim. “[H]e or she may avoid federal 19 jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. Thus, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, 20 federal –question jurisdiction arises where the “complaint establishes either that federal law 21 creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of 22 a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). 23 This is an unlawful detainer action, which is purely a creature of California law. Thus, 24 federal law does not create the cause of action. Wells Fargo Bank v. Lapeen, 2011 WL 2194117, 25 at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2011); Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, 2010 WL 4916578, at *2 (C.D. 26 Cal. Nov. 22, 2010). Moreover, the Court concludes that the claim will not necessarily depend 27 upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. While Defendants’ notice of removal 1 the premises at the expense of a handicapped person, there are no factual allegation in the 2 complaint or Defendants’ answer supporting the applicability of that provision. Further, the form 3 Plaintiff used for removing the case from state court, claims that the action was removed from Los 4 Angeles County Superior Court and refers to a violation of the Los Angeles County Municipal 5 Code, when in fact the matter was removed from Contra Costa County Superior Court and 6 involves the municipality of Pittsburg, California 7 Further, a court cannot exercise removal jurisdiction based on an allegation that the 8 complaint gives rise to a potential or an anticipated defense that might raise a federal question, 9 even if the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 10 at 10, 14; see also Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be 11 removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, 12 even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that 13 the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”). Therefore, there is no federal question 14 jurisdiction. 15 The Court also determines that it does not have diversity jurisdiction over this matter. The 16 amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of $75,000. “In unlawful 17 detainer actions, the right to possession is contested, not title to the property, and plaintiffs may 18 collect only damages that are incident to that unlawful possession.” Federal Home Loan 19 Mortgage Corp. v. Pulido, 2012 WL 540554 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2012). Here, Plaintiff filed the 20 action as a “limited civil case” that “does not exceed $10,000.” (Dkt. 1.) Where, as here, a 21 plaintiff specifically alleges that the amount in controversy is less than the jurisdictional threshold, 22 a defendant has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the amount in controversy exceeds 23 $75,000. See Lowerdermilk v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 1000, (9th Cir. 2007)). 24 Defendant has not done so here. 25 Diversity jurisdiction is likewise lacking. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) prohibits removal where a 26 defendant in that case is a citizen of the state in which the plaintiff originally brought the action. 27 See Spencer v. U.S. Dist. Ct for Northern Dist. (Altec Ind., Inc.), 393 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1 be removed by that defendant, or by any other defendant.” Republic W. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 2 || 765 F.Supp. 628, 629 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Here the complaint alleges that Defendant resides at the 3 subject property located in Pittsburg, California and is therefore a citizen of California. (Dkt. 1.) 4 Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter. 6 Given the lack of subject matter over this action, the Court recommends that it be 7 REMANDED to the Contra Costa Superior Court. Any party may object to this recommendation 8 || within fourteen days of the filing of this order. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
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