Sierra Pacific Industries v. United States
This text of 38 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,345 (Sierra Pacific Industries v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION
This dispute comes before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Plaintiff, relying on 41 U.S.C. § 601, et seq. and 28 U.S.C. § 1491, is seeking refunds from the Forest Service of the United States Department of Agriculture for portions of the purchase price paid for various timber sales. At issue is whether plaintiff’s failure to comply with the contractual time limitation provision for the submission of claims bars such claims.
The majority of the parties’ arguments are discussed and resolved by this court’s opinion, issued today, in Stone Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 410. For the reasons set forth in the Stone Forest opinion, thirty-one of plaintiff’s thirty-three claims are time-barred,1 and the [421]*421court grants the defendant’s motion with respect to those claims.2
This opinion shall address two sales for which an alternative ground was given to bar the claim. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claims on the Willow and Swift timber sales are barred because an express release was signed. These sales were closed pursuant to a timber sale closure agreement under the Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act. Under that agreement, the contracting parties were released from all rights and obligations under the contract. Plaintiff argues that the release is void because the regulation which mandated the release is invalid, citing Sierra Pacific Industries v. Lyng, 866 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir.1989).
This issue is identical to the Spike claim in the Stone Forest case. The court finds that it is not necessary to reach this issue because both the Willow and Swift claims are time-barred. With the Willow sale, the closure letter was sent March 7, 1986 and the claim was filed April 4,1991. With the Swift sale, the closure letter was sent March 11, 1986 and the claim was filed April 3, 1991. The claims for both sales were filed well beyond the 60 day time limitation. For the reasons set forth in Section I of the Stone Forest opinion, these claims are time-barred.
CONCLUSION
The court grants the government’s motion as it pertains to the time-barred claims. This opinion does not address those claims which are not time-barred. The parties shall file a joint status report within 60 days from the date of this opinion discussing further proceedings in this case.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
38 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,345, 26 Cl. Ct. 420, 1992 U.S. Claims LEXIS 392, 1992 WL 135080, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sierra-pacific-industries-v-united-states-cc-1992.