Sierra Club v. R. Max Peterson, in His Official Capacity as Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

717 F.2d 1409, 230 U.S. App. D.C. 352
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedSeptember 28, 1983
Docket82-1695
StatusPublished
Cited by141 cases

This text of 717 F.2d 1409 (Sierra Club v. R. Max Peterson, in His Official Capacity as Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service, Department of Agriculture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sierra Club v. R. Max Peterson, in His Official Capacity as Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, 717 F.2d 1409, 230 U.S. App. D.C. 352 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge MacKINNON.

MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge:

In proceedings in the district court, the Sierra Club challenged the decision by the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) and the Department of the Interior (Department) to issue oil and gas leases on lands within the Targhee and Bridger-Te-ton National Forests of Idaho and Wyoming. The plaintiff alleged that the leasing program violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1976), because no Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared prior to the action. On cross-motion for summary judgment the district court upheld the decision to issue the leases without preparing an EIS. Sierra Club v. Pe terson,, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. March 31, 1982). The plaintiff appeals from a portion of the judgment and we reverse the decision of the district court.

I.

The land originally involved in this dispute encompassed a 247,000 acre roadless area in the Targhee and Bridger-Teton National Forests of Idaho and Wyoming, known as the Palisades Further Planning Area. In its most recent Roadless Review *1411 and Evaluation, RARE II, 1 the Forest Service designated this entire area as a Further Planning Area and consequently, the land may be considered for all uses, including oil and gas exploration, as long as its potential wilderness quality is preserved.

In 1980, the Forest Service received applications for oil and gas leases in the Palisades Further Planning Area. 2 After conducting an Environmental Assessment (EA), the Forest Service recommended granting the lease applications, but with various stipulations attached to the leases. Because the Forest Service determined that issuance of the leases with the recommended stipulations would not result in significant adverse impacts to the environment, it decided that, with respect to the entire area, no Environmental Impact Statement was required at the leasing stage.

The leasing program approved by the Forest Service divides the land within the Palisades Further Planning Area into two categories — “highly environmentally sensitive” 3 lands and non-highly environmentally sensitive lands. The stipulations attached to each lease are determined by the particular character of the land. All of the leases for the Palisades contain “standard” 4 and “special” 5 stipulations. These stipulations require the lessee to obtain approval from the Interior Department before undertaking any surface disturbing activity on the le'ase, but do not authorize the Department to preclude any activities which the lessee might propose. The Department can only impose conditions upon the lessee’s use of the leased land.

In addition, a No Surface Occupancy Stipulation (NSO Stipulation) is attached to the leases for lands designated as “highly environmentally sensitive.” This NSO Stipulation precludes surface occupancy unless and until such activity is specifically approved by the Forest Service.

For leases without a No Surface Occupancy Stipulation, the lessee must file an application for a permit to drill prior to initiating exploratory drilling activities. The application must contain a surface use and operating plan which details the proposed operations including access roads, well site locations, and other planned facilities. On land leased without a No Surface Occupancy Stipulation the Department cannot deny the permit to drill; it can only impose “reasonable” conditions which are designed to mitigate the environmental impacts of the drilling operations. See Joint Appendix (JA) at 86a.

*1412 II.

Following an unsuccessful administrative challenge to the decision to issue all the leases in accord with the Forest Service’s plan, the Sierra Club sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Sierra Club argued that leasing land within the Palisades without preparing an EIS violated NEPA. The federal defendants 6 responded that because of the finding of “no significant impact” contained in the Environmental Assessment, it was not necessary to prepare an EIS.

The district court upheld the finding of “no significant impact” and the decision to lease without preparing an EIS. The court based its decision upon the conclusion that the lease stipulations were valid and that the government could thereby “preclude any development under the leases.” Sierra Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230, slip op. at 12 n. 5 (D.D.C. March 31, 1982). The court granted the federal defendants’ motion for summary judgment, stating that “[t]he stipulations included in the leases ... will effectively insure that the environment will not be significantly affected until further analysis pursuant to NEPA.” Id. at 13-14.

The Sierra Club appeals only that portion of the district court’s judgment which involves lands leased without a No Surface Occupancy Stipulation. The Sierra Club concedes that the Department retains the authority to preclude all surface disturbing activities on land leased with a NSO Stipulation until further site-specific environmental studies are made. By retaining this authority, the Department has insured that no significant environmental impacts can occur from the act of leasing lands subject to the NSO Stipulation.

Approximately 80% of the Palisades was designated as highly environmentally sensitive and, therefore, leased with the NSO Stipulation. Only the remainder, approximately 28,000 acres, is at issue in this appeal. As to this smaller area, the Sierra Club contends that the Department cannot preclude surface disturbing activities, including drilling, on lands leased without the NSO Stipulation. The Department has only retained, Sierra Club asserts, the authority to “condition” surface disturbing activities in an effort to “mitigate” any environmental harm which might result from the activities. Thus, some surface disturbing activities may result from the act of issuing leases without NSO Stipulations on lands within the 28,000 acres. Appellant asserts, therefore, that the finding of “no significant impact” and the decision not to prepare an EIS, insofar as land leased within this smaller area is concerned, was improper. Because on these leases the Secretary cannot preclude surface disturbing activity, including drilling, the Sierra Club argues that the decision to lease is itself the point of irreversible, irretrievable commitment of resources — the point at which NEPA mandates that an environmental impact statement be prepared. We agree.

III.

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Bluebook (online)
717 F.2d 1409, 230 U.S. App. D.C. 352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sierra-club-v-r-max-peterson-in-his-official-capacity-as-chief-forester-cadc-1983.