Siegler v. Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 30, 2019
• Docket: 3:18-cv-01681
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SARA ELIZABETH SIEGLER and CASE NO. 3:18-cv-01681-GPC-MSB 12 Sara Elizabeth Siegler,

13 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING 14 vs. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR EXPEDITED ORDER FOR 15 SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS, INC., CHANGE OF VENUE TNK THERAPEUTICS, INC., BDL 16 PRODUCTS, INC., CARGENIX [ECF NO. 133.] HOLDINGS LLC, TUFTS MEDICAL 17 CENTER, PROSPECT CHARTERCARE ROGER WILLIAMS 18 MEDICAL CENTER LLC, HENRY JI, RICHARD PAUL JUNGHANS, 19 STEVEN C. KATZ, and THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SORRENTO 20 THERAPEUTICS, INC., 21 Defendants. 22 On August 27, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Sara Elizabeth Siegler filed an 23 ‘emergency’ motion for a change of venue, requesting a ruling by August 30, 2019. 24 (ECF No. 133.) Upon review of the motion, and in light of applicable law, the 25 motion is DENIED for the reasons articulated below. 26 I. Background 27 28 1 On July 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant action in the Southern District of 2 California. After extensive motions practice, the Court on August 2, 2019, granted 3 dismissal with prejudice on all of the claims in Plaintiff’s second amended 4 complaint. (ECF No. 126.) 5 On August 26, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s sixth omnibus motion 6 which requested (1) an extension on statutory deadline to file her Rule 59(e) motion 7 against the dismissal order entered August 2, 2019, and (2) leave to file a motion 8 for reconsideration which would exceed the 25 page limit prescribed by the local 9 civil rules. The Court denied the first request and reaffirmed the statutory August 10 30, 2019, deadline because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 expressly forbids the 11 Court to provide the extension requested. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court 12 must not extend the time to act under Rules 50(b) and (d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), 13 and 60(b).”). The Court granted the request to depart from the 25 page limit; in the 14 absence of a requested brief length, the Court permitted a filing of up to 35 pages. 15 Plaintiff’s instant motion for change of venue is predicated on her 16 disagreement with the August 26, 2019 Order. She seeks a venue change out of 17 this district because she believes the Court has not afforded her adequate 18 accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and because she insists 19 that the Court and Court staff have conspired to retaliate against her, or subject her 20 to biased and prejudicial treatment on account of her pro se status. Plaintiff does 21 not specify where she would like the case to be transferred to, or where believes 22 venue is proper, stating only that the case could be transferred to any federal 23 district, and should be directed to a court that would be able to accommodate her. 24 I. Transfer of Venue 25 Plaintiff’s motion fails as a request for a change of venue. At worst, the 26 request is a dilatory tactic to avoid the effects of the Court’s August 2, 2019 order 27 dismissing the entirety of the action. See Silver Valley Partners, LLC v. De Motte, 28 No. C05-5590 RBL, 2006 WL 2711764, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2006) 1 (warning against late-blooming requests for transfer brought merely as dilatory 2 practice). According to Plaintiff, she seeks a transfer venue so that she can set her 3 yet-to-be filed motion for reconsideration before a different Court. (ECF No. 133- 4 1, at 8.) That is no basis for transfer. 5 At best, Plaintiff’s request for a venue change is waived as inadequately 6 briefed. Most critically, Plaintiff has not requested transfer to any specific venue. 7 To support a motion for transfer of venue, the moving party must establish 8 “that venue is proper in the transferor district; that the transferee district is one 9 where the action might have originally been brought; and that transfer will serve the 10 convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the interests of justice.” 11 Vu v. Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155–56 (N.D. Cal.2009) 12 (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F.Supp. 13 503, 506 (C.D. Cal. 1992)). 14 Once venue is determined to be proper in both districts, “[t]he Court must 15 consider public factors relating to ‘the interest of justice’ and private factors 16 relating to ‘the convenience of the parties and witnesses.’” Decker Coal Co. v. 17 Commonw. Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). Such factors include: 18 (1) plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) convenience of the parties; (3) convenience of 19 the witnesses; (4) ease of access to the evidence; (5) familiarity of each forum with 20 an applicable law; (6) feasibility of consolidation with other claims; (7) any local 21 interest in the controversy; and (8) the relative court congestion and time of trial in 22 each forum. Vu, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. 23 Here, Plaintiff has provided no justification for element three. Significantly, 24 it was Plaintiff herself who brought the case in the Southern District of California; 25 in other words, this was Plaintiff’s own choice of forum. As master of her case, 26 Plaintiff does not stand in the position of the usual transfer of venue movant, who is 27 presumed to be a defendant. See Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843 (“The defendant 28 1 must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff’s 2 choice of forum.”). Plaintiff cannot show transfer is in the interest of justice merely 3 because she hopes another court would reach a different conclusion on a dispositive 4 motion after it has been decided. 5 Moreover, the defending parties have invested considerable resources in 6 responding to her suit in the instant district, filing pro hac vice requests and 7 litigating the issues in Plaintiff’s chosen forum. Plaintiff has offered no explanation 8 of the prejudice or convenience that would befall the defendants if venue was 9 transferred, nor could she without specifying which venue she prefers. 10 In addition, the Court has spent considerable time familiarizing itself with 11 Plaintiff’s allegations. It has considerable institutional knowledge of the facts and 12 procedural history of this litigation. It has issued an abundance of orders 13 accommodating Plaintiff’s filing requests (for extensions of time, for leave to file 14 oversize briefs) and permitted her access to the CM/ECF system so that she might 15 directly file. It has gone to considerable lengths to comprehend and construe 16 liberally Plaintiff’s prolix, perplexing, and often procedurally-deficient filings in 17 light of her pro se status. And when it has ruled on dispositive motions, the Court 18 has painstakingly enumerated, at a level of guidance and specificity not ordinarily 19 accorded to counseled parties, the precise reasons Plaintiff’s claims were 20 unavailing, so that she might amend and cure. The Court has not acted in a biased 21 or prejudiced manner toward Plaintiff; in fact it has striven to do quite the opposite. 22 If Plaintiff believed there was another venue where she would receive greater 23 solicitude and accommodations, she could have identified one in her motion. 24 Seeing none, and finding the request for transfer both dilatory and inadequately 25 briefed, the Court will deny the request. 26 Transfer is not appropriate. 27 II. Motion for Reconsideration 28 1 Plaintiff has not set forth any newly discovered evidence, change in 2 controlling law, or clear error or manifest injustice. To the extent that the motion 3 for change of venue constitutes a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s August 4 26, 2019 order, it is also DENIED. 5 | I. Conclusion 6 For the above reasons, the emergency motion is DENIED. (ECF No. 133.) 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. g || Dated: August 30, 2019 7 sale As 9 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -4- CASE NO. 18-CV-01681-GPC-BGS