Siedlecki v. Employees' Retirement System

896 A.2d 374, 168 Md. App. 238, 2006 Md. App. LEXIS 49
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedApril 11, 2006
DocketNo. 433
StatusPublished

This text of 896 A.2d 374 (Siedlecki v. Employees' Retirement System) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Siedlecki v. Employees' Retirement System, 896 A.2d 374, 168 Md. App. 238, 2006 Md. App. LEXIS 49 (Md. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

WOODWARD, J.

This appeal involves a question of statutory construction, specifically the meaning of section 23-58(a) of the Baltimore County Code.1,2 Appellant, Stanley Siedlecki, served as a Balti[240]*240more County police officer for fifteen years, when, on March 16, 1990, he retired on accidental disability. In 2002, at the request of the Employees’ Retirement System of Baltimore County, Maryland (“ERS”), Siedlecki underwent two medical examinations. The evaluating physicians determined that he was fit to return to full-time police work. Siedlecki then challenged ERS’s authority under section 23-58(a) to have him examined. The Baltimore County Board of Appeals (“board”), and thereafter, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County rejected the challenge. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court and so uphold the board’s decision.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are uncontested. Siedlecki was born on January 17, 1954. He began serving as a Baltimore County police officer in 1975. In 1983, he injured his back in a car accident while on duty. He sought treatment for low back pain over the next seven years, until the county granted him accidental disability retirement, beginning on March 16, 1990. He was thirty-six years old when he retired.

In the Spring of 2002, a neighbor of Siedlecki informed ERS that Siedlecki regularly engaged in strenuous physical activity. The county conducted surreptitious surveillance of Siedlecki from this neighbor’s property. It then passed on the surveillance tapes to Drs. Hung K. Cheung, the medical director for Baltimore County, and Stephen R. Matz, an orthopedic surgeon, who conducted examinations for ERS.

Pursuant to section 23-58(a), ERS directed Siedlecki to undergo a medical examination. Dr. Matz examined Siedlecki on August 7, 2002, and issued a report on that date in which he concluded that “from the standpoint of his low back Mr. Siedlecki is capable of returning to work as a police officer on a full-time basis unrestricted.” Dr. Cheung examined Siedlecki on November 5, 2002, and reached a similar conclusion. The ERS’s Medical Board also concluded on November 21, 2002, that Siedlecki could return to police work.

[241]*241On December 10, 2002, ERS rescinded Siedlecki’s accidental disability retirement benefits. He appealed the decision to the board, which held hearings on June 26, 2003, September 11, 2003, November 20, 2003, January 22, 2004, and April 8, 2004. It concluded, by a vote of two to one, that Siedlecki was able to serve as a police officer3 and upheld ERS’s decision to rescind his disability retirement benefits. The board issued a written opinion and order on August 24, 2004. Siedlecki then sought judicial review in the circuit court, which affirmed the board in a written opinion and order filed on April 11, 2005. Siedlecki noted a timely appeal to this Court.4

We rephrase the question for our review as whether section 23-58(a) allows periodic medical examinations of a Baltimore County police officer, who retired on an accidental disability before reaching age fifty-five and before completing twenty years of creditable service, until that officer attains the age of fifty-five. We construe the Baltimore County Code to allow for such examinations and, accordingly, to allow ERS to rescind disability retirement benefits based on those examinations and on other evidence in the record indicating that appellant was no longer disabled.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, we review the board’s decision, not the circuit court’s decision. See Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 590, 865 A.2d 590 (2005). Because this appeal raises a purely legal question, we may reverse the board’s decision if it [242]*242was premised on an erroneous conclusion of law. See Marzullo v. Kohl, 366 Md. 158, 171, 783 A.2d 169 (2001) (citation omitted). However, “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.” Id. at 172, 783 A.2d 169; see also Phillips, 384 Md. at 590, 865 A.2d 590.

Section 23-58(a) provides, in part:

Once each year during the first five (5) years following the retirement of a member on a disability retirement allowance, and once in every three-year period thereafter, the board of trustees [of ERS] may and upon his application shall require any disability beneficiary who has not yet attained the normal service retirement age to undergo a medical examination, such examination to be made at the place of residence of such beneficiary or other place mutually agreed upon, by a physician or physicians designated by the board of trustees.

(Emphasis added). The Baltimore County Code currently does not define the phrase “normal service retirement age.” We must apply the cannons of statutory construction to divine the legislature’s intended definition. See Phillips, 384 Md. at 591, 865 A.2d 590.

First, we read the plain language of that section with the perspective of “the overall purpose of the statutory scheme.” Id.; see also Zografos v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 165 Md.App. 80, 101, 884 A.2d 770 (2005) (stating that statutory language should be read in context, not in isolation) (citation omitted). “The statute must be construed as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Phillips, 384 Md. at 591, 865 A.2d 590. If the plain language is clear and consistent with the statutory scheme, our review ends and we give full effect to the statutory language. See id. If the language is unclear, we may turn to “legislative history, prior case law, and [the] statutory purpose.” Id. Because “normal service retirement age” is not presently defined for police [243]*243officers, the parties agree that its meaning is unclear. They ask us to ascertain the legislature’s intent from other, related provisions of the law and from legislative history.

Siedlecki argues that, under section 23-58(a), the County Council intended a police officer to reach “normal service retirement age” twenty years after the officer began police service. He refers us to section 23-51 (d),5 which provides, in part:

Sec. 23-51. ALLOWANCE FOR SERVICE RETIREMENT-POLICE.
(d) A member who retires on or after July 1, 1995 shall be entitled to receive a service retirement allowance irrespective of age ... provided such member shall have a minimum of twenty (20) years of creditable service.

(Emphasis added).

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Related

Wilson v. State
321 A.2d 549 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1974)
Marzullo v. Kahl
783 A.2d 169 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2001)
Zografos v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
884 A.2d 770 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 2005)
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Phillips
865 A.2d 590 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2005)
Kushell v. Department of Natural Resources
870 A.2d 186 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2005)
Maguire v. State
65 A.2d 299 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1949)

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896 A.2d 374, 168 Md. App. 238, 2006 Md. App. LEXIS 49, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/siedlecki-v-employees-retirement-system-mdctspecapp-2006.