Sidy v. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
This text of Sidy v. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (Sidy v. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MAMADOU MOUSTAPHA SIDY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01089 (UNA) ) CYBERSECURITY AND ) INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY ) AGENCY LEGISLATIVE, ) ) Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, and
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained,
the court will grant the IFP application and dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
Plaintiff, who resides in Senegal, sues the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (“CISA”). From there, the complaint is difficult to follow. Although any of the
surrounding circumstances and the specific alleged wrongdoing are completely unclear, plaintiff
contends that he is employed by CISA and broadly asserts that is he owed unpaid wages. He also
seeks damages “and everything a CISA employee is entitled to.” He cites to certain federal statutes
and subsections of the Code of Federal Regulations, all of which involve records management by
federal agencies, but none of which convey a private right of action. Plaintiff fails to explain the
applicability of this legal authority, if any, to his claims. Indeed, his intended claims are entirely
ambiguous. As exhibits, he attaches correspondence from the Department of Homeland Security
the Office of Information Policy within the Department of Justice regarding two Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. But the complaint itself does not once reference the FOIA,
nor does seek any relief available under that statute. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3)(A), (4)(B)(1). First, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1)
a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir.
2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted
so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a
“complaint [] contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated,
nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments
[,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C.
2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017).
The instant complaint falls squarely within this category.
Second, plaintiff has failed to establish this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Without
more information, plaintiff’s demand for unpaid wages is ostensibly a breach of contract claim.
The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, gives the United States Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded, inter alia, upon any express
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort. This grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims is “exclusive,” but “only
to the extent that Congress has not granted any other court authority to hear the claims that may
be decided by the [Court of Federal Claims].” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48
(1988). Absent other grounds for jurisdiction, a claim is subject to the Tucker Act’s stringent
jurisdictional restrictions if, in whole or in part, it explicitly or “in essence” seeks more than
$10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government. See Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967–68 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Heller, Ehrman, White & MacAuliffe v. Babbitt, 992 F.2d 360, 363
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (a plaintiff “may not, by creatively framing their complaint, circumvent a
congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”). Here, plaintiff seeks in excess of $10,000.
Accordingly, this court is want of jurisdiction, and assuming he could make out a viable claim, he
would be nonetheless be required to seek recourse in the Court of Federal Claims.
Put simply, the complaint is vague, confused, and fails to provide adequate notice of any
claim. Furthermore, plaintiff fails to establish this court’s jurisdiction or to present a valid basis
for relief. Consequently, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. An order consistent with
this memorandum opinion is issued separately.
Date: May 1, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
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