Sidney Elaine Calvert Ryan v. Philip Ray Ryan Sr.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 15, 2023
• Docket: 02-22-00471-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-22-00471-CV ___________________________

SIDNEY ELAINE CALVERT RYAN, Appellant

V.

PHILLIP RAY RYAN SR., Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Wise County, Texas Trial Court No. CV21-07-507

Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sidney Elaine Calvert Ryan (Wife) appeals from the trial court’s final divorce

decree. In three issues, she complains that the trial court abused its discretion by

confirming that 21 acres and a house were the separate property of her husband,

Appellee Phillip Ray Ryan Sr. (Husband). We will affirm.

I. Background

Over a decade before Husband and Wife married, Husband purchased a brick

home on 23 acres. By August 2005, Husband had paid off the mortgage on the

property. In May 2006, Husband sold two of those acres, along with a mobile home

on that tract. The two-acre tract’s street address is 2455 CR 2224. The 21-acre tract’s

street address is 2403 CR 2224.

Husband and Wife married in July 2007, and they lived together in the house

on the 21-acre tract. Several years later, they repurchased the two-acre tract and

mobile home. By June 2019, they had paid off the mortgage on the two-acre tract.

Husband sued for divorce in July 2021. Wife asked the trial court to declare the

21 acres and the house as her separate property based on a quitclaim deed that

Husband had drafted and signed several months before filing for divorce. The

quitclaim deed conveyed Husband’s rights “to the following real estate property

located at 2403 CR 2224”—the 21-acre tract’s street address—but it described the

property as follows: “2.0 acres, Abst: A-490 J Levins, Label: TEX0550597/98, Make:

MH Manufacturing Inc. Serial: CW2001237TXA/B, Model: Southern Star, Model:

2 28X56, YR: 1995.” At trial, Wife argued that the quitclaim deed gave the 21 acres and

house to her. Husband argued that the quitclaim deed referred to the two acres and

the mobile home.

Wife testified that Husband had offered the quitclaim deed to her to procure

the proceeds that she had received from the sale of her separate real property.

Husband testified that the quitclaim deed was only for the two acres with the mobile

home. He stated that he got the legal description from Wise County’s website: “[i]t’s

got a lot number, two acres—J Levins subdivision, and it’s got a serial number for a

model Southern Star 28 by 56 length and width in 1995.” He further testified that the

mobile home listed in the quitclaim deed referred to the mobile home on the two

acres (as opposed to another mobile home that was on the 21 acres) because of the

mobile home’s brand (Southern Star) and size (doublewide). Husband explained that

when he filled in 2403 CR 2224 as the address of the real-estate interest being

transferred, he thought “it was wanting the mailing address.” Husband also testified

that despite having signed the quitclaim deed, he had not intended to give any

property to Wife because he had changed his mind about giving the two acres to her.

After the bench trial ended, the trial court confirmed the two acres and mobile

home as Wife’s separate property and confirmed the 21 acres as Husband’s separate

property. Wife timely moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied the same day

it issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Relevant here, the trial court

found that Husband’s testimony was “credible when he testified that his only donative

3 intent, when preparing and signing the Quit[claim] Deed . . . was to deed the 2 acres

and the manufactured home specifically described therein.”

Wife has appealed and raises three issues challenging the trial court’s

confirmation of the 21 acres as Husband’s separate property: (1) the trial court made a

legal error by transferring Wife’s separate property to Husband because the street

address in the quitclaim deed sufficiently described the property being transferred;

(2) the trial court abused its discretion by confirming the 21 acres and house as

Husband’s separate property; and (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient

to support the trial court’s judgment.

II. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s division of property for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,

Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). A

trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or if it does not

analyze or apply the law properly. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011). Although

a trial court does not abuse its discretion by deciding based on conflicting evidence,

sufficient evidence must nevertheless support the decision; therefore, the traditional

sufficiency-review standards are relevant to our review. Hamilton v. Hamilton, No. 02-

19-00211-CV, 2020 WL 6498528, at *3 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Nov. 5, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op.); In re S.C., No. 02-17-00377-CV, 2018 WL 5289370, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Oct. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Stated another way, when we

review if the trial court abused its discretion by ruling based on legally or factually

4 insufficient evidence, “we must determine (1) whether the trial court had sufficient

evidence on which to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court acted

reasonably in applying its discretion to those facts.” Hamilton, 2020 WL 6498528, at

*3.

When, as here, the trial court files findings of fact and conclusions of law, the

fact-findings have the same force and dignity as a jury’s answers to jury questions.

Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). A trial court’s legal

conclusions do not bind us, and we review them de novo. Wise Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Am.

Hat Co., 476 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.). A trial court’s

fact-findings on disputed issues are not conclusive, and when the appellate record

contains a reporter’s record, an appellant may challenge those findings for evidentiary

sufficiency. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). We review the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting challenged findings using the same standards

that we apply to jury findings. Id.

All property possessed by either spouse during or upon dissolution of marriage

is presumed to be community property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003(a). This

presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that an asset is a

spouse’s separate property. See id. § 3.003(b); see also Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d

361, 363 (Tex. 2011) (“Parties claiming certain property as their separate property

have the burden of rebutting the presumption of community property. To do so, they

must trace and clearly identify the property in question as separate by clear and

5 convincing evidence.” (citation omitted)). Evidence is clear and convincing if it gives

the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction that the allegations sought to be established

are true. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007.

To determine if evidence is legally sufficient under the clear and convincing

standard, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged

finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or

conviction that the finding is true. In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 674

(Tex. 2020). Similarly, in evaluating whether evidence is factually sufficient under the

clear and convincing standard, we determine whether, on the entire record, a

factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the challenged

finding is true. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006).

III. Applicable Law

As noted, all property possessed by either spouse upon dissolution of marriage

is presumed to be community property, and a party can overcome this presumption

only by proving by clear and convincing evidence that the disputed property is

separate property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003; see id. § 3.002 (“Community property

consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse

during marriage.”). Separate property includes property a spouse owned before

marriage and property a spouse acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent.

Id. § 3.001(1), (2). Whether property is separate or community is determined by its

character at inception. E.g., Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001).

6 Here, although the 21-acre tract was presumptively community property, it is

undisputed that Husband owned the 21 acres when he married Wife and that it was

thus his separate property when they married. The only way the 21 acres could be

characterized as Wife’s separate property is if Husband gifted it to her. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. §§ 3.001(2), .003. “A deed for property from one spouse as grantor to the

other spouse as grantee creates a rebuttable presumption that the grantee spouse

received the property as separate property by gift.” In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d

665, 671 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d

910, 913 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied)). This appeal thus hinges on whether

the quitclaim deed sufficed to create a presumption that Husband gifted the 21-acre

tract to Wife.1

In contrast to a warranty deed for land, which actually conveys property, “a

quitclaim deed conveys the grantor’s rights in that property, if any.” Geodyne Energy

Income Prod. P’ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 161 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tex. 2005); see Jackson v.

Wildflower Prod. Co., Inc., 505 S.W.3d 80, 88–89 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet.

denied) (explaining that “the granting clause in a deed purports to grant and convey

the described property, whereas the granting clause in a quitclaim deed only purports

1 A gift is a voluntary transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without consideration. Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 432 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.). The elements of a gift are (1) the intent to make a gift; (2) delivery of the property; and (3) acceptance of the property. Id. Generally, one who is claiming a gift’s existence has the burden of proof, but when the conveyance is from one spouse to the other, there is a presumption of a gift. Id.

7 to grant and convey whatever ‘right, title, and interest’ the grantor has in that property

at the time the instrument is executed and delivered”). When construing a deed, the

court must “ascertain the true intention of the parties as expressed within the ‘four

corners’ of the instrument.” Cherokee Water Co. v. Freeman, 33 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.). “To be valid, a conveyance of real property must

contain a sufficient description of the property to be conveyed.” 2 AIC Mgmt., 246

S.W.3d at 645; see Hahn v. Love, 394 S.W.3d 14, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2012, pet. denied).

An appraisal district’s legal description of a property along with the property’s

mailing address is a sufficient property description. Hahn, 394 S.W.3d at 25–27. A

property description is also sufficient if it explicitly references county-appraisal-district

tax-tract maps. AIC Mgmt., 246 S.W.3d at 648. But when a deed has conflicting

descriptions of the property being conveyed, specific provisions control over general

expressions. Stribling v. Millican DPC Partners, LP, 458 S.W.3d 17, 20 (Tex. 2015).

Applicable here, when the property’s street address conflicts with the legal description

from appraisal-district records, the legal description controls. See WK Props., Inc. v.

With a quitclaim deed, a court must look to whether the instrument’s language, 2

taken as a whole, conveyed the property itself or merely the grantor’s rights in the property. Geodyne Energy, 161 S.W.3d at 486. The deed at issue in this case did not convey the property to Wife; it merely conveyed Husband’s right, title, interest, and claim to the property to Wife. It is thus a quitclaim deed. See id. Even so, deed- construction rules still apply. See, e.g., AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 641, 645 (Tex. 2008).

8 Perrin SA Plaza, LLC, 648 S.W.3d 513, 518–19 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no

pet.) (holding that legal description from appraisal-district records recited in deed

controlled over conflicting street addresses); White v. Harrison, 390 S.W.3d 666, 678–79

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (“[T]he legal description of a property will control

over a common description or street address.”); cf. Stribling, 458 S.W.3d at 20–21

(explaining that when metes-and-bounds description conflicts with general property

description, the more specific metes-and-bounds description controls).

Alternatively, a deed can be ambiguous. Whether a deed is ambiguous is a legal

question; a deed is not ambiguous if it can be given a definite and certain meaning as a

matter of law. Winegar v. Martin, 304 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010,

no pet.). Nor is a deed ambiguous simply because two parties interpret the deed

differently—“ambiguity exists only if both parties’ interpretations are reasonable.”

Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff, 596 S.W.3d 740, 743–44 (Tex. 2020); see Winegar, 304 S.W.3d

at 665. If a deed is ambiguous, a trial court may consider extrinsic evidence in

determining the parties’ intent. See Cherokee Water, 33 S.W.3d at 353.

IV. Analysis

Wife’s three issues challenge the trial court’s characterization of the 21-acre

tract as Husband’s separate property. Wife claims that the quitclaim deed

unambiguously conveyed Husband’s interest in the 21-acre tract to her:

BE IT KNOWN BY ALL , that Mr. Phillip R Ryan, (“Grantor”) whose address is 2403 CR 2224, Decatur, Texas 76234, hereby REMISES, RELEASES AND FOREVER QUITCLAIMS TO Mrs. Sidney

9 Calvert Ryan (“Grantee”), whose address is 2403 CR 2224, Decatur, Texas 76234, all right, title, interest and claim to the following real estate property located at 2403 CR 2224 in the City/Township of Decatur, located in the County of and State of Texas and ZIP code of 76234, to- wit:

Property having LOT No. A0490.0020.01, with the Section No. 1, and having the following description: 2.0 acres, Abst: A-490 J Levins, Label: TEX0550597/98, Make: MH Manufacturing Inc. Serial: CW2001237TXA/B, Model: Southern Star, Model: 28X56, YR: 1995. [Underlining added.]

Because 2403 CR 2224 is the 21-acre tract’s address but the legal description is

from the county-appraisal-district records for the two-acre tract and mobile home, the

street address and the legal description conflict. Wife contends that although there are

two different property descriptions, the street address is the more specific and thus

controls. Wife, however, is mistaken. The legal description is more specific than the

street address and thus controls. See WK Props., 648 S.W.3d at 519 (citing White, 390

S.W.3d at 678–79). The conflict between the street address and the legal description

did not render the quitclaim deed insufficient or ambiguous. See id. (concluding that

legal description controlled over street address and rejecting argument that conflict

between the two rendered contract ambiguous). Accordingly, the quitclaim deed

conveyed Husband’s interest in the two acres and the mobile home to Wife.3 It did

not transfer Husband’s interest in the 21 acres to Wife and thus did not suffice to

create a presumption that he had gifted the 21-acre tract to her. Applying the

3 Neither party challenges the trial court’s confirmation of the two-acre tract and mobile home as Wife’s separate property.

10 applicable review standards, we thus conclude and hold that the trial court did not

make a legal error or abuse its discretion in confirming that the 21-acre tract was

Husband’s separate property.4 We overrule Wife’s three issues.

V. Conclusion

Having overruled Wife’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s final divorce

decree.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice

Delivered: June 15, 2023

4 Even if the quitclaim deed was ambiguous and the trial court thus could have properly considered extrinsic evidence relating to the parties’ intent, the evidence here did not suffice to create the gift presumption. Husband testified that the quitclaim deed referred to only the two acres and the mobile home on it and explained that he got the information from the county website. Additionally, the more specific legal description in the quitclaim deed matches the Wise County Appraisal District’s description of the two-acre tract. Husband also testified that the brand and size of the mobile home listed in the quitclaim deed referred to the mobile home located on the two-acre tract. Husband further explained that when he listed the address of 2403 CR 2224 in the quitclaim deed, he did so because he thought “it was wanting the mailing address.” Wife admitted on cross-examination that the more specific description in the quitclaim deed referred to the mobile home on the two-acre tract.