2024 IL App (5th) 220564-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 08/08/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0564 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
BRIAN K. SIDES, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellant, ) Champaign County. ) v. ) No. 20-OP-101 ) CRISTINA M. MANUEL, ) Honorable Anna Benjamin ) and Ronda Holliman, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judges, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Welch and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in striking and dismissing the appellant’s petition for an order of protection and imposing sanctions against the appellant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137. Denial of emergency relief on his petition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court’s determination that the appellant failed to state a claim that would entitle him to relief under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2020)) was appropriate. Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the appellant or in placing restrictions on his future filings with the court, where the court found that he was using the litigation process to make unfounded, offensive statements meant to harass the respondent-appellee. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶2 This matter arises out of a petition for order of protection (petition) filed by petitioner-
appellant Brian Sides against respondent-appellee Cristina Manuel. Manuel filed a motion to strike
and dismiss the petition. The circuit court granted her motion, striking part of the petition,
dismissing the rest, and imposed sanctions against Sides. In addition to sanctions in the form of
1 attorney fees, the court restricted Sides from filing any future motions or pleadings without leave
of court, with the exception of notices of appeal. Sides now appeals, pro se, from the circuit court’s
order assessing sanctions against him, as well as the underlying order striking and dismissing his
petition and awarding sanctions.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The parties in this matter were involved in number of pending cases during the relevant
time period, including a family law case. 1 The parties are parents to two children, a daughter and
son, who were aged 16 and 12, respectively, at the time that Sides filed his petition. The court had
entered a temporary parenting order in the related family law case on June 17, 2019, which
awarded the majority of parenting time to Manuel and regular parenting time to Sides. Manuel had
also previously requested an order of protection against Sides in another case; she did not seek to
include the children as protected parties.
¶5 On February 5, 2020, Sides filed a petition for order of protection against Manuel in the
underlying case, seeking relief on behalf of the parties’ two minor children. This was
approximately one month after Manuel filed her aforementioned petition, and approximately two
days before the plenary hearing date on Manuel’s petition. In his petition, Sides requested that both
children be listed as protected parties, that Manuel be ordered not to abuse or harass him or the
children, and that he be granted physical care and possession of the children and significant
decision-making responsibility for them. He further sought the restriction of Manuel’s parenting
time, specifying “non-sleep over parenting for Mom,” and that she never be allowed to sleep with
the children.
1 The court may take judicial notice of matters generally known to the court and not subject to reasonable dispute, including matters of record in its own proceedings. See In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 237 (1999). 2 ¶6 In a two-page attachment to his petition, Sides wrote that the parties’ 16-year-old daughter
had told him that Manuel had been sleeping in the same bed as their 12-year-old son almost every
night for the past several months. Sides stated that he did not know, but suspected, that Manuel
was engaging in a sexual relationship with their son, and/or was grooming him for a future sexual
relationship. He also made several derogatory allegations about Manuel’s physical and mental
health in his petition, as well as graphic, disparaging remarks about her sexual conduct, in alleged
support of his claims. Sides concluded that he was “gravely concerned” about the alleged sleeping
arrangement and the “serious endangerment” of his son. He additionally stated that he had
provided the same information to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶7 In an ex parte hearing, the circuit court denied Sides’ request for an emergency order of
protection and set the matter for a plenary hearing. On February 12, 2020, Manuel filed a motion
to strike and dismiss and motion for sanctions (motion) in response to Sides’ petition. She sought
to strike the statements of Sides’ petition that were based on alleged hearsay from the parties’
minor daughter, as well as the scandalous, immaterial comments about her sexual history and
conduct. She also moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)), arguing that Sides did not make any allegations of
abuse as required under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq.
(West 2018)), and any statements purporting to constitute such allegations were conclusory
remarks unsupported by specific factual allegations and/or the aforementioned comments that
ought to be stricken. Lastly, she moved for sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137
(eff. Jan. 1, 2018) because Sides filed his petition without a good-faith basis, and for the purpose
of harassing and embarrassing Manuel and prolonging litigation in the parties’ family law case;
3 she added that Sides was a licensed attorney at the time of filing his petition and was aware of
pleading requirements and of the supreme court rules.
¶8 On February 28, 2022, the court heard oral argument on Manuel’s motion, through counsel,
and from Sides, pro se and in the custody of the county sheriff as he was incarcerated for direct
criminal contempt of court at the time. The court took the matter under advisement and allowed
Sides time to file a response. He did not file a response by the deadline.
¶9 The court entered a memorandum opinion and order on August 1, 2022. In its order, the
court began by noting that the parties had a number of pending cases between them, and the court
had previously heard multiple days of testimony and evidence in the parties’ family law case
relating to the permanent allocation of parental responsibilities. The court had also heard various
motions relating to parenting time in that case, granted Sides’ counsel’s motion to withdraw, and
heard Manuel’s motion to restrict abusive litigation. The court noted that it had found Sides in
direct criminal contempt based on his behavior before the court.
¶ 10 In summarizing Sides’ petition, the court stated, “Sides feigns concern for Manuel and her
mental health, and he superficially admits to a lack of knowledge about certain allegations. Yet,
he lists multiple highly prejudicial accusations, which have no bearing on whether Manuel abused
their child.” The court also addressed Sides’ contention that he did not receive proper notice or a
copy of Manuel’s motion, finding that his argument was without merit because the certificate of
service included with her motion and signed by her counsel was prima facie proof that the motion
was properly submitted to Sides via U.S. Mail, and that Sides further received notice of the hearing
when he appeared at an earlier hearing in the family law matter.
¶ 11 The court also listed Sides’ arguments at the hearing in support of his petition. He stated
that he became concerned about Manuel’s behavior when his daughter raised her concerns to him,
4 and that it was not unlawful for him to include her hearsay statements. He said that if he wanted
to harm Manuel, he would have called DCFS instead of filing a petition that would not be
accessible to any third party, and that Manuel was harmed more by calling her motion for hearing
than by merely filing the allegations. He also stated that he believed his filing the petition was
successful because he believed the alleged behavior had stopped.
¶ 12 Manuel argued that the petition was one example of the many harassing filings by Sides.
She asserted that the language of his petition was abusive and unnecessary. She further alleged
that Sides contradicted himself by stating that he would have called DCFS if he wished to harm
her, because he verified under oath in his petition that he had already provided the same
information to DCFS.
¶ 13 The court’s order struck part of Sides’ petition and dismissed the rest. In its analysis, the
court noted that the only factual allegation contained in the two-page attachment to Sides’ petition
was that he found out through his daughter that Manuel was sleeping in the same bed as their 12-
year-old son. He did not allege that Manuel had engaged in any behavior that would constitute
abuse under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act. Instead, he merely concluded that, based on the
hearsay statement and his own purported knowledge of Manuel that had nothing to do with their
children, she may be engaging or planning to engage in an inappropriate sexual relationship with
their minor son.
¶ 14 The court struck all of these statements, and further struck the remaining statements Sides
made in the attachment to his petition. The court found that the allegations about Manuel’s history,
attire, physical health, mental health, and sexual conduct had little, if any, probative value on the
issue of child abuse and what little probative value might be contained in Sides’ statements was
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” According to the court, the
5 allegations were “designed to create the impression that Manuel is a deviant person, and, therefore,
she is capable of sexually abusing her child.” However, none of Sides’ statements actually alleged
that she was abusing their son. Therefore, the court struck the allegations contained in Sides’ two-
page attachment to the petition.
¶ 15 Next, the court found that, after striking the irrelevant allegations and unsupported factual
allegations, Sides’ petition failed to state any cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
The court found no well-pleaded facts that would support a finding of abuse, and that a liberal
construction of the pleadings would not save the petition from “being completely devoid of
substance.” Therefore, the court dismissed the remainder of the petition with prejudice.
¶ 16 The court also imposed sanctions against Sides pursuant to Rule 137 and ordered Manuel’s
counsel to file an affidavit of attorney fees. Additionally, the court ordered that Sides must obtain
leave of court prior to filing any further motions or pleadings in the matter, with the exception of
notices of appeal, and imposed page and formatting limits on any such motions for leave to file.
In explaining its decision, the court stated that the petition was not grounded in fact, instead
stringing together “largely unrelated and unsupported factual allegations against Manuel in an
attempt to scandalize her and her relationship with her child.” Furthermore, while Sides “claims
to have regard for Manuel, and tries to carefully sidestep making the ultimate allegation of sexual
abuse, he draws the most egregious conclusions from what he claims to know.” The court therefore
determined that his conclusions were not reasonable under the circumstances, and the only purpose
of the allegations seemed to be to harass and embarrass Manuel and needlessly increase her costs
of litigation.
¶ 17 On August 15, 2022, Manuel’s counsel filed and served a notice of hearing on Sides,
notifying him that the hearing on the determination of monetary sanctions was set for August 30,
6 2022. Sides did not appear at the hearing. The circuit court held the hearing in his absence and
assessed attorney fees and other monetary sanctions in the amount of $3000 against Sides.
¶ 18 Sides now appeals from the circuit court’s order assessing sanctions, as well as the
underlying orders striking and dismissing his petition and imposing sanctions and denying
emergency relief. On appeal, he argues that his petition was never denied on the merits because
Sides did not prosecute the petition, having allegedly “obtained information that the abuse had
ceased.” He further contends that the court improperly characterized his allegations, including by
calling them highly prejudicial and claiming that he was feigning concern for Manuel.
¶ 19 Sides raises four issues on appeal. He first claims that the court’s refusal to grant emergency
relief on his petition was against the manifest weight of the evidence because he provided “ample
evidence of ongoing abuse” warranting an emergency order of protection. He next argues that the
court’s refusal to require Manuel to properly serve Sides with a notice of hearing on the motion
constituted an abuse of discretion, and that it was legally insufficient to notify him of the hearing
date during a prior hearing, without requiring Manuel to provide written notice in the manner
prescribed in the Rules of Practice of the Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Rule 2.1(d) (eff.
Nov. 6, 2014) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 11 (eff. July 1, 2021).
¶ 20 Sides’ third and fourth points are that the circuit court abused its discretion in striking and
dismissing his petition, as well as in sanctioning him. In support, he claims that the court threatened
him in a retaliatory manner after he informed the judge that he intended to file documents relating
to her misconduct in this case, as required by the court’s order prohibiting Sides from filing
anything without leave of court. He also contends that the court abused him in other ways,
including, inter alia, causing his attorney to withdraw, restricting his visitation with his son,
referring in its order to allegedly irrelevant occurrences in other cases between the parties, and
7 otherwise intimidating him from accessing the court. In summary, his arguments on these last two
points are about the judge’s supposed retaliatory antagonism and abuse towards him, as well as
some allegedly untrue statements made about him by Manuel’s counsel.
¶ 21 ANALYSIS
¶ 22 A. Denial of Emergency Relief on the Petition
¶ 23 The Illinois Domestic Violence Act (Act) allows a petitioner to request from the court an
ex parte emergency order of protection to protect the petitioner and/or specified persons from
harassment, abuse, threats, neglect, interference with personal liberties, or exploitation. 750 ILCS
60/101 et seq. (West 2022). When filing on someone else’s behalf, the petitioner has the burden
of proving that the individual or individuals to be protected have suffered “abuse[ ] by a family or
household member” and, “because of age, health, disability, or inaccessibility, cannot file the
petition.” Id. § 201(b)(i).
¶ 24 The Act requires the court to make a finding of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.
Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 348 (2006). We will not disturb the circuit court’s determination
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. A judgment is against the manifest
weight of the evidence “if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” Id. at 350 (citing In re D.F., 201
Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002)). In determining whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. In re Marriage of
Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 516 (2004). Under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, we accord
deference to the circuit court as the finder of fact because it is best positioned to observe the
conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses. Id. at 515.
8 ¶ 25 As Manuel notes on appeal, there is no transcript of the ex parte hearing in the record, and
we therefore rely on the pleading itself to review the circuit court’s denial of emergency relief. For
the reasons further discussed below in our review of the court’s striking and dismissing the petition,
we find that Sides failed to meet his burden of showing that the children were abused by Manuel.
As stated by the court in its ruling on Manuel’s motion, Sides failed to plead abuse in his petition,
instead making conclusory, unsupported, and derogatory allegations about Manuel.
¶ 26 Reserving further review of the sufficiency of his pleadings for section C of our order, we
note here that he specifically stated, in a section of his attachment to the petition entitled “Facts I
don’t know,” that he did not know whether she was “grooming” their son and/or whether she was
engaging in inappropriate sexual relations with him, nor did he have evidence to support any such
accusations. Finding nothing in the record that would support his request for an emergency order
of protection, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of emergency relief.
¶ 27 B. Notice of Hearing
¶ 28 The local rules of the circuit court, Sixth Circuit, require the moving party to provide
written notice of hearing on motions to all parties, to be given in the manner prescribed in Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 11. See Rules of Practice of the Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Rule
2.1(d) (eff. Nov. 6, 2014). Rule 11(c) of our supreme court rules provides for the methods of
service of documents, including by U.S. mail where electronic service is not possible. Ill. S. Ct. R.
11(c) (eff. July 1, 2021). Rule 12 further requires that proof of service be filed with the clerk of
the court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). Furthermore, pleadings and motions must be filed
“with a certificate of counsel or other proof that the documents have been served on all parties.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 104(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018).
9 ¶ 29 In its August 1, 2022, order, the circuit court found Sides’ argument that he had not been
properly served with notice of the hearing on Manuel’s motion to be meritless. The court explained
that Manuel’s counsel filed a signed certificate of service with the motion, and this was prima facie
proof that the motion was properly served on Sides. The court further found that Sides received
additional notice of the hearing when he appeared at an earlier hearing in the family law matter
and was reminded of the hearing date at that time. The court also noted that her motion was filed
on February 12, 2020, and the hearing took place on February 28, 2022, giving Sides over two
years to prepare his arguments. He was also notified of the hearing date at a January 11, 2022,
hearing in the parties’ family law case, at which Manuel requested that her motion be set for
hearing. Sides appeared in person at the hearing and was afforded the opportunity to present oral
argument, which he did. At the hearing, the court also granted his request for an additional 28 days
to file any written response, so that he could review his files and notes upon his release from
custody. However, Sides did not file any response.
¶ 30 We find that the record does not support Sides’ argument that he was not served with notice
of hearing on Manuel’s motion, or that he was deprived of sufficient time to respond to her motion.
We agree with the court that the certificate of service attached to the notice of hearing filed on
February 14, 2022, is prima facie proof that the notice of hearing was mailed to Sides via U.S.
Mail addressed to him at the Champaign County jail, where he was incarcerated at the time. Sides
also appeared at the hearing on the motion and, according to the court, he seemed to be prepared
to deliver his argument, at times reading off of previously prepared notes. Finally, the circuit court
granted his motion for an additional 28 days to file a written response, to include any argument he
could not prepare while incarcerated. Sides failed to file a written response; we additionally note
10 that he does not provide a reason why he could not file a timely response immediately after Manuel
filed her motion.
¶ 31 Ultimately, Sides had over two years to respond to Manuel’s motion, and the record reflects
that he did prepare and deliver his argument before the court at the scheduled hearing date. We
find that his argument that he was not properly served with notice of hearing lacks merit, and he
has failed to show that he was disadvantaged in any way by lack of adequate notice. We therefore
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in excusing any purported lack of proper notice.
¶ 32 C. Striking and Dismissal of the Petition
¶ 33 A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint by
alleging defects on its face. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558,
578 (2006); 735 ILCS 5/2-615(a) (West 2022). Because Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, a
plaintiff “is required to set forth a legally recognized claim and plead facts in support of each
element that bring the claim within the cause of action alleged.” Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner
Review Board, 376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 434 (2007) (citing Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 369
(2003)). The pleading may not rest on mere unsupported factual conclusions. Grund v. Donegan,
298 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1037 (1998). In reviewing the pleadings, all well-pled facts “must be taken
as true, and the pleadings must be liberally construed for the purpose of doing justice between the
parties.” Dvorak v. Primus Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 625, 632 (1988).
¶ 34 Additionally, the trial court “has discretion to allow an amendment to the pleadings or to
terminate the litigation”; “it is the plaintiff’s burden to persuade the trial judge to dismiss without
prejudice if he wishes to replead.” Id. at 635. “The practice of striking or dismissing a complaint
should be confined to cases where there is want of equity on the face of the complaint and it is
clear that no amendment will aid it.” Dunavan v. Calandrino, 167 Ill. App. 3d 952, 960 (1988).
11 ¶ 35 We review the circuit court’s granting of a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615
de novo. Solaia Technology, 221 Ill. 2d at 578.; Hampton v. Chicago Transit Authority¸ 2018 IL
App (1st) 172074, ¶ 19.
¶ 36 In the present matter, the court struck the statements Sides made in his attachment to the
petition and dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding that he had failed to plead facts sufficient
to support a claim of abuse, relying instead on unsupported factual conclusions and irrelevant
accusations about Manuel’s character, physical and mental health, and sexual history unrelated to
Sides’ claim of child abuse, which served the predominate purpose of harassing and embarrassing
Manuel. The court further found that Sides’ basis for claiming that Manuel was sleeping in the
same bed as their son was the hearsay statements of the parties’ minor daughter, and that Sides
made several unsupported accusations that were so scandalous and graphic that their probative
value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. After ruling that
these unsupported and prejudicial accusations were stricken, the court dismissed the petition.
¶ 37 We agree with the circuit court’s characterization of Sides’ allegations. He admits in the
attachment to his petition that the sole basis for his belief that Manuel was sharing a bed with their
12-year-old son came from the concerns raised by their 16-year-old daughter. Moreover, in this
attachment, Sides includes a list of supposed facts that he admits to not knowing, which read, in
part, “I don’t have evidence that Cristina has attempted or has succeeded in engaging in a sexual
relationship with” the parties’ son, and “I do not know if Cristina is merely attempting to groom
[the son] for a future sexual relationship.” Therefore, it is apparent from the fact of the petition
that Sides, by his own admission, lacks support for his claim of abuse.
¶ 38 None of his other allegations provide any factual support for his claim that Manuel was
abusing their son, as defined in the Act. We find that the language of the petition supports the
12 court’s statement that Sides “concludes from the statement from their daughter, and from his own
purported historical knowledge of Manuel, having nothing to do with their children, that she may
be engaging in an inappropriate sexual relationship or grooming their child,” and that such
conclusory allegations are insufficient to sustain a cause of action. See Chandler v. Illinois Central
R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 331, 348 (2003) (“[A] complaint is deficient when it fails to allege the facts
necessary for recovery.”). Even construing the pleadings liberally, we do not find any support for
his conclusory allegations. Therefore, we find that the court properly dismissed the petition for
failure to state a cause of action.
¶ 39 Moreover, we find that the court’s decision to dismiss the petition with prejudice was
proper. After determining that dismissal of the pleadings is warranted, the trial court has discretion
to allow an amendment to the pleadings or to terminate the litigation. See Dvorak, 168 Ill. App.
3d at 635. As the pleading party, Sides bore the burden of persuading the court to dismiss without
prejudice if he wished to replead. Id. Dismissal with prejudice is proper “where there is want of
equity on the face of the complaint and it is clear that no amendment will aid it.” Dunavan, 167
Ill. App. 3d at 960.
¶ 40 Here, it suffices to note that Sides himself stated at the hearing that the alleged abuse had
stopped, and he was no longer interested in pursuing his petition. In addition to admitting in his
petition that he did not know whether any abuse was occurring, he admitted during oral argument
that he did not believe there to be a basis for his claim. He did, however, contend that filing the
petition was a proper use of court procedure because it made Manuel stop the alleged abuse.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that, had Sides requested to replead, there were any possible
facts that would have saved his petition. Therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the petition
with prejudice.
13 ¶ 41 Lastly, the court did not err in striking the statements Sides made in the attachment to his
petition. For the same reasons discussed above, he failed to support his claim with statements of
fact, and even admitted that he did not have any evidence to believe that Manuel was abusing their
son. 2 In addition to a lack of factual statements that supported his claim of abuse under the Act,
the majority of Sides’ attachment to the petition contains statements that are irrelevant to his claim
and/or severely lacking in probative value. Pursuant to the Illinois Rules of Evidence, even relevant
evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.” Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
¶ 42 The court determined that the statements Sides made in his petition about Manuel’s
physical health, apparel, mental health, sexual history, and sexual conduct were not relevant to his
claim that she was abusing their son, but rather only meant to portray Manuel as a sexual deviant
who was capable of abusing her child. Where evidence is found to be prejudicial, with little to no
probative value, it is properly stricken. See People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 392 (2004). We find
that the court did not err in striking portions of the petition, where the statements made were not
relevant to Sides’ claim of abuse and were highly prejudicial to Manuel.
¶ 43 D. Imposition of Sanctions Against Sides
¶ 44 Rule 137 allows a court to impose sanctions “against a party or counsel who files a pleading
or motion that is not well grounded in fact, is not warranted by existing law or a good-faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or is interposed for any
improper purpose.” In re Marriage of Schneider, 298 Ill. App. 3d 103, 108 (1998). Rule 137
imposes “an affirmative duty on attorneys and litigants alike to conduct an investigation of the
2 While Sides sought to include both of the parties’ children in the order of protection, he did not allege any abuse of their daughter in his petition. 14 facts and the law before filing an action, pleading, or other paper.” Id. at 108-09. The signature of
an attorney or party on a pleading or motion represents that, “to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry,” the filing “is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and that is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1,
2018).
¶ 45 The purpose of this rule is “to prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing claimants
who bring vexatious and harassing actions based upon unsupported allegations of fact or law.”
Fremarek v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1074 (1995). The
rule is not, however, “intended to simply penalize litigants for the lack of success; rather, its aim
is to restrict litigants who plead frivolous or false matters without any basis in law.” Id. The court
applies an objective standard in evaluating what was reasonable at the time of filing. Id.; see also
Whitmer v. Munson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 501, 516 (2002). Additionally, even where the initiating party
honestly believed that their claims were well grounded in fact or law, it is still unreasonable to file
the suit if its falsity could have been uncovered through reasonable inquiry. Fremarek, 272 Ill.
App. 3d at 1074-75.
¶ 46 The decision to impose Rule 137 sanctions is within the sound discretion of the circuit
court and is entitled to great weight. Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193 Ill.
2d 560, 579 (2000) (citing Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 487 (1998)); Schneider,
298 Ill. App. 3d at 109. Thus, its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs only where no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the circuit court. Schneider, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 109; Nelson v. Chicago Park District,
15 408 Ill. App. 3d 53, 67-68 (2011). If reasonable people would differ on this matter, we cannot say
that the circuit court abused its discretion. Fremarek, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 1074.
¶ 47 Sanctions need not be limited to an imposition of reasonable attorney fees against the
offending party. See Eisterhold v. Gizewski, 2022 IL App (1st) 210490, ¶ 39. Courts may consider
the defamatory nature of untrue allegations in pleadings and motions when considering a request
for sanctions. In re Marriage of Stone, 197 Ill. App. 3d 457, 471-72 (1990) (finding that the “heart
of misconduct by respondent” was that the allegations were untrue and harassing, but the “fact that
the allegations were defamatory was a proper compounding factor”). In selecting appropriate
sanctions, the court should consider the degree of bad faith involved, whether sanctions could deter
others from similar conduct, and the relative merits of the parties’ positions. Penn v. Gerig, 334
Ill. App. 3d 345, 354 (2002).
¶ 48 Rule 137 also requires that the circuit court provide an explanation of its decision to impose
sanctions, and on review, we may only affirm on the grounds specified by the circuit court. Nelson,
408 Ill. App. 3d at 68. In reviewing the court’s decision to impose sanctions our primary
consideration is whether the decision was “ ‘informed, based on valid reasoning, and follows
logically from the facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Sterdjevich v. RMK Management Corp., 343 Ill. App. 3d
1, 19 (2003)).
¶ 49 In the present matter, the circuit court included in its August 1, 2022, order a thorough
explanation of its decision to impose Rule 137 sanctions against Sides. The court detailed his
actions in the procedural history of the underlying case and the parties’ related cases. This included
his being held in direct criminal contempt stemming from his communications with the court and
the court clerk. Manuel also filed a motion to restrict abusive litigation in the parties’ family law
case in 2021. Sides had also made many filings in the parties’ related cases.
16 ¶ 50 The circuit court provided a detailed basis for its finding that Sides filed his petition for the
purpose of prolonging litigation and increasing costs for Manuel. See In re Marriage of Betts, 172
Ill. App. 3d 742, 752 (1988) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning
a party for filing an unfounded and vexatious motion that burdened the courts). It further found
that the graphic, highly offensive comments that Sides attempted to mask as concern for Manuel’s
wellbeing in his petition were not brought in good faith, were not well grounded in fact, and were
not relevant to his claims. See In re Marriage Stone, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 471-72 (the defamatory
nature of the allegations was a proper compounding factor in the court’s decision to impose
sanctions). The court wrote in its order that “the only purpose these allegations appear to have is
to harass and embarrass Manuel, and to further delay and needlessly increase the costs of litigation
for her.”
¶ 51 We add that Sides himself admitted at the hearing on the motion that he would provide the
same information included in his petition to DCFS if he wished to harm Manuel; he states in the
petition that he did, in fact, provide this information to DCFS. This further supports the circuit
court’s finding that he filed the allegations in his petition for improper means.
¶ 52 On appeal, Sides does not present any argument as to why we should find that the court
abused its discretion. Rather, he contends that the judge wished to harm and retaliate against him,
that she impermissibly punished him for future actions (namely, his stated intent to make future
filings), and that she sought to intimidate him from accessing the judicial system. We find that his
allegations fail to demonstrate any supposed misconduct by the court. Rather, the record reflects
that the sanctions were informed by the specific facts in this case, were proportional to the degree
17 of Sides’ misconduct, bore a reasonable relationship to the Rule 137 violations, and were not
imposed merely to punish Sides.3
¶ 53 Affording due deference to the circuit court’s determination that sanctions were warranted,
we find that the court’s view was reasonable, and its decision was not an abuse of discretion. It is
clear from the record and from the face of the petition that it was not reasonable for Sides to believe
that his petition was well grounded in fact and law and was not filed for the improper purposes of
harassing Manuel and causing unnecessary delay and increase in cost of litigation.
¶ 54 We therefore find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Sides in
the form of attorney fees and costs, as well as by imposing restrictions on his future filings with
the court.
¶ 55 CONCLUSION
¶ 56 For the reasons stated, the circuit court did not err in entering an order striking and
dismissing Sides’ petition for order of protection, imposing sanctions against Sides pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137, and restricting the appellant’s future filings. The judgment of the
circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 57 Affirmed.
3 Sides does not present any authority supporting an argument that the form of the court’s sanctions was an abuse of discretion, and we therefore need not further review its decision. 18