Sibley v. Manufacturers Furniture Co.

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Sibley v. Manufacturers Furniture Co.

247 S.W.2d 20, 220 Ark. 234, 1952 Ark. LEXIS 684

CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

DecidedMarch 17, 1952

Docket4-9724

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 247 S.W.2d 20 (Sibley v. Manufacturers Furniture Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sibley v. Manufacturers Furniture Co., 247 S.W.2d 20, 220 Ark. 234, 1952 Ark. LEXIS 684 (Ark. 1952).

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Opinion

George Rose Smith, J.

The appellant, R. W. Sibley, filed a complaint under Ark. Stats. 1947, § 29-506, to set aside for fraud a judgment obtained against him by Manufacturers’ Furniture Company in 1942. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and the only question presented to us is whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Sibley’s complaint alleges that on May 23, 1938, he owed the furniture company $443.60. On that date the company accepted a check for $200 in full satisfaction of the account. This compromise was negotiated by a bank which was acting as Sibley’s agent, and Sibley, without knowing that the debt had been discharged, was induced by the furniture company to give promissory notes for the account on August 17, 1938. The company brought suit on these notes in 1942, and Sibley, still unaware of the settlement, permitted judgment for $362.70 to be entered by default. The present complaint was filed in 1951 after the company instituted garnishment proceedings to collect its judgment:

•We agree that no cause of action is stated. While the complaint alleges that the procurement of the default judgment was a fraud upon the court, that is a conclusion of law not admitted by the demurrer. The facts conceded by the demurrer are that the company’s claim was settled in 1938 and that without knowledge of the settlement Sibley executed the notes and failed' to defend the suit. These facts establish at most a fraud in the company’s cause of action on the notes rather than an extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the judgment. The eases defining this distinction were reviewed at length in Alexander v. Alexander, 217 Ark. 230, 229 S. W. 2d 234, and need not be re-examined in detail. It is enough to say that litigation would never come to an end if the losing party were permitted to reopen the case after judgment merely to submit a defence that he neglected to offer in the first instance.

Affirmed.

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George Rose Smith, J.

The appellant, R. W. Sibley, filed a complaint under Ark. Stats. 1947, § 29-506, to set aside for fraud a judgment obtained against him by Manufacturers’ Furniture Company in 1942. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and the only question presented to us is whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Sibley’s complaint alleges that on May 23, 1938, he owed the furniture company $443.60. On that date the company accepted a check for $200 in full satisfaction of the account. This compromise was negotiated by a bank which was acting as Sibley’s agent, and Sibley, without knowing that the debt had been discharged, was induced by the furniture company to give promissory notes for the account on August 17, 1938. The company brought suit on these notes in 1942, and Sibley, still unaware of the settlement, permitted judgment for $362.70 to be entered by default. The present complaint was filed in 1951 after the company instituted garnishment proceedings to collect its judgment:

•We agree that no cause of action is stated. While the complaint alleges that the procurement of the default judgment was a fraud upon the court, that is a conclusion of law not admitted by the demurrer. The facts conceded by the demurrer are that the company’s claim was settled in 1938 and that without knowledge of the settlement Sibley executed the notes and failed' to defend the suit. These facts establish at most a fraud in the company’s cause of action on the notes rather than an extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the judgment. The eases defining this distinction were reviewed at length in Alexander v. Alexander, 217 Ark. 230, 229 S. W. 2d 234, and need not be re-examined in detail. It is enough to say that litigation would never come to an end if the losing party were permitted to reopen the case after judgment merely to submit a defence that he neglected to offer in the first instance.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

247 S.W.2d 20, 220 Ark. 234, 1952 Ark. LEXIS 684, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sibley-v-manufacturers-furniture-co-ark-1952.

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