Shyneika D. Taylor v. Ronald Killen

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: November 4, 2024
• Docket: N22C-03-068 CLS
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHYNEIKA D. TAYLOR, and ) JACQUETTE N. MURREY, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) C.A. No.: N22C-03-068 CLS RONALD KILLEN, ) TALLEY BROTHERS, INC., MAZDA ) MOTOR CORPORATION and ) MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, ) INC., ) ) Defendants. ) )

Date Submitted: September 4, 2024 Date Decided: November 4, 2024

Upon Defendant Mazda Motor Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss, DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff Shyneika Taylor’s Motion in the Alternative for Limited Jurisdictional Discovery GRANTED.

ORDER

Joseph J. Bellew, Esquire and Joseph E. Brenner, Esquire, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, 19801, Attorney for Defendant Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

Joel H. Fredricks, Esquire, Nitsche and Fredricks, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware 19899, Attorney for Plaintiff Shyneika D. Taylor.

Aman K. Sharma, Esquire, the Sharma Law Firm, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware 19801, Attorney for Plaintiff Jaquette Murrey.

SCOTT, J. 1 INTRODUCTION This products liability matter arises from a December 29, 2021, car accident

in New Castle County, Delaware. Plaintiff Shyneika Taylor (“Plaintiff Taylor”) was

driving a 2013 Mazda CX-5 automobile. Plaintiff Taylor alleges Defendant Ronald

Killen’s (“Defendant Killen,”) vehicle struck her and propelled her vehicle into Co-

Plaintiff Jaquette Murrey’s (“Plaintiff Murray”) vehicle and resulted in various

injuries. Plaintiff Taylor asserts claims against Ronald Killen, Talley Brothers, Inc.,

Mazda Motor Corporation, and Mazda Motor of America, Inc., for alleged injuries

sustained from the accident. Plaintiff Taylor, specifically, asserts claims against

Defendants Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor of America, Inc., for the

negligent design, construction, testing, sale, advertisement, marketing and

distribution of seats that allegedly resulted in various injuries she sustained.

Defendant Mazda Motor Corporation (“Mazda Motor Corporation,”) has now

moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Taylor filed a response

to Mazda Motor Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Murrey does not take a

position regarding Mazda Motor Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Taylor,

subsequently, filed a Motion in The Alternative for Limited Jurisdictional Discovery

if the current factual record is insufficient to deny Mazda Motor Corporation’s

Motion to Dismiss. Defendant Mazda Motor Corporation filed an opposition to

Plaintiff Taylor’s Motion in The Alternative for Limited Jurisdictional Discovery.

2 Upon, review of Mazda Motor Corporation Motion to Dismiss, Mazda Motor

of America, Inc., Support of Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff Taylor’s response, Plaintiff

Taylor’s Motion in the Alternative for Limited Jurisdictional Discovery and Mazda

Motor Corporation’s response the Court DENIES Defendant Mazda Motor

Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS Plaintiff Taylor’s Motion for Limited Jurisdictional Discovery and will

allow Mazda Motor Corporation to move for Summary Judgement at the conclusion

of jurisdictional discovery if it chooses.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND On December 29, 2021, a car accident occurred in New Castle County,

Delaware. Plaintiff Taylor was driving a 2013 Mazda CX-5 automobile. Plaintiff

Taylor alleges Defendant Killen’s vehicle struck her stopped vehicle while she was

waiting to make a left turn. Plaintiff Taylor alleges the impact of Defendant Killen’s

vehicle propelled Plaintiff Taylor’s vehicle into Plaintiff Murray’s vehicle which was

allegedly stopped at the light on the opposite side of the road. Plaintiff Taylor alleges

Defendant Killen was acting as an employee of Defendant Talley Brothers, Inc., at

the time of the accident. Plaintiff Taylor alleges substantial injuries resulted from

this accident. Plaintiff Taylor alleges her Mazda CX-5 was designed and

manufactured by Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

Plaintiff Taylor asserts that Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor of America,

3 Inc., designed, built, tested, manufactured, sold, advertised, marketed, and

distributed the Mazda CX-5 vehicle equipped with a seat, headrest, and restraint

system that was allegedly defective, improperly designed, and not crashworthy.

Plaintiff Taylor alleges Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor of America,

Inc., negligently designed, constructed, tested, sold, advertised, marketed, and

distributed the seats that allegedly resulted in Plaintiff Taylors suffering from

exacerbated injuries.

Mazda Motor Corporation is a Japanese corporation that designs, creates,

controls, advertises, and employs a distribution system for the sale of motor vehicles

in Delaware and throughout the United States. Mazda Motor Corporation of

America, Inc., is a foreign corporation with a principal place of business in

California. Plaintiff Taylor alleges Mazda Motor of America, Inc., is a subsidiary of

Mazda Motor Corporation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears

the burden to make a prima facie showing that the defendant is amenable to the

jurisdiction of a Delaware court, pursuant to Delaware's long-arm statute.1 The Court

must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in

1 Boone v. Oy Partek Ab, 724 A.2d 1150, 1154 (Del.Super.1997). 4 favor of the plaintiff.2 Additionally, the Court is not limited to the pleadings and may

consider affidavits, briefs, and the results of discovery.3 The Court's first inquiry is

whether the long-arm statute confers jurisdiction.4 Then, if the statute applies, the

Court determines whether the exercise of jurisdiction is in accord with due process.5

Due process requires the Court to determine whether defendant has minimum

contacts with the forum state, and whether asserting personal jurisdiction comports

with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”6

If no evidentiary hearing has been held, Plaintiffs need only make a prima

facie showing, in the allegations of the complaint, of personal jurisdiction and the

record is construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.7

DISCUSSION

Delaware's long-arm statute lists six circumstances under which any

nonresident or personal representative thereof, who in person or through an agent, is

2 Id. at 1155; Aeroglobal Capital Management, LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 2003 WL 77007, *3 (Del. Super. Ct.). 3 Hartsel v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 2011 WL 2421003, *7 (Del. Ch.) aff'd, 38 A.3d 1254 (Del.2012) cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 32 (2012). 4 Trinity Logistics, Inc. v. Aurilius LLC, 2013 WL 1092133, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.). 5 Id. 6 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Boone, 724 at 1158. 7 Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 265 (Del.Ch.2007). 5 considered amenable to the jurisdiction of Delaware courts.8 The statute is “broadly

construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due

process clause.”9 Plaintiff Taylor argues that its claim against Mazda Motor

Corporation, a nonresident, is based on Mazda Motor Corporation’s various acts of

designing, creating, controlling, advertising, and employing a distribution system for

the sale of motor vehicles in Delaware and throughout the United States.

The Court finds that § 3104(c)(1) is most applicable to Plaintiff Taylor's

claims. Section 3104(c)(1) permits jurisdiction where a nonresident “[t]ransacts any

business or performs any character of work or service in the State”.10 An act on the

part of the defendant must have occurred in Delaware and the plaintiff's claims must

have arisen from that act.11 The statute is construed as a “single act” statute in which

only a single transaction or act is sufficient for jurisdiction over a claim arising out

of the conduct of “transacting business.”12 Where “a claim arises out of the

transaction of business or the non-performance of a contract, then this Court need

8 10 Del. C. §§ 3104(b) and 3014(c). 9 Aeroglobal Capital Management, LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 2003 WL 77007, *4 (Del. Super. Ct.). 10 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(2). 11 Boone, 724 A.2d at 1156. 12 Int'l Playtex, Inc. v. B & E Machinery Co., 1987 WL 17178, *2 (Del.Super.Ct.). 6 seek no other indicia of the defendant's activity in this state, but that contract or

transaction.”13

Plaintiff Taylor has not made a prima facie showing that this Court has

personal jurisdiction over Mazda Motor Corporation. Plaintiff Taylor argues that, by

designing, creating, controlling, advertising, and employing a distribution system for

the sale of motor vehicles in Delaware and throughout the United States, Mazda

Motor Corporation is subject to jurisdiction of this Court. The Court, however, finds

Plaintiff Taylor’s Second Amended Complaint failed to meet the burden established

in § 3104(c)(1) that Mazda Motor Corporation “transacted any business or

[performed]…work or service in the State [ of Delaware].”14

Alternatively, Plaintiff Taylor requests, this Court exercise its discretion to

reserve decision in order to grant Plaintiff Taylors’s reasonable opportunity to take

limited jurisdictional discovery as to Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor

of America, Inc.’s additional contacts with Delaware. Specifically, Plaintiff Taylor

requests: The topics of the discovery would likely include, without limitation:

The financial and corporate control that MMC exerts over MMOA; the income obtained by MMC from the activities of MMOA; the control that MMC exerts over MMOA’s daily business activities; the control MMC and MMOA exert over authorized dealerships in

13 Id. (citing LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., Inc., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del.1986)). 14 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(2). 7 Delaware; the revenue derived by MMC from the sales of their vehicles in Delaware; the indemnity agreements between MMC, MMOA, and authorized dealerships in Delaware; the exclusive distribution rights granted to MMOA by MMC; the extent of MMC’s involvement in and direction over MMOA’s marketing and distribution decisions; warranty coverage provided to customers who purchase MMC vehicles from dealerships in Delaware; the financial options provided to customers who purchase vehicles from dealerships in Delaware; and the recall of MMC products in Delaware.

It is true the Court may reserve decision in order to grant Plaintiff Taylor

reasonable opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery.15 Although the Court has

discretion to do so, the Court will not ordinarily preclude a plaintiff from conducting

reasonable discovery to aid a plaintiff in proffering a prima facie factual showing of

discovery.16 Accordingly, the Court will allow Plaintiff Taylor to conduct limited

discovery for the sole purpose of determining Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda

Motor of America, Inc.’s contacts with Delaware. Following the completion of

discovery, Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor of America, Inc., may move

for summary judgment if it so chooses.

Conclusion

15 Trinity Logistics, Inc. v. Aurilius LLC, No. 2013 WL 1092133, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct.) citing Hartsel v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 2011 WL 2421003, at *15 (Del. Ch.2011); Klita v. Cyclo3pss Corp., 1998 WL 749637, *4 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Hart Holding Co., Inc. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 593 A.2d 535, 539 (Del. Ch.1991). 16 Hart Holding Co., 593 A.2d at 539. 8 Based on the foregoing, Defendant Mazda Motor Corporation’s Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff

Shyneika Taylor’s Motion in the Alternative of Limited Jurisdictional Discovery is

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Calvin L. Scott Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.