Shushanna Hill-Becton v. MIA Aesthetics Clinic, LLC

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: 3D2025-0072
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 7, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-0072 Lower Tribunal No. 24-10823-CA-01 ________________

Shushanna Hill-Becton, Appellant,

vs.

MIA Aesthetics Clinic, LLC, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William Thomas, Judge.

Russomanno & Borrello, P.A., and Christopher Russomanno and Robert J. Borrello; Wasson & Associates, Chartered, and Roy D. Wasson, for appellant.

Falk, Waas, Hernandez, Solomon, Mendlestein & Davis, P.A., and Scott L. Mendlestein and Jessica M. Hernandez, for appellees MIA Aesthetics Clinic, LLC and Sol Plastic Surgery, LLC.

Before SCALES, C.J., and EMAS and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM.

Appellant Shushanna Hill-Becton, the plaintiff below, appeals a non-

final order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by the defendants

below, appellees Lauren M. Wright, D.O., Mia Aesthetics Clinic, LLC and Sol

Plastic Surgery, LLC. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(I).

“Courts must consider three elements when ruling on a motion to

compel arbitration: ‘(1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists;

(2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration

was waived.’” Lemos v. Sessa, 319 So. 3d 135, 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)

(quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999)). In this

appeal, as below, Hill-Becton challenges only the first element, claiming that

the parties do not have a valid agreement to arbitrate because the arbitration

provisions contained in the parties’ contract are purportedly unconscionable.

Because, on our de novo review,1 we agree with the trial court that Hill-

Becton failed to establish that the subject arbitration provisions are both

procedurally and substantively unconscionable, we affirm the challenged

1 See Concierge Auctions, LLC v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, LLC, 394 So. 3d 119, 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“Generally, we review de novo an order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration.”).

2 order that compels arbitration of Hill-Becton’s underlying claims. See M.P. v.

Guiribitey Cosmetic & Beauty Inst., Inc., 389 So. 3d 598, 603 (Fla. 3d DCA

2023) (“Florida case law provides concrete guidance as to the burden

assumed by a litigant seeking to avoid arbitration. The litigant must establish

both procedural and substantive unconscionability.”); SheddF2-FL3, LLC v.

Penthouse S., LLC, 314 So. 3d 403, 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“[B]ecause

there was absolutely no evidence of procedural unconscionability, the

Obligors’ claim of unconscionability fails as a matter of law.”); see also

Massage Envy Franchising, LLC v. Doe, 339 So. 3d 481, 484 (Fla. 5th DCA

2022) (“[A] clickwrap agreement occurs when a website directs a purchaser

or user to the terms and conditions of the sale and requires the user to click

a box to acknowledge that they have read those terms and conditions. These

agreements are generally enforceable.”).

Affirmed.2

2 We decline Hill-Becton’s invitation to decide, in the first instance, whether the contract’s arbitration provisions are violative of public policy. We express no opinion regarding this separate and distinct issue that the record reflects remains unadjudicated by, and pending in, the trial court.