Shultz v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation

315 F. Supp. 1323, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 553, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10782, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,296
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedJuly 28, 1970
DocketCiv. 67-258
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 315 F. Supp. 1323 (Shultz v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shultz v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 315 F. Supp. 1323, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 553, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10782, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,296 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).

Opinion

OPINION

ROBERT M. McRAE, District Judge.

This action was brought by the Secre- ' tary of Labor to enjoin Kimberly-Clark Corporation (hereinafter called employer) and the defendant unions from violating the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff charges that the employer has violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), which prohibits paying discriminatory wages on the basis of sex, and that the unions have violated 29 U. S.C. § 206(d)(2) by causing, or attempting to cause, the employer to discriminate in violation of § 206(d)(1). Plaintiff also seeks to restrain the employer from withholding payment of any wages due the employees as a result of the violation.

The applicable section of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) is as follows:

“No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex; Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.”

The Secretary of Labor alleges that the employer pays women less in fourteen separate jobs which require greater or “equal skill, effort and responsibility” than one or more of nine jobs formerly performed exclusively by men. The employer denies that the lower paying jobs are equal in skill, effort and responsibility performed under similar working conditions and further says that if they are equal within the meaning of the Act the exception set forth in (iv) applies in that the difference in pay is based upon factors other than sex, namely, job content.

*1325 If there is discrimination, the period to be considered for back pay commenced September 22, 1965, two years before the complaint was filed.

The employer produces paper products on a world-wide basis and has one of its sixty facilities located in Memphis, Tennessee. The Memphis Mill employs approximately 1500 people in all phases of its operations in a plant covering 37 acres. The instant suit concerns some of the 700 employees in the converting department of the Memphis Mill. Although other products are made in Memphis, the employees involved herein are concerned with the separate sections which produce Kotex feminine napkins, Kleenex facial tissue, Delsey bathroom tissue and table napkins.

The converting department receives the products which have been processed from pulp in the manufacturing section and are sent to the various converting department sections for further processing, in the form of cutting, folding and packaging. In the converting department the various products are packaged for retail sale or industrial use in boxes or see-through wrapping and further packaged in shipping cartons, which are fed on to a cross-mill conveyor belt which, in turn, transports them to the shipping department. Most of the processing in the converting department is done by machines, which the record shows are constantly being improved upon by the latest technology. 1 The employees are required variously to properly feed the machines with products, to observe the operation of the machines, to remove the products in process from the machines, to visually inspect the products and packaging and to pack manually some of the products in shipping cartons.

In addition to developing and acquiring machinery of varying intricacies, the employer must vary the production schedules continuously to meet the many demands of its customers. The employer uses over one hundred production codes in the Memphis mill. For example, Delsey Tissue is packaged in single rolls for commercial consumers, such as motels, in twin pack rolls with see-through wrappers for shipment in a variety of colors for resale in retail outlets; and, on other occasions, the production code calls for four or six roll packages. The Kotex product has even more variables in the individual product and its packaging. Facial tissue is varied by the size and color of the product and the quantity in a box. In addition, it is packaged in a small number of tissues in what is known as “Pocket Packs”. This requires an entirely different processing from the boxed facial tissue.

In June 1964, when the Equal Pay Act became effective for the employer, the operations of the employer had evolved over a period of many years by its needs and improved techniques, and by collective bargaining on an annual basis, to a set of job classifications based in the various product sections. Lines of progression based upon seniority by sections were established in the collective bargaining agreements.

Certain job classifications were exclusively for women and some were exclusively for men. In this evolutionary process the heavier duties in the plant, such as handling large rolls of products or large cartons, were assigned to men and the lighter jobs which permitted sitting for part of the time were assigned to women. This was partially motivated by the state laws regulating maximum working hours and working conditions for women. The rates of pay in the women’s jobs in the various sections were, for the most part, lower than the *1326 rates in the men’s jobs. For example, in the Feminine Napkin section there were eight different jobs in the men’s line of progression which varied in the hourly-rate of pay between $2.33 and $2.99 and, in the same section, there were seven different jobs in the women’s line of progression which varied from $2.24 to $2.37 per hour. Labor Agreement effective August 1, 1965 (Ex. to Answers to Plaintiff’s interrogatories filed January 19, 1968).

When the Labor Agreement which became effective August 1,1965, was negotiated, in addition to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been enacted. In early 1964 the Personnel Superintendent of the employer had surveyed and considered various job classifications and reported that the employer was not in violation of the Equal Pay Act (Tr. 1152). However, the separate lines of progression for men and women were realized to be a problem under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq., but no guidelines had been issued and the 1965 Labor Agreement was executed with job classifications similar to those of former years.

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Bluebook (online)
315 F. Supp. 1323, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 553, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10782, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,296, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shultz-v-kimberly-clark-corporation-tnwd-1970.