Shults v. Bartz

431 S.W.2d 416, 31 Oil & Gas Rep. 168, 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2876
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 2, 1968
Docket16956
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 431 S.W.2d 416 (Shults v. Bartz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shults v. Bartz, 431 S.W.2d 416, 31 Oil & Gas Rep. 168, 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2876 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).

Opinion

OPINION

. LANGDON, Justice.

The plaintiffs’ (appellees’) motion for summary judgment was granted in a trespass to try title suit to recover an undivided one-fourth (¾⅛) of all the oil, gas and other minerals in, on or under, and that may be produced from 1,029½ acres, more or less, in Parker County, Texas.

The pleadings of the defendants (appellants) contained a general denial, a plea of not guilty, the three, five, ten and twenty-five year statute, laches and stale demand. The exceptions to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as well as the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants were overruled.

The controlling question presented on appeal to this Court is whether or not the plaintiffs, or their predecessors in title, by either or both of two certain deeds, conveyed an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the minerals ? (It is conceded that a one-fourth (¼⅛) interest was conveyed.)

*417 The answer to this question depends upon the construction placed upon the following instruments:

(1) A mineral deed to H. H. Tucker,, jr>> Trustee, dated February 25, 1919. 1

*418 (2) A quit claim deed to H. H. Tucker, Jr., Trustee, dated March 18, 1950, executed by Mrs. S. R. Peters, “also known as Mrs. Jodie Peters,” a widow. 2

The following' facts are undisputed: S. R. Peters, also known as Sam R. Peters, is the common source of title to the lands involved and such lands were the community property of S. R. Peters and his wife, Mrs. S. R. Peters, also known as Jodie Peters and M. Jodie Peters.

S. R. Peters died intestate December 14, 1917, survived by his widow, Mrs. M. Jodie Peters, and four children. The names and ages of the children (in 1924) were: (1) Cora Peters Pincham (later Wor *419 cester), 38 years; (2) Mattie E. Tierce (wife of Millard L. Tierce), 27 years; (3) Marion F. Peters (wife Vyda Lowe Peters), 22 years; (4) Bernice L. Peters (later Bernice L. Rogers), 15 years.

Mrs. Peters applied for Community Administration, January 12, 1918, alleging inter alia the existence of community debts. She was duly appointed. Her bond in the amount of $44,296.90 and inventory was filed and approved and by order entered January 26, 1918, she was authorized to control, manage and dispose of said community estate.

The regularity of the proceedings pertaining to Mrs. Peters’ appointment and her qualification is unchallenged.

The appellants have launched a three pronged attack on the action of the trial court contending that (1) the 1919 deed from Mrs. S. R. Peters to H. H. Tucker, Jr., Trustee, on its face and under applicable rules of law, conveyed a full one-half interest in the minerals and not merely “one-half of one-half,” as contended by the appellees; (2) if the 1919 deed from Mrs. Peters to Tucker be held ambiguous, then the parties hereto, by their subsequent acts, have interpreted and construed it to convey a full one-half interest, and shown that it was their intention for the deed to convey a full one-half interest and ap-pellees are bound by such interpretation; and (3) the 1950 deed from Mrs. S. R. Peters to H. H. Tucker, Jr., Trustee, either alone or with the 1919 deed from the same grantor to the same grantee, conveyed a full one-half interest in the minerals; thereby leaving no title or interest in the heirs or estate of S. R. Peters (appellees) and appellees therefore are not entitled to recover.

Under part one of their attack the appellants are in effect contending that there is no ambiguity in the deed in question and under applicable rules of construction they are entitled to ,½ interest whereas the appellees are contending with equal vigor that the same deed conveyed only a one-fourth (!¼⅛) interest. This in itself, under the facts of this case, clearly indicate that the instrument in question is susceptible of more than one construction and thus is ambiguous. This conclusion is supported by an examination of the instruments themselves. Since in our opinion the instruments are ambiguous it follows that extrinsic evidence was admissible to determine the intention of the parties. Such evidence, including other instruments, was available and undoubtedly will shed some light upon the question. 19 Tex.Jur.2d 485, § 164, and authorities cited. See also Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 220, 301 S.W.2d 608.

We hold that the 1919 deed from Mrs. Peters to Tucker is ambiguous and that there is a fact question presented as to whether the parties thereto by subsequent acts have interpreted and construed the deed and thereby shown what they intended the deed to convey. This being a question of fact it was error for the court to grant the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

In 19 Tex.Jur.2d, page 420, Deeds, Sec. 121, the following principle is stated: “Where a party to a deed recites its effect, as he understands it, in another deed to a third person, the recital may be regarded as a practical construction, and entitled to great weight in determining the proper interpretation of the first deed.”

See also 23 Am.Jur.2d 217, Deeds, Sec. 171, on the same principle: “A deed which is ambiguous or uncertain may be made definite and certain by the practical construction of the parties to it while in interest. The construction put on such a deed by the parties is an indication of their intention, and to determine their construction the court may properly consider their subsequent acts and admissions. Great weight is to be given to the construction put upon an ambiguous or uncertain deed by the parties, especially in the case of doubtful questions which must be presumed to be within their knowledge, and such *420 practical interpretation of the parties themselves by their acts under a deed is entitled to great, if not controlling, influence.”

26 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 852, Deeds, Sec. 93 states: “Where a deed is ambiguous, subsequent acts of the parties, showing the construction they put on the instrument, are entitled to great weight in determining what the parties intended, and such construction may be deemed the true one, unless the contrary is shown.” Also see Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Reclamation Co., 58 S.W.2d 1082 (Fort Worth Civ.App., 1933, dism.); Lone Star Gas Co. v. X-Ray Gas Co., 139 Tex. 546, 164 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Sup., 1942); Webb v. British American Oil Producing Company, 281 S.W.2d 726 (Eastland Civ.App., 1955, ref. n. r. e.); Gulf Coast Water Co. v. Hamman Exploration Co., 160 S.W.2d 92 (Galveston Civ.App., 1942, writ ref.).

Reversed and remanded for trial.

RENFRO, J., not participating.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Payne v. Vinson
761 S.W.2d 474 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1988)
Cuevas v. Garcia
668 S.W.2d 897 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1984)
Coffield v. Shults
464 S.W.2d 947 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
431 S.W.2d 416, 31 Oil & Gas Rep. 168, 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shults-v-bartz-texapp-1968.